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The business record provisions of the Evidence Acts determine a record’s ad-
missibility by evidence of its history, which must be the product of “the usual and
ordinary course of business” (or comparable “business activity” wording). The
electronic record provisions determine a record’s admissibility by the, “integrity of
the electronic records system in which it is recorded or stored.” The difference is,
records management (RM) based on “paper records concepts” versus “electronic
records systems concepts.” The former is subjective — each business determines its
own “usual and ordinary course of business”; the latter, objective — in accor-
dance with authoritative standards of RM. Because of the many new laws that de-
mand and depend upon records, electronic RM is now a matter of “legal compli-
ance” and not merely good business practice. The business record provisions were
enacted when: (1) electronic records came from stand-alone mainframe computers
and not complex computer networks; (2) most of the present methods of, and rea-
sons for making false records and damaging RM systems did not exist; for example,
paper record systems cannot be damaged “remotely,” nor by software failures and
error rates; and, (3) objective, authoritatively recognized national and interna-
tional standards of electronic RM did not exist. The “usual and ordinary course of
business” test allows every business to choose its own principles and practices of
RM. Therefore it is now too subjective and vague to provide sufficient protection
against the use of unreliable records as evidence. The objective, standards-based
“system integrity” test must therefore become the sole test of admissibility and
“weight.” Or, the business record provisions be reinterpreted so as to judge RM
systems and not individual pieces of paper — an alteration perhaps more appropri-
ately left to the legislature. The American case law is used as a comparison. And
common electronic RM practices and defects are referred to because the admissi-
bility and “weight” of electronic business records should be interdisciplinary de-
terminations. That is what the “system integrity” of electronic RM requires. A list
of points made appears immediately before the Appendices.
* Ken Chasse, member of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario), and of the Law
Society of British Columbia, kchasse@fixy.org.
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I. THE PROBLEM — NO ADEQUATE ADMISSIBILITY TEST AND
ITS “DISCLOSURE” CONSEQUENCES
(a) “System integrity” versus “the usual and ordinary course of
business”
The electronic records provisions1 of the Evidence Acts put forward an “elec-
tronic records system integrity test.” It will be very effective when it has case law
providing definition, interpretation, and examples for its application. In contrast,
the “usual and ordinary course of business” test of the business record provisions is
now too weak to adequately guard against the use of unreliable electronic records
as evidence. Its “business activity” wording is an adaptation of an American
“model Act” wording enacted in Canada in 1969.2 It is inadequate for judging the
reliability of the records produced by a since-created sophisticated technology, far
beyond the 1969 stand-alone mainframe computers limited to the batch-processing
1 “Electronic records” means electronically-produced records, which includes almost all
records today. And “electronic” includes “optical” which refers to optical systems,
which operate on photons of light instead of flows of electrons. For example, the On-
tario Evidence Act (OEA), R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 34.1(1) states: “‘Electronic record’
means data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer system or
other similar device, that can be read or perceived by a person or a computer system or
other similar device, and includes a display, printout or other output of that data, other
than a printout referred to in subsection (6);“Section 34.1(6) OEA provides for the
“relied-upon printout.” See the references to the “relied-upon printout” in footnotes 35
and 134 infra, and accompanying text. “Data” is defined in the same section as: “repre-
sentations, in any form, of information or concepts.” The electronic record provisions
of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA) R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, are ss. 31.1 to 31.8. They are
reproduced in the table in Appendix C, along with those of the OEA, s. 34.1, the Al-
berta Evidence Act (AEA), R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, ss. 41.1 to 41.8, and the Nova Scotia
Evidence Act (NSEA), R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154, ss. 23A–23G. The Uniform Evidence Act
(UEEA), being a model Act produced by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada is
produced at the end of the table. It is the model Act used to draft the electronic records
provisions of these Evidence Acts. That is why they are so very similar across Canada.
2 For example, s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA) was enacted in 1969 (as s. 29A).
It, and its provincial counterparts were a reaction to the decision of the House of Lords
in, Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1964), [1965] A.C. 1001, [1964] 2 All
E.R. 881, 48 Cr. App. R. 348 (U.K. H.L.) [Myers]. It held that: (1) the common law
hearsay exception for business records was not able to admit an assembly line motor
vehicle registration record because its absent author couldn’t be proved to be dead; and,
(2) Parliament would have to legislate a solution. The Supreme Court of Canada dis-
agreed, simplifying and extending the common law business records exception to the
hearsay rule in Canada: Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608, 12 C.R.N.S. 349, 14 D.L.R.
(3d) 4 (S.C.C.) [Ares]. (See also note 21, infra.) Between these dates, the present “busi-
ness record provisions” were added to the Evidence Acts. The “usual and ordinary
course of business,” test, and the “circumstances of the making” test in the business
record provisions both came from the Uniform Evidence Act of 1953, which was a
“model Act” and not legislation. Section 63(13) used the phrase, “regular course of
business.” And therefore Rule 803(6) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence uses the
phrase, “in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.” I refer to these tests
collectively as “‘business activity’ tests of admissibility.”
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of records.
(b) RM (Records Management) Based Upon “Records Concepts,” and
Now “Systems Concepts”
In 1969 the following did not yet exist: word-processing, the personal com-
puter, laptops, the Internet, email, online services, computer networks, and all of
the many devices upon which electronic data is stored today. Electronic technology
was limited to functions that merely speeded-up the procedures of traditional “pa-
per-original” RM. Records were still paper-based or microfilm-based documents.
Electronic technology had not yet removed RM from its “records concept” founda-
tion. It hadn’t yet changed the fact that the reliability of a record is dependent upon
its own history and not that of the record system it comes from. Electronic technol-
ogy has given RM a fundamentally different foundation. The integrity of an elec-
tronically-produced record is dependent upon the integrity of the electronic records
system it comes from. A record is now a flow of electrons (or photons of light in an
optical system) and not a piece of paper or microfilm. By separating data (informa-
tion) from such “media of storage,” record integrity and reliability become “sys-
tems based.” And therefore, so must admissibility. For that reason, the electronic
records provisions of the Evidence Acts have a “system integrity” rule of admissi-
bility.3 And therefore those jurisdictions having only a business record provision,
such as British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, and U.S. Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(6) (FRE 803(6)), will have to give those provisions a “system integ-
rity” interpretation if they are to provide adequate protection against the use of un-
reliable records as evidence. But their “business activity” type of admissibility rule
is a subjective test that allows any poor quality records system to produce admissi-
ble records if such records are the product of the usual and ordinary course of “bus-
iness activity.” “Business activity” can no longer provide sufficient protection
against unreliable records being used as evidence, if it ever could. But their “cir-
cumstances of the making of the record” subsections can.4
3 Only the Evidence Acts of British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador do not
yet contain electronic record provisions. The B.C. Evidence Act does contain a business
record provision, but not that of Newfoundland and Labrador, or Alberta. Therefore the
Evidence Acts (or comparable legislation) of 12 of Canada’s 14 jurisdictions contain
electronic records provisions, and 12 of them contain business record provisions. The
business record exception to the hearsay rule at common law can be used with or with-
out a business record provision. Its admissibility test uses the words, “in the routine of
business,” which provides the historical base of the “business activity” type of business
record hearsay exception used in the Evidence Acts today.
4 For example, s. 30(6) CEA links the words, “the circumstances in which the informa-
tion contained in the record was written, recorded, stored or reproduced,” with its open-
ing words, “For the purpose of determining whether any provision of this section ap-
plies.” Therefore such “circumstances” of any record system can deny its records
admissibility. Such “circumstances” can be measured by and be accountable to authori-
tative standards of electronic records management. That provides good protection
against “bad” electronic RM, and expressly makes relevant in interpreting, “the usual
and ordinary course of business,” the features of “good” electronic RM. However, this
use of subsection 30(6) could be made clearer and stronger if its wording expressly
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In contrast to the “business activity” type of admissibility test, the word “sys-
tem” enables the “system integrity test” to be sufficiently flexible to cope with
every change in electronic technology applied to RM. The word “integrity” gives it
the objectivity and stability inherent in being measurable by and accountable to
national and international standards of electronic records management. That is why
the electronic records provisions expressly invite the use of standards in determin-
ing admissibility.5 As a result, “system integrity” is a very good test for determin-
ing admissibility.
But there are important questions to answer. For example, is “a system” the
whole of an organization’s electronic RM system? Or are the various departments
such as, imaging, payroll, and travel and accommodation expenses each “a sys-
tem”? Does it include the RM systems of all the branch offices, and does it also
depend upon how interdependent they are, or their command structure as to how
many chief records managers there are? At what point do corporate “mergers and
acquisitions” meld to produce one RM system? Is a breathalyzer machine an elec-
tronic RM system that produces expert opinion evidence? It does, and for more
than just the fact that its software is the product of expert opinions. The relatively
simple software of a typical breathalyzer machine has about 54,000 lines of code
having an average error rate of 2.5%, meaning 1,350 lines are vulnerable to error.6
The more sophisticated software can make discretionary “choice” decisions.
Should there be an “expert evidence” voir dire conducted for every printout? And
how to prove “integrity,” and what is it in regard to electronic RM? Does the error
rate of the software of a RM system determine its “system integrity”?
(c) Disclosure and Admissibility Are Interdependent
And how does one get “disclosure and discovery” of that if it isn’t in the po-
lice “investigative file”?7 Disclosure and admissibility are so intimately interdepen-
made it an “inclusionary” rule and not merely an “exclusionary” rule as it is now. A
similar subsection exists in the business record provisions of the provincial and territo-
rial Evidence Acts, but they expressly apply only to “weight” and not to admissibility.
That would have to be amended if they were to provide protection against the use of
unreliable electronic records as evidence.
5 See for example, s. 31.5 CEA, and s. 34.1(8) OEA. See Appendix C because it contains
the electronic records provisions of the CEA, OEA, the Alberta Evidence Act (AEA),
and the NSEA. For the National Standards of Canada, see infra notes 40, 53, 78, and
165, and accompanying text.
6 See notes 129–132 and accompanying text in, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in
the Criminal Court System” (2010) 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111 at 156-157.
7 As to the disclosure obligations upon the Crown prosecutor in relation to the “investi-
gative file,” see: R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, ¶42; R. v.
Shearing, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, 165 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 2 C.R. (6th) 213; R. v. Mills,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 28 C.R. (5th) 207, 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v.
O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1; R. v. Chap-
lin, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, 96 C.C.C. (3d) 225; R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1; R. v. Bjelland, [2009] S.C.J. No. 38, 2009 SCC
38. See also, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,”
(2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111.
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dent as to require that the “system integrity” concept of admissibility also dominate
disclosure.
“Your Honour, I bring this application for disclosure and production of the
‘source codes’ of the many varieties of software that drive the electronic records
management system from which the disclosure package comes, so that I might have
that software tested for its integrity and reliability. For otherwise Your Honour, the
Crown’s case can hide behind its printouts without opportunity of cross-examina-
tion nor fear of accountability to ‘full answer and defence’. The paper in the inves-
tigative file is but the end product of complex electronic technology applied to
records management. A technology tested to give accurate results only to the point
of being successfully marketable, and not to the point of being reliable beyond a
reasonable doubt. Without ‘disclosure and discovery’ of the software and the sys-
tem that produced those printouts, they have the dispositive power of an expert who
can adduce expert opinion evidence, but does not have to testify, nor prove suffi-
cient qualifications to give that opinion. That reverses the burden of proof and puts
in place a de facto presumption of guilt, and also removes the opportunity to make
full answer and defence.”
(d) Records Management Networks are Vulnerable Like Blood
Donation Networks
Paper record systems are physically separate such that they cannot infect or
otherwise damage one another except by the transfer of paper records one to the
other, and each such physical transfer cannot damage record systems around the
world. But electronic records systems are intimately and continuously connected
throughout the world such that they can all be infected and damaged disastrously in
seconds. Electronic communications and the records they create are a “vital but
vulnerable” foundation of our lives. They are as vulnerable as an international
blood donations network. Viruses, worms, and other maliciously destructive
software (“malware”) launched on the Internet, create electronic communications
technology’s “blood infections.” Therefore the reliability of the records they pro-
duce must be tested and protected with the same rigorous surveillance and regula-
tion as that applied to donations of blood. And so must “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” And with this “vital but vulnerable network” concept of our use of elec-
tronic technology for RM, the “evidence to the contrary” presumptions and other
reverse onus mechanisms of the electronic and business records provisions must be
scrutinized. To reverse the onus of proof so as to place a burden upon the party who
does not have access to, nor knowledge of the electronic records system whose
“system integrity” is at issue, is to defeat the purpose of the electronic records
provisions.
As lawyers and judges, we use sophisticated software and procedural security
to protect and guarantee the reliability of our own electronic files from being at-
tacked and corrupted by external and internal electronic operations and mischie-
vous “malware” and spam, but then we go into court to apply admissibility rules of
the weak “regular course of business activity” variety. They provide inadequate
protection against the use of unreliable electronic records as evidence. The incon-
sistency is ignored — the inconsistency between the standards we apply to our own
electronic RM systems, and that which we apply under the laws of evidence to
impose substantial changes upon the lives of litigants, particularly so the involun-
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tary litigants of the criminal courts. To say, “the Evidence Act rules,” is not a suffi-
cient answer when there are arguments above and below to make it rule differently.
The case law, beginning with the amendment of the Canada Evidence Act in 2000,
has produced no analysis yet of the electronic record provisions — no discussion of
their underlying “systems” concept, or of what “system integrity” means and its
proof requires. Therefore the disclosure and discovery case law won’t either. They
should go hand-in-hand. Both the admissibility and disclosure of records are now
dependent upon the efficacy of the “system integrity” concept to create and make
easy the “disclosure and discovery” of relevant records at the smallest time and
cost.
(e) US Case Law
The American case law is now struggling with the same problems, but in rela-
tion to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) (FRE 803(6)), which is also being used in
most states, or a provision similar to it, the FRE having been adopted as their state
codes of evidence. It is a business record provision being used for electronic
records. But like that in Canada, its case law provides no analysis yet of the con-
ceptual and consequential factual and legal differences between traditional and
electronic RM. Reading the American authorities in comparison, makes apparent
how important is the choice of issue and the definition given to each of the three
rules of admissibility for records: (1) the business record exception to the hearsay
rule; (2) the best evidence rule; and, (3) the authentication rule. Categorization of
an issue in some cases may have been guided more by the admissibility rule de-
sired, and less by the integrity of the categorization.
II. ISSUE CATEGORIZATION DETERMINES THE APPLICABLE
RULE OF ADMISSIBILITY
For example, in Canada, the authentication rule plays the minor role of requir-
ing proof of authorship and authority to publish, or otherwise make known, a state-
ment as that of the author. It is seldom invoked. In contrast, the following quotation
from a law journal article written by experienced authors defines the use of the
American authentication rule in terms that show it to be a test of the reliability of
the evidence adduced; (the following is stated in reference to the use of computer
animations and simulations):8
As referenced by the Insight Technology court,9 computer animations are
most often used by practitioners as demonstrative evidence, “to illustrate
and explain a witness’s testimony,” and to be admissible, must be “authenti-
8 Hon. Paul W. Grimm, (Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland), Michael V. Ziccardi, (the 2008-09 law clerk to
the Hon. Paul W. Grimm), Alexander W. Major, (a member of Venable LLP’s Com-
mercial Litigation group in Baltimore, Maryland, and part of the firm’s E-Discovery
Task Force), “Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and
New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information,” (2009), 42
Akron L. Rev. 357, at 378.
9 Insight Technology v. Surefire, LLC., Civ. No. 04-CV-74-JD, 2007 WL 3244092
at*2 (D.N.H. Nov. 1, 2007).
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cated by testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of the content of
the animation, upon a showing that it fairly and adequately portrays the
facts and that it will help to illustrate the testimony given in the case.” Such
a standard has been held to be applicable in both state and federal courts.
And if the hearsay exceptions are not demanding enough of the foundation
evidence for admissibility, one’s analysis can favour the use of the authentication
rule. For example, for the distinction between computer-stored evidence and com-
puter-generated evidence, the former can be left to some hearsay rule exception.
But the more complex and risky computer-generated evidence should perhaps be
submitted to the scrutiny of “authentication.” Consider this passage from the same
authors:10
Despite the analysis in Lorraine,11 the cases cited therein, and the authori-
ties referenced in this Article, not all courts are so quick to draw the admit-
tedly subtle distinction between computer-generated and computer-stored
statements for purposes of determining whether the records produced by the
computer are “statements” made by a “human declarant” for purposes of
application of the hearsay rule. . . . The take-away lesson from Lorraine’s
discussion of Rule 801(b)12 as it applies to electronic or digital evidence is
that adherence to the five step analysis the opinion describes will ensure that
the correct result is achieved — proper distinction between computer-stored
statements initiated by a human declarant, which are excluded unless cov-
ered by a hearsay exception, and computer-generated non-hearsay state-
ments, that are not admissible unless authenticated by showing that they
were generated by a system or process capable of producing a reliable
result.
It seems a dubious distinction given that humans provide everything that a
computer is, has, and does. Therefore their renderings are as subject to human
weaknesses as are humans themselves, whether producing computer-stored or com-
puter-generated statements. Both should be subject to the same rule of admissibility
(applied to suit each unique issue as to “truth of contents”), unless the time has
come to employ a new rule. That appears to be where the American case law is
now. This view is confirmed by the litigation and technology lawyer (attorney),
George L. Paul:13
However, in some cases, courts simply assume that computer-generated in-
10 Supra note 8 at 399-400.
11 Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). As
to the “five step analysis” this quotation refers to, the Lorraine decision states
five questions for determining admissibility (at 538): (1) relevance, (2) authenti-
cation, (3) not a hearsay issue or is it admissible hearsay, (4) the “best evidence”
rule, and (5) not unduly prejudicial. Using this “analysis” would not advance nor
enhance the law in Canada.
12 (U.S.) Federal Rule of Evidence 801(b): “A ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a
statement.”
13 George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence, (American Bar Association, 2008),
p. 119-20. The author is a partner and experienced trial lawyer in the Business Litiga-
tion Section of Lewis and Roca LLP in Phoenix, Arizona. His other books include, The
Authenticity Crises, The Discovery Revolution, and, Information Inflation: Can the Le-
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formation is hearsay, without performing an analysis, seemingly avoiding
the preliminary issue [of whether the information constitutes the “state-
ment” of a “human declarant”]. These courts analyze objections to admissi-
bility by searching for a hearsay exception, which they nearly always find.
And courts that hold that computer-generated information is hearsay often
complicate matters by using the term “computer-generated information”
loosely, lumping all evidence that comes from a computer together, and fail-
ing to focus on whether what is really at issue is computer-stored informa-
tion — often usually hearsay under anyone’s definition. For example, in
United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1493–95 (7th Cir. 1990) the court
considered computerized “telephone records [that] listed the telephone num-
bers, the names of the subscribers placing calls to, as well as the subscribers
receiving calls from, the three telephone numbers that were the subjects of
[a] DEA wiretap investigation, the date, time and length of the call” to be
hearsay, but did not parse which information, if any, was generated by a
computer. The court simply assumed that the collective evidence was hear-
say and analyzed the problem under the business records exception. [being
(U.S.) Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), reproduced in note 17 infra]
     This casual characterization of evidence coming from information sys-
tems renders the jurisprudence in the area somewhat murky. But, in many of
the cases where courts actually analyze the hearsay issue, computer-gener-
ated evidence is rendered nonhearsay following the Armistead rationale,14
reasoning that if you are not a human being, you cannot make a statement,
and therefore hearsay cannot be involved, as there is no statement involved.
. . . . .
     Now, regularity of preparation has become the key to admitting business
records, including records containing computer-generated information. And
if regularity is the test, almost any computer-generated information quali-
fies, without any showing of reliability. Accordingly, both the hearsay
rule — and the main exception used to test admissibility of statements of
information systems under it — become trivial, without any meaningful
competency determination by the court. The ability to exclude out-of-court
statements, the hearsay rule, appears to have largely evaporated with regard
to computer-generated information. Rather, in almost every case, all com-
puter evidence is admitted and things go to weight of the evidence. That
may be our final, preferred policy, after rule makers and thinkers address
this issue during the coming years, but in the meantime practitioners should
acknowledge the reality of where the law has drifted.
After describing the weaknesses of computer systems, Paul concludes that no
gal System Adapt? He has been active in several sections of the ABA and of the Ari-
zona State Bar concerning technology law and litigation.
14 State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983). The court held that a computer
printout of telephone traces was “computer-generated data,” and therefore not
hearsay because the computer had recorded the source of the incoming calls inde-
pendent of human activities. Therefore the court held the printout not to be a
“statement” within the meaning of the hearsay rule, the assertions not having
been made by a person.
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distinctions should be drawn among such systems. “Statements of information sys-
tems are therefore hearsay.”15 Then, under the heading, “There Must Be a New
Exception to the Hearsay Rule,” he states:16
But, notwithstanding their existence as hearsay, such statements will and
must be admitted into evidence. There are too many such statements, and
they are too important as evidence about our daily lives. Accordingly, there
must be a properly considered exception to the hearsay rule. The business
records exception is a creature of the mid-nineteenth century. But this prob-
lem is one of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first. It implicates
not a compendium of human-entered statements, like the shop books of old,
but the statements of information systems’ reading and writing games. We
need a new exception, or at least a consistent refinement to the closest one
we have, Rule 803(6). As discussed, this exception should probably be
called systems reliability.17
Accordingly, proponents of computer-generated information will need to lay a
foundation to qualify statements as reliable under a systems reliability exception.
Paul is thus calling for a new interpretation of a business record provision,
15 Supra note 13 at 145.
16 Ibid.
17 (U.S.) Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6):
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant
Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from infor-
mation transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that busi-
ness activity to make the memorandum, report, re-
cord, or data compilation, all as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or
by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless
the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit. [emphasis added]
Accordingly, proponents of com-
puter-generated information will
need to lay a foundation to qualify
statements as reliable under a sys-
tems reliability exception.
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FRE 803(6), to incorporate a “systems reliability” test. Then it would better handle
electronic records. Equally, that is the purpose of the, “system integrity” test.
In Canada, the “electronic records systems integrity test” of the electronic
records provisions of the federal, provincial, and territorial Evidence Acts can per-
form that same function, which is what it was designed to do.18 Therefore it must
be considered the prime test of admissibility, not just a way of satisfying a rule that
electronic technology has made useless — the best evidence rule. The latter should
be restricted to traditional, non-electronic records. It was born of the errors of hand-
copying from paper to paper; it should live to rule only there, separating the true
“true copies” from the not-so-true.
Therefore, for more than 20 years American commentators have been calling
for the abolition of the best evidence rule. For example, in 1992 the view that com-
puter technology has made the best evidence rule irrelevant was put forward by
Donald S. Skupsky, JD, C RM, an American lawyer, certified records manager, and
expert on computer-produced business records. For several years prior he had ar-
gued for substantial changes to the best evidence rule, if its repeal could not be
obtained. The following quotation from one of his articles is typical of other com-
mentaries as to the incompatibility of the best evidence rule with electronic records
as evidence:19
THE NEW BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The Best Evidence Rule needs immediate, radical changes. Any reference to
the original records or paper records as the best evidence should be ex-
cluded from both legal philosophy and law. The Best Evidence Rule should
be changed to indicate that accurate records, regardless of form, can be in-
troduced in evidence or used for regulatory purposes.
With the safeguards that can be built into today’s modern records technol-
ogy systems, the best evidence will not be the product of a particular tech-
nology but [the] result of a trustworthy process or system used to produce
the records. Rule 901(b)(9) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence [and FRE
901(b)(9)]20 reflects what should be the criteria for introducing records into
evidence. Under the title of “Identification and Authentication,” [“Rule 901.
Requirement of Authentication or Identification”] the rule establishes that
18 Only two of Canada’s 14 jurisdictions, British Columbia and Newfoundland and Lab-
rador, have yet to add electronic records provisions to the their “evidence” legislation.
Quebec has comparable provisions in its Civil Code of Quebec, Book Seven, “Evi-
dence,” particularly: Articles 2831–2842, 2859–2862, and 2869–2874, and, An Act to
Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology, R.S.Q., c. C-1.1, ss. 2 and
68.
Given that all jurisdictions (except for the Northwest Territories) have enacted elec-
tronic commerce legislation, they will need express rules as to the admissibility of elec-
tronic records — commerce needs such rules to enforce its laws and practices. See Ap-
pendix B below, “A List of Electronic Commerce Acts and Electronic Record
Provisions in the Evidence Acts in Canada.”
19 Donald S. Skupsky, The Best Evidence Rule is Dead . . . Except in the Mind of the
Law!, Records Management Quarterly, July 1992, 32–36, at 36, columns 2 and 3.
20 FRE 901(a), (b)(9) states:
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification
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records (or other evidence) can be admitted in evidence if the proponent
provides “evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.” This
definition remains independent of a bias towards originals, duplicates, or
any particular technology. The accuracy of the process or system used to
produce the result will determine the legal acceptance of the records.
The Association for Information and Image Management [AIIM] has estab-
lished a task force to prepare guidelines for the legal acceptance of records
technologies based upon the accuracy of the process or system used to pro-
duce the results rather than the specific technology used. While the ultimate
goal of this task force is to establish the guidelines for systems, the task
force also seeks to eliminate laws that specify a preference for one technol-
ogy or another. The findings of the task force clearly go contrary to the Best
Evidence Rule.
CONCLUSION
The preference for original records makes no sense at this time in our his-
tory. Paper records are not inherently more reliable than other forms of
records.
Paper records often result in the poorest, least accurate, and most unreliable
form of records. Fraud can readily be perpetuated in paper records systems
without a trace. Little or no sophistication is required to commit fraud since
security for records is rarely provided.
Modern records technology systems, on the other hand, may utilize sophisti-
cated equipment, establish procedures, audits, and other system components
to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the system. While fraud is still possi-
ble, systems safeguards make it improbable while audit trails track the
source of the problem.
Paper records are not best, but neither are records produced from modern
records technology systems. Each form of record must be viewed based
upon the accuracy of the process or system used to produce the record.
The time has come for the legal community to recognize that the Best Evi-
dence Rule is irrelevant when it shows a preference for original paper
records. The Best Evidence Rule is dead and has been dead for a long pe-
riod of time. It is now time for the legal community to awaken to this
reality.
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentica-
tion or identification as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not
by way of limitation, the following are examples of
authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing
a process or system used to produce a re-
sult and showing that the process or sys-
tem produces an accurate result.
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Unfortunately, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada chose otherwise for its
Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA), a “model Act” that was used to draft the
electronic record provisions. The “system integrity” admissibility test for electronic
records in the UEEA is worded as “satisfying the best evidence rule,” which is a
contradiction. (See the list below of the eight points of contradiction under the
heading, “5.(c) The Best Evidence Rule,” p. 137.)
III. THE DIVERGENCE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
PRACTICE FROM LEGAL THEORY UNDER THE BUSINESS
RECORD PROVISIONS OF THE EVIDENCE ACTS
The theory of the law’s reliance upon tests of admissibility and weight such
as, “the usual and ordinary course of business,” (s. 30(1) CEA (Canada Evidence
Act); s. 35(2) OEA (Ontario Evidence Act); s. 23 NSEA (Nova Scotia Evidence
Act))21 and, “the circumstances of the making of the record,” (s. 30(6) CEA; s.
35(4) OEA) is that it is always within a business’s self-interest and conducive to
the maximization of profit to maintain complete and accurate records. The need to
maximize profit is presumed to be an unfailing and sufficient guarantee of com-
plete and accurate records and RM systems, but in many situations now, incom-
plete and inaccurate records are necessary to minimize losses, which can be an
incentive as powerful as the profit motive, because:
(1) There are many more demands for production of records and informa-
tion by private litigants and government departments and regulatory
agencies than was the case when the theory, and the present law it sup-
ports, were created. Official agencies such as environmental, taxing, con-
sumer, labour and securities authorities have much greater and more fre-
quently used powers to force production of records, and disclosure of
21 This article cites throughout, the electronic records provisions of the Alberta, Nova
Scotia, Ontario, and Canada Evidence Acts (using the designations: AEA, NSEA,
OEA, and CEA). They are reproduced in the “Legislation Grid” in Appendix C below.
It is not feasible to cite all of the Evidence Acts from all 14 provinces, territories, and
the federal, Canada Evidence Act. The Alberta Evidence Act (like that of Newfound-
land and Labrador) contains no business record provision. Therefore the business
records exception to the hearsay rule at common law is relied upon. For the revised
definition of that exception in Canadian law, see: Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608,
12 C.R.N.S. 349, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4 (S.C.C.), and the case law it has generated. Hall J.,
delivering the judgment of the Court, defined the rule in the second last paragraph:
“Hospital records, including nurses’ notes, made contemporaneously by someone hav-
ing a personal knowledge of the matters then being recorded and under a duty to make
the entry or record should be received in evidence as prima facie proof of the facts
stated therein.”
See also the references to Ares and the common law exception in, Ken Chasse, “Elec-
tronic Records as Documentary Evidence” (2007), 6 Canadian Journal of Law and
Technology 141, and in, J. Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence In Canada (To-
ronto: Carswell (now Thomson Carswell), 1984), and for business records in general,
see the first three chapters, pp. 1–119. (Unfortunately Ewart’s book is “out of print.” In
spite of its age, it contains the best treatment of the law concerning non-electronic
records.)
ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC BUSINESS RECORDS   117
information, and to conduct their own assessments, and searches and
seizures under expanded legal powers. Such powers provide an incentive
to “losing” damaging and embarrassing records and information in one’s
own records system. Often it is more conducive to profit and avoidance
of loss to destroy or otherwise “lose” such records than to comply with
demands for their production, even though such “spoliation” can bring
severe penalties in legal proceedings, and in some jurisdictions it is a sep-
arate cause of action.22
(2) Often it is more important to corporate management to satisfy the
investors and the fate of the stock they hold than it is to secure a profit in
the marketplace. The income of senior management in public companies
is usually focused on the stock price and stock options because stock
price is often a basis for compensation and bonuses.
(3) The civil courts can be used to force production, disclosure, injunc-
tions restraining competitive activities, and to obtain “Anton Pillar Or-
ders,” the civil search warrant. Therefore “damaging” records will not be
left vulnerable to such processes.
(4) Many business, institutional, and government agencies have found
that they can carry on business even though they have sub-standard elec-
tronic records systems, which indicates profit incentives are insufficient
in themselves to produce high quality RM. (See the list of “common defi-
ciencies” below in section 4.)
(5) Charitable and other non-profit organizations do not use a profit mo-
tive as an inducement to high quality RM.
(6) Many large commercial organizations, once feeling secure in their
dominant position in the marketplace, take on a “social responsibility”
mission as an additional strategy for preserving their dominance, rather
than attempting to obtain optimum efficiency in pursuit of profit.
(7) Computer-to-computer transmission of data, both national and inter-
national, maximizes the weaknesses of electronic record systems because
it greatly reduces human supervision of the transmission and manipula-
tion of data, including the auditing of such systems for compliance with
the recognized principles and practices. For example, “just in time” in-
ventories, allowing manufacturers to maintain supplies only in sufficient
quantities for daily or weekly production, require great amounts of docu-
mentation as to orders, acceptances, and deliveries, the necessary volume
and speed of which dictate the use of computer-to-computer communica-
tions without human intervention.
(8) The use of several types of shared technology, such as “cloud com-
22 For a helpful analysis of the spoliation doctrine in Canada, along with a review of the
caselaw to 1998, see, Craig Jones, “The Spoliation Doctrine and Expert Evidence in
Civil Trials,” (1998), 32 U.B.C.L.Rev. 293–325.
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puting,”23 reduces the security one can apply to one’s electronic records
system. The efficiency and lower cost achieved, also means less control
of, and security for the system.
Such factors operate to undermine the ability of the profit motive and good
business practice as sufficient justification for the “usual and ordinary course of
business” test as being adequate for determining the admissibility of business
records.24 The business record provisions of the Evidence Acts are of dubious effi-
cacy in limiting admissible records to “good” records. Therefore admissibility
should require proof of good business practice in the management of records sys-
tems. But that is not what happens in court, neither in argument nor judgment.
What should counsel advise the records manager as to what to expect as to admissi-
bility, “weight,” and electronic discovery? Today, it’s better if the records manager
advises counsel.
And the many corporate scandals of recent years of the Enron and WorldCom
variety,25 and the resulting legislation of the (US) Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 kind,26
23 A definition of “cloud computing” can be found at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/
SNS/cloud-computing; and, http://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
The Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario) recently advertised to its members this
audio seminar concerning the “cloud”:
“Running a Virtual Law Office, November 15, 2010 12:00 p.m.–1:30 p.m.
“The virtual law office has moved from concept to reality. How can you connect an
iPhone, Blackberry, and notebook computer to a “cloud” and stay on top of your files?
What are the pitfalls of online backups and cloud storage? Learn about the possibilities
and the responsibilities regarding confidentiality and its intersection with technology.”
24 Applicable is the principle that, to justify the abandonment of a theory that is the foun-
dation of an evidentiary provision determinative of admissibility, it is not necessary to
show that it is no longer true in all, or even in most cases. It should be sufficient to
show that there are competing inducements to inaccurate records management that
make the current theory insufficient in itself to be determinative of admissibility.
25 See the Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Com.
26 A significant reform of corporate governance, disclosure and accounting practices in
the U.S. was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX” or, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745, enacted July 30, 2002) also known as the, Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002. It is a U.S. federal law enacted in response to a
number of major corporate and accounting scandals including, Enron, Tyco Interna-
tional, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems, and WoldCom. These scandals cost investors bil-
lions of dollars when the share prices of the affected companies collapsed and shook
confidence in the securities markets. SOX prescribes a comprehensive system of fed-
eral oversight relating to corporate governance and financial practices for companies
that have issued securities in U.S. public markets and that file reports with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). It is a complex piece of legislation
that was passed in response to the numerous, recent high-profile corporate and account-
ing scandals. The implications of SOX in the area of records management are
considerable.
SOX is one of a number of recent Acts that have brought effective records management
to the forefront of corporate concerns. CEOs and boards of directors now must imple-
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(enacted in many countries, and it influenced certification requirements and audit
committee standards in Canada27) indicate that the “profit motive” theory underly-
ment and constantly monitor records management programs to ensure their effective-
ness. Given the many high-profile incidents of records mismanagement, one area re-
ceiving attention from lawmakers is how companies manage, retain and destroy their
business records. SOX clearly holds companies and senior executives accountable,
which underscores the need for comprehensive retention and destruction policies for
documents and records generated by all participants in the corporate governance and
auditing process. The consequences of non-compliance can be as severe as the demise
of a company. For example, Arthur Andersen disappeared virtually overnight largely
due to its disregard and abuse of records management policies and procedures. The
U.S. Supreme Court exonerated the company on the question of criminal intent, but the
company had ceased to exist by then.
SOX introduces important new recordkeeping provisions and mandates retention re-
quirements for certain types of records. It also criminalizes and imposes severe penal-
ties on executives and employees who obstruct justice by destroying or tampering with
corporate accounting records. It creates a new federal crime for destruction, mutilation
or alteration of corporate records with the intent to impede or influence a government
investigation or other official proceeding or in relation to, or in contemplation of any
such matter or case. This provision expands upon previous laws relating to the destruc-
tion of records with a presumed intent to obstruct justice. Previously, the law required a
pending or imminent proceeding with a subpoena issued for the records that were de-
stroyed. Under SOX, the government can bring charges of obstruction of justice if a
company destroys potentially relevant records even before a subpoena is issued. In ad-
dition, it specifies minimum retention periods for auditor’s work papers, correspon-
dence, and other records that contain analyses, opinions, conclusions, financial data, or
other information about corporate audits. SOX also creates an oversight board with
broad authority to subpoena records produced by public accounting firms and their
clients.
Prosecutions under SOX have been plentiful and the consequences severe. For exam-
ple, in September 2004 Frank Quattrone, the most prominent investment banker of the
1990s “tech boom,” was fined $90,000 and sentenced to 18 months prison and two
years probation after being convicted of obstruction of justice. The charges brought
against Quattrone appeared to be relatively minor. Prosecutors accused him of trying to
block investigations when he forwarded an e-mail urging colleagues to “clean up their
files.”
27 In Canada, Bill 198, enacted by the Ontario legislature, protects investors by encourag-
ing the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. It came into effect on Decem-
ber 31, 2005 as Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act. It created a statutory civil
liability regime for misleading and inadequate disclosure by public issuers. For an anal-
ysis of Bill 198, see: Philip Anisman and Garry Watson, “Some Comparisons between
Class Actions in Canada and the U.S.: Securities Class Actions, Certification, and
Costs” (2006), 3 Canadian Class Action Review 467; see also: Philip Anisman, “Com-
ments on Class Proceedings, Securities Market Liability and the CSA Proposal” in Se-
lected Topics in Corporate Litigation: Queen’s Annual Business Law Symposium, 2000
113 (Queen’s University, Kingston Ontario, 2001).
Also, Canadian securities regulators adopted SOX-influenced certification require-
ments and audit committee standards and supervision in rules made under the securities
laws. See the Ontario Securities Commission’s website for National Instruments (rules)
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ing the “usual and ordinary course of business” test is no longer a reliable guaran-
tee of record accuracy and RM integrity.28
However, the “system integrity test” of the electronic records provisions (s.
34.1 OEA; ss. 41.1–41.8 AEA; s. 23D NSEA, and, ss. 31.1–31.8 CEA), can sup-
port an alternative application of the existing “admissibility” provisions.29 No
change need be made to their underlying “systems integrity” concept and test of
admissibility (a record is no better than the system it comes from), but for consis-
tency of terminology, the language of “best evidence” should be replaced with that
of an “authentication” rule of the American variety.30 It could be applied as an
expanded “authentication” provision even though it labels itself as a “best evidence
rule” provision. Given the frequency of software defects and failures, and an ab-
sence of a recognized and independent certification process for software and elec-
52-108 (auditor oversight), 52-109 (certification of financial statements and other dis-
closure obligations, and CP 52-109), and 52-110 (and CP52-110, on audit committees).
Staff compliance review reports can also be found on the OSC’s website. Therefore in
Canada, as in the U.S., records management has now expanded from an important busi-
ness process to a very important matter of “legal compliance.”
28 Again, to justify the abandonment of a theory that is the foundation of an evidentiary
provision determinative of admissibility, it is not necessary to show that it is no longer
true in all, or even in most cases. It should be sufficient to show that there are compet-
ing inducements to inaccurate RM that make the current theory insufficient in itself to
be determinative of admissibility.
29 The “system integrity test” is a shortform reference to these operative words in the
electronic record provisions: “The integrity of the electronic record may be proved by
evidence of the integrity of the electronic records system by or in which the data was
recorded or stored, . . ..” (s. 23D(1) NSEA; s. 34.1(5.1) OEA; s. 41.4(2) AEA). Section
31.2(1) CEA has a very similar wording: “The best evidence rule in respect of an elec-
tronic document is satisfied (a) on proof of the integrity of the electronic documents
system by or in which the electronic document was recorded or stored, . . ..” Section
23D(1) NSEA: “In any legal proceeding, subject to subsection (2), where the best evi-
dence rule is applicable in respect of an electronic record, the rule is satisfied on proof
of the integrity of the electronic records system in or by which the data was recorded or
store.” Section 23D(2) NSEA defines the “relied-upon printout”; see note 1, supra, and
notes 35, 134 and 142 infra. And see the electronic record provisions in Appendix C,
below, p. 178.
30 See for example, In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 2005 WL 3609376 (9th Cir. BAP
Cal. 2005); and, George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence (American Bar As-
sociation, 2008), Ch. 8, “The New Foundation of System Reliability,” pp. 131–150. In
Vinhnee (“filed” (released) Dec. 16, 2005), American Express credit card records were
rejected for reasons that established a new and more detailed test of authenticity, and
therefore better foundation evidence required for (U.S.) Federal Rule of Evidence
(“FRE”) 803(6) supra note 17, the business record provision under which the admissi-
bility of electronic and non-electronic business records is determined. See the text ac-
companying notes 56–68 infra. It is concluded below that Canadian courts can simi-
larly refurbish the business record provisions of the Evidence Acts in Canada to a badly
needed increased efficacy.
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tronic devices in general, such has practical and even necessary use.31
At present, the admissibility of electronic business records is determined by
satisfying two sets of provisions. If a “hearsay” challenge is raised, the business
record provisions are applied (s. 42 BCEA; s. 35 OEA; s. 23 NSEA; s. 30 CEA).32
If in addition, a “best evidence rule” challenge is raised, the electronic record provi-
sions are also applied. However, business records that have never been in electronic
form (e.g., paper records still in their “native” form, and those on traditional, pre-
computer-driven microfilm) have to satisfy only the business record provisions. In
the interests of trial efficiency, and simplifying preparation for trial, they should
have been legislated into one provision.
In determining the admissibility of a business record that is an electronically
recorded or stored record, one recent decision implies that the applicable business
record provisions are to be satisfied first, and then the applicable electronic record
provisions as well.33 What is proposed here would require the reverse order, i.e.,
the “authenticating” function of the electronic record provisions would be applied
first, followed by an examination of the adduced record for compliance with the
31 Examples of recognized and authoritative certification processes are: (1) the Criminal
Code’s Alcohol Test Committee which certifies various makes and models of
breathalyzer and intoxilyzer machines for use in relation to the impaired driving and
“over 80” provisions (Can. Reg. SI/85-201 re s. 258 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46), and the “approved roadside screening devices” (Can. Reg. SI/85-200 re
s. 254) and, (2) the Part 1, “Personal Information Protection” provisions of PIPEDA
(the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5),
s. 5 of which makes mandatory the application of the Principles set out in the National
Standard of Canada entitled Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information,
CAN/CSA-Q830-96 in Schedule 1 of the Act. And the following Quebec statute should
be enacted as well in the other 13 jurisdictions of Canada, An Act to Establish a Legal
Framework for Information Technology R.S.Q., 2001, c. C-1.1, in particular ss. 8 and
68 concerning the certifying of technology. This Act is Quebec’s electronic commerce
legislation, which serves the same purpose as e.g., Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act,
2000, S.O. 2000, c. 17, and B.C.’s Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10. As
to software failures in general and defects in relation to breathalyzer and intoxilyzer
machines in particular, see: Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court
System,” (2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111, at 153–165.
32 “Hearsay” means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted within it, but made otherwise than in testimony at the proceeding in which it is
offered: R. v. O’Brien, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 591 at 593-94; (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 209 at
211 (S.C.C.).
33 See R. v. Morgan (January 10, 2002), [2002] N.J. No. 15 at ¶¶6, and 20 to 27, Flynn
Prov. J. (N.L. Prov. Ct.). Morgan was charged with violating a fishing licence condi-
tion. A Crown witness tendered a computer generated copy of the fishing license and
its conditions, and produced two affidavits attested to by the Acting Licensing Admin-
istration. Flynn, Prov’l. Ct. J., held that the electronic record provisions of the Canada
Evidence Act cannot by themselves admit a document into evidence. Admissibility
must be found by way of some other rule such as the business record provisions of s.
30 CEA. The electronic record provisions merely answer any objection based upon the
best evidence rule. Note that subsections 31.2(1) and (2) CEA were accepted as being
alternative means of answering such objections.
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business record provisions. “Authentication” of an adduced record would require
proof that it has been recorded or stored in or by an electronic record system having
the required “systems integrity.”
Also, electronic technology has blurred the distinction between “hearsay” is-
sues and “best evidence rule” issues. It has made possible the separation of “data”
from its “medium of storage” (e.g., to read words and numbers, and to file and store
them, they no longer have to be on a piece of paper or microfilm). Therefore in
order to preserve (unnecessarily) the “best evidence rule,” the electronic record pro-
visions have had to redefine it as being the exact opposite of its traditional defini-
tion,34 i.e. an “original” is now the last produced record and not the first produced
record.35 In regard to electronically-produced records, the “best evidence rule”
should be repealed.
If, for example, a software failure casts doubt upon the truth of the contents of
a printout, does that create a hearsay rule issue or a best evidence rule issue? “Truth
of contents” issues are hearsay rule issues. But the electronic record provisions ex-
pressly treat electronic record systems and their printouts as creating best evidence
rule issues — a printout is thus a “copy” of its electronic (“digital”) source. Is the
necessary answer that the hearsay rule applies to the declarations of human beings
and not to those of electronic devices and the record systems that contain them? If
it is not a hearsay rule issue, what is it? Perhaps therefore it is more correct to
consider such as being the declarations of humans because it is humans who set
such electronic systems in motion to make such declarations? The answer should
be, “It doesn’t matter how such issues are categorized!” The software failure has
34 The traditional best evidence rule states that where a fact or event is to be proved by
means of a document or other recording, the “original” of such document or recording
must be used unless an adequate explanation can be given for the absence of the
original: R. v. Cotroni, 1979 CarswellOnt 78, 1979 CarswellOnt 48, [1979] S.C.J. No.
47, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, 45 C.C.C. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); Papalia v. R., [1979] S.C.J. No. 47,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 256, 45 C.C.C.(2d) 1.
35 The wording of the subsections that establish the “‘system integrity’ admissibility test”
created by the electronic record provisions shows that the best evidence rule is recast to
focus on the end product of the electronic information processing chain, rather than
upon the first recording of information upon an “original” document. Electronic tech-
nology as applied to RM makes that necessary if one insists on perpetuating the best
evidence rule from the paper into the electronic record world. Section 34.1(5) OEA
states: “Subject to subsection (6), [the “relied upon printout” provision] where the best
evidence rule is applicable in respect of an electronic record, it is satisfied on proof of
the integrity of the electronic record.” And s. 34.1(5.1) OEA states: “The integrity of
the electronic record may be proved by evidence of the electronic record system by or
in which the data was recorded or stored. . ..” Section 31.1(1) CEA states: “The best
evidence rule in respect of an electronic document is satisfied (a) on proof of the integ-
rity of the electronic documents system by or in which the electronic document was
recorded or stored, or (b) if an evidentiary presumption established under section 31.4
applies.” Section 31.4 CEA provides for the making of regulations to establish eviden-
tiary presumptions in relation to electronic documents signed with secure electronic
signatures.
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cast doubt upon the credibility of the contents of its printout.36 The technology
requires that the distinction between hearsay rule and best evidence rule issues be
replaced by one concept, the reliability of electronic records. The required admissi-
bility test will dictate the foundation evidence proving a sufficient guarantee of
reliability. The electronic record provisions can provide that test. Then, the busi-
ness record provisions must be removed or used to supplement that test.
IV. THE COMMON DEFECTS OF RM SYSTEMS AFFECT
ADMISSIBILITY AND “WEIGHT”
The credibility of any part of a record system can be decisively damaged by
defects in its other parts — “decisively,” meaning the inadmissibility of any of its
records when adduced as evidence. The “system integrity test” of the electronic
record provisions (s. 34.1(5.1) OEA; s. 41.4(1), (2) AEA; s. 23D NSEA; s.
31.2(1)(a) CEA)37 determines the admissibility of an electronic record by judging
the “integrity” of the complete electronic records system, not just any particular
part. However, those provisions also invite the use of recognized standards in aid of
determining admissibility (s. 41.6 AEA, s. 23F NSEA, s. 34.1(8) OEA; s. 31.5
CEA).38 Therefore the National Standards of Canada, Electronic Records As Docu-
mentary Evidence CAN/CGSB 72.34 (“72.34”), and Microfilm and Electronic
Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB 72.11-93 (“72.11”) must be ap-
36 The divergence between the theory and practice of the business record provisions is
further analyzed in, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records As Documentary Evidence,”
(2007), 6 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 141 at 150-51 (issue 3, November,
2007); and, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010),
14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111.
37 This article contains several analytical references to the electronic records provisions of
the Alberta Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, ss. 41.1–41.8 (AEA), the Evidence Act
(Nova Scotia), R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154 (NSEA), the Evidence Act (Ontario), R.S.O.
1990, c. E.23, 34.1 (OEA), and to the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, ss.
31.1–31.8 (CEA). See Appendix C below. Note that the OEA, AEA, and NSEA provi-
sions use the terms, “electronic record” and “electronic records system”; the CEA uses,
“electronic document” and “electronic documents system.” Prior to “proclaiming in
force” the CEA provisions in 2000, “document” meant a paper record (an electronic
record printed out on paper). Now greater attention must be given to context because
“record” and “document” will be used interchangeably because of this transgression in
legislative drafting.
38 Without such reference to the relevance of standards, the use of the vague word “integ-
rity,” which is unprecedented in Canadian “admissibility” legislation, could make the
electronic record provisions vulnerable to a “void for vagueness” attack. Standards,
such as those cited above, provide sufficiently detailed principles and practices of RM
so as to give the “system integrity test” a sufficient definition and ease of application
that takes the electronic record provisions well beyond the realm of being “vague.”
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plied.39 They have been developed by the Canadian General Standards Board.40
They provide rules and procedures for RM with which to satisfy the tests and their
undefined phrases in the Evidence Acts. They are based upon a “systems” concept
of RM, as is RM itself.
There is no law specifically requiring compliance with these two standards as
mandatory requirements of admissibility. But because they have been approved and
promulgated by the Standards Council of Canada, and developed in accordance
with the standards-development procedure required by the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization in Geneva Switzerland (the ISO), they should be consid-
ered mandatory requirements. There is no competing standard or court decision.
And, what is one’s answer when accused of not being in compliance with such
authoritatively recognized standards? Non-compliance will be taken as an absence
of “system integrity.”
A particularly important requirement of these standards is the “Prime Direc-
tive,” which states (quoting 72.34): “An organization shall always be ready to pro-
duce its records as evidence.”41 Failure to comply will risk a presumption of a lack
of “system integrity.”
As a truly objective test of undifferentiated application (unlike the very sub-
jective “usual and ordinary course of business” test) the “system integrity” test
should mean that a record system either has that essential “integrity” or it doesn’t.
A test is to be applied to the whole of a RM system, not just to parts of it. That
interpretation of the test does not allow for admissibility obtained by proving the
39 See Appendix A, p. 174 “Summary of RM system compliance standards established by
the National Standard of Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence
CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005 (“72.34”).
40 For example, in regard to 72.34: “CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005” is its designation in Can-
ada’s National Standards System, which states that it is standard “72.34,” (its shortform
reference) developed by the Canadian General Standards Board (the CGSB), and ap-
proved in 2005 by the Standards Council of Canada, the coordinating body of the Sys-
tem. National Standards of Canada are written by standards-development agencies ac-
credited by the Standards Council of Canada. Draft standards are submitted to the
Council for its approval, and then published by the development agency. The Council’s
function is to ensure that the formal, established process for developing standards has
been followed. On acceptance by the Council, they become National Standards of Can-
ada. The national standards cited herein are those of the Canadian General Standards
Board (CGSB), particularly, its newest electronic records standard, Electronic Records
as Documentary Evidence-CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005, and its narrower predecessor, Mi-
crofilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence-CAN/CGSB-72.11-93
(amended to April 2000). These standards are the work of committees composed of
experts from the records and information management field, including legal advisors.
They have been recognized by the ISO, the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion in Geneva, Switzerland. The CGSB, a government agency within Public Works
and Government Services Canada, has been accredited by the Standards Council of
Canada as a national standards-development organization. The process by which such
national standards are created and maintained in Canada is described within the Stan-
dard itself and on the CGSB’s website (see, “Standards Development”), from which
website these standards may be obtained, online: <www.ongc-cgsb.gc.ca.>.
41 Clause 5.4.3c at p. 17 of 72.34, and subsection 4.1.2 at p. 21 of 72.11.
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“integrity” of only a particular part of a record system, even if the contents of a
record adduced as evidence were directly affected by only a part. The test being a
“system” test, there can be no valid argument that the sub-standard quality of other
parts of the RM system not directly related to the production of the records in ques-
tion are irrelevant.
No matter how good any one part of an electronic records system is from both
a RM and legal point of view, in regard to legal proceedings its credibility and
ability to satisfy the “system integrity test” is vulnerable to the defects in any other
part of the RM system. Doubt cast upon a part casts doubt upon the whole. That
will be the strategy for opposing the use of records as evidence — exploit a defect
in any part of the RM system to defeat the records adduced from any other part of
the system. Like the credibility of a witness as to sincerity, the “system integrity”
of a RM system is a seamless whole. Therefore a legal opinion about a part of a
RM system in relation to legal proceedings, must caution about the relevance of
other parts of the system to issues concerning the admissibility and weight of
records as evidence, and as to the requirements of electronic discovery. Therefore,
the definition as to what is a “system” is critical to admissibility. Does an organiza-
tion have one or many electronic records systems? Each separate “system” will
have to comply with all of the requirements of the National Standards of Canada
and not only the whole of an organization’s records systems. Therefore it might
facilitate the admissibility of records to operate the specialized RM functions by
which they were recorded or stored as being part of one RM system. Deciding what
is the scope, jurisdiction, and function of an RM system can be a complex question
of fact without law that provides criteria for ascertaining whether an organization
has one or many systems. And, given the complex world wide web of RM system
connections and communications of data, case law is needed for determining
whether a particular record is the product of one more RM systems.
For example, the “integrity” of a high quality imaging system will be harder to
prove if opposing counsel can show that, in that same electronic records system: (1)
email messages are not preserved and there is no email protocol regulating them as
business records subject to RM system requirements; (2) there is no RM procedures
manual as required by the National Standards of Canada; (3) the extent of records
holdings is not known; (4) RM bylaws and orders from senior management are
inadequate and (5) those that do exist are not complied with; (6) summaries and
recordings of video, audio, and text communications are not made part of the RM
system; and, (7) the “usual and ordinary course of business” in regard to RM is
determined in a piecemeal, informal, and ad hoc fashion by various records officers
as needs arise.
But, given the great capacity and flexibility of movement and manipulation
provided by electronic RM, that has to be the rule and interpretation of “system
integrity” — like human character and credibility, it is “of one piece” and not to be
segmented into “good and bad” pieces, parts, and purposes.42 Once possible to
move and manipulate data (information) without a physical medium of storage such
as paper and microfilm, anything can be done to and with it. That is why electronic
42 I use “electronic RM” in its widest sense to include optical and other digitized systems
of manipulating and creating records.
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records must be judged by the practice and reputation of the system they come
from, and not simply by their own history, as is the case with the “usual and ordi-
nary course of business” test of s. 30 CEA, 35 OEA, s. 42 BCEA, and s. 23 NSEA.
And apart from the needs of litigation, the same applies to the requirements of
all legislation dependent upon high quality RM, e.g., legislation concerning elec-
tronic commerce,43 personal information protection and privacy,44 electronic dis-
covery,45 and the records requirements of government departments and agencies.46
A failure to satisfy the requirements of one will likely mean, and signal, a failure to
satisfy all. Sharing a common “electronic RM foundation,” they have a close inter-
dependence and consequent failure.
The alternative interpretation of the “system integrity test,” that it need be sat-
isfied only in relation to those parts of an electronic records system that affected the
record adduced as evidence and not all parts of the system is impractical. The con-
cept is “systems integrity”; not, “part system integrity,” and data can be too easily
and inaccountably be moved throughout a system. And because one cannot know
what future cases will demand of a record system, it is dangerous as well as im-
practical to leave the maintenance and updating of a system, or a part of it, until
particular records are required. Alterations made “in contemplation of litigation”
undermine the credibility of the entire system. They raise an inference that the sys-
tem lacked the necessary “integrity” before such alterations. Also, such alterations
and the records they produce would not be made “in the usual and ordinary course
of business.” Therefore such alterations would most likely result in a failure to sat-
isfy both the electronic record and business record provisions of the Evidence Acts.
That is one of the reasons why “the Prime Directive” of the National Standards of
43 For example, Ontario’s Electronic Commerce Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 17, and B.C.’s
Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10.
44 For example, Part 1, “Personal Information Protection,” of the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), S.C. 2000, c. 5, which applies
within provincial legislative jurisdiction as well as federal, until a province enacts its
own personal information protection Act (a PIPA”), which displaces it in the provincial
sphere. B.C., Alberta, and Quebec are the only provinces that have done so.
45 For example, Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 29.1.03(4).
46 For example, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) informs the public of its polices and
procedures by means, among others, of its Information Circulars (IC’s), and GST
Memoranda. In particular, see: IC05-1, dated June 2010, entitled, Electronic Record
Keeping, paragraphs 24, 26 and 28. Note that use of the national standard cited in para-
graph 26, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-
72.11-93 is mandatory for, “Imaging and microfilm (including microfiche) reproduc-
tions of books of original entry and source documents . . ..” Paragraph 24 recommends
the use of the newer national standard, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence
CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005, “To ensure the reliability, integrity and authenticity of elec-
tronic records.” However, if this newer standard is given the same treatment by CRA as
the older standard, it will soon be mandatory as well. And similar statements appear in
the GST Memoranda, Computerized Records 500-1-2, Books and Records 500-1.
IC05-1. Electronic Record Keeping, concludes with the note, “Most Canada Revenue
Agency publications are available on the CRA web site www.cra.gc.ca under the head-
ing ‘Forms and Publications.’”
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Canada cited herein47 states, “an organization should always be prepared to pro-
duce its records as evidence.” (Clause 5.4.3c of, Electronic Records as Documen-
tary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005 (p. 17); and, paragraph 4.1.2 of, Microfilm
and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-93 p. 21).
Compliance with “the Prime Directive” is a substantial part of compliance with the
whole of the National Standards of Canada.
But what if all RM systems, as with some lawyers, are not thoroughly perfect
practitioners; can they still claim to have the necessary “system integrity”? If, (1)
the business record provisions can no longer provide adequate protection against
the use of unreliable records as evidence, and, (2) there are many serious defects in
RM practice that are very commonly found, then the “system integrity test” is
badly needed, and needed to be the dominant test of admissibility if not the sole test
thereof.
Serious defects in the management of electronic records systems are common
even in the best of organizations. Each can taint the “system integrity” of the whole
system. Among the most common, routinely found in the systems of large organi-
zations, including those of government departments and agencies, universities, util-
ities, and commercial organizations are these:48
• the extent of the records holdings is not known;
• records are not properly classified nor indexed such that retrieval of
records relevant to any particular subject is very difficult if not
impossible;
• no definitive classification system among institutional, transitory, and
personal records (e.g., which research and business records are those of
each professor, and which are those of the university?);
• no records manual, or one that isn’t kept current, or is not complied with;
• no bylaws (or orders of comparable authority from senior management)
dealing with the records system — essential for establishing an organiza-
tion’s “usual and ordinary course of business” in regard to its records
system;
• email is not classified, indexed nor pruned, or possibly not retained; there
is no “email protocol” operative throughout the organization;
• records repositories are not well defined nor centrally accessible;
• no central policy for records management thus allowing the many divi-
sions of the organization each to operate its own independent records sys-
tem according to its own rules and practices;
• original paper records are not disposed of after being put into digital stor-
age in a secure records management environment (with the exception of
industry, professional, or special legal requirements as to retaining desig-
nated originals);
47 Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48 This list of defects comes from the records management experts I work with on
projects concerning the maintenance, alteration, and updating of large electronic
records systems.
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• image quality is not verified when original paper records are converted to
electronic images, and there is no imaging manual dealing with the tech-
nical requirements for scanning paper records into electronic storage;
• metadata (data about data — data as to the management of records
through time) is not used, therefore the biographical and bibliographical
information about records is not used and properly maintained, therefore,
e.g., there are extensive duplicates and an inability to track official or
original versions;
• no audit trails or controls detailing deletions, i.e., when, who, by what
retention-destruction/disposal authority?;
• no clear definition and practice as to what is the “deletion” of a record
such that, e.g., records may or may not continue to exist in backup stor-
age thus diminishing knowledge of the extent of records holdings and
their control;
• changes in technology result in unaccounted for and undocumented
changes in records practice;
• no consistent practice as to other forms of communication that create
records, e.g., video and audio recordings, instant messaging, cellphone
(mobile) communications;
• no “retention and disposal” program for records lifecycles;
• years after a merger or acquisition, the records system is still operating
according to the conflicting rules of its component parts;
• no chief records officer with clearly defined and adequate authority;
• “orphaned data,” i.e., records that can no longer be retrieved or read be-
cause the new technology that now operates the records system is incom-
patible with the old technology that created those records (a “migration
program” should accompany the installation of new technology);
• poor security protection;49
49 The ninth point of proof specified in the National Standard of Canada, Electronic
Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005 (supra, note 40 and ac-
companying text) section 5.5 states:
i) security — security procedures are in place to protect the integrity of
the records management system; at least the following should be able
to be proved:
1. protection against unauthorized access to data and per-
manent records;
2. processing verification of data and information in
records;
3. safeguarding of communications lines;
4. maintenance of backup copies of records to replace falsi-
fied, lost and destroyed permanent or temporary records;
5. retention and disposition of electronic records in compli-
ance with legislated and internal retention periods and dis-
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• inadequate compliance with the records management requirements of the
privacy laws;50
• inadequate testing, auditing, and quality control;
• substantial non-compliance with the National Standards of Canada con-
cerning records management, and a lack of appreciation of the conse-
quences of non-compliance.
There is also an important “auditing consequence” for defective records sys-
tems. An auditor/accountant in testing the “internal controls” of a records system,
may find that they cannot be relied upon.51 Then the audit cannot be conducted
using statistically based random sampling methodology to test the integrity of a
series of records. A full substantive audit has to be done — which entails 100%
verification. If cross examination of a records manager revealed that no reliance
could be placed on the system and that a full substantive audit had to be done, that
in itself would give significant support to an argument that the records from that
records system should not be relied upon. The records system lacks “system integ-
rity.” Therefore the “system integrity test” of the electronic records provisions of
the Evidence Acts has a strong similarity to auditing standards.
Such defects will result in (1) the “system integrity test” not being satisfied;
(2) the demands of electronic discovery inadequately complied with; and, (3) ad-
missibility refused, or, “weight” lost. For example, because of such defects, a dis-
closure request as simple as, “produce all records on subject X please,” cannot be
position [disposal] requirements, and documenting such
compliance and disposition schedules; and,
6. a business continuity plan for electronic records and as-
sociated data, including off-site copies of essential files, op-
erating and application software [a “disaster recovery”
factor].
50 For example, s. 5 in Part 1, “Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector,”
of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5,
(“PIPEDA”) makes mandatory, compliance with the National Standard of Canada,
Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q830-96, which is
Schedule 1 of the Act. PIPEDA applies not only federally, but also in those provinces
that don’t have their own PIPA (personal information protection Act), which is all
provinces except British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec — see s. 26(2)(b) re exempt-
ing provinces. Part 2, “Electronic Documents,” is the federal electronic commerce leg-
islation (which has similar counterparts in 12 of the other 13 jurisdictions of Canada
(NWT doesn’t)), and Part 3, “Amendments to the Canada Evidence Act,” added the
electronic records provisions to the CEA, ss. 31.1–31.8 (which have similar counter-
parts in all of the other jurisdictions except for British Columbia and Newfoundland
and Labrador).
51 For the principles, definition, and examples of, “internal controls,” see these sites from
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complied with, with complete certainty as to accuracy, comprehensiveness, and
knowledge of the time, cost, and disruption to be incurred by answering such re-
quest. Therefore one cannot defend oneself against disclosure and discovery de-
mands that violate the “proportionality test” that dominates the “discovery of docu-
ments” in the Rules of Civil Procedure and in the Sedona Canada Principles. One
has to know one’s RM system well, and have it operating well, to know what is
disproportionate. But such defects will not be known if system documentation
showing the state of the RM system is never requested nor examined. A RM system
should be regularly “internally audited,” and periodically independently, “exter-
nally audited.”52
An electronic records system having the above defects cannot comply with the
“prime directive” of the national standards: “An organization shall always be ready
to produce its records as evidence.”53 In turn, it cannot comply with the “system
integrity test” by which the admissibility of electronic records is to be
determined.54
V. REVISED PURPOSES FOR THE ELECTRONIC AND BUSINESS
RECORD PROVISIONS OF THE EVIDENCE ACTS
(a) Authentication
To determine how the tests of admissibility of electronic records might be
changed, a comparison with the American rules is instructive. The American “au-
52 I have been the “legal advisor” on such external, independent audit teams with RM
experts. That process provides a thorough system analysis and comprehensive certifica-
tion of compliance with the two National Standards of Canada cited supra note 40 and
accompanying text. But a quicker and less expensive procedure is needed for certifying
such “systems compliance” for records to be used as evidence. Different reasons for
such certifications should create different levels of certification. Therefore, the Cana-
dian General Standards Board, the sponsor of these two standards, has been asked to
consider establishing educational courses for RM specialists to become licensed, or
otherwise official certifiers. See the discussion of this proposal in: Ken Chasse, “Elec-
tronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law
Review 111 at 163–65, and its recommendations 6 and 7 on p. 167.
53 Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005, clause 5.4.3 c)
at p. 17; and, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-
72.11-93, paragraph 4.1.2 at p. 21, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
54 There are more than 200 specific compliance tests that the project teams I have worked
with apply to determine the level of compliance of a records system with the national
standard, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence, supra note 40. There are more
than 50 tests performed in relation to the earlier national standard, Microfilm and Elec-
tronic Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-93. The resulting report
indicates the level of compliance found by each test, along with recommendations, and
a legal opinion as to “legal compliance” with legislated records and RM requirements
and consequences. See below section 11.(e), p. 169, “The transition from RM to ‘legal
compliance.’”
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thentication rule” has a greater purpose than the Canadian rule55 even though they
use the same circular statement of the rule: 
Rule 901(a), (U.S.) Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 901(a)): General provi-
sion. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition pre-
cedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that a matter in question is what its proponent claims.56
Section 34.1(4) OEA: The person seeking to introduce an electronic record
55 The “minimalist” nature of the Canadian rule is confirmed by, John D. Gregory, “Au-
thentication Rules and Electronic Records,” (2002), 81 Can. Bar Rev. 529 at 562: “The
trends of minimalism and technology neutrality dominate but do not hold the field ex-
clusively.” He describes (at 537) three factors of concern as to the reliability of elec-
tronic records under these three headings: “Uncertainty of storage; Uncertainty of re-
trieval; and, Ease of alteration, difficulty of detection.” As to the nature of
authentication he states (at 531): “Three questions arise in the process of authentica-
tion: What is this record? Where or who does it come from? Has its content been al-
tered, either intentionally or unintentionally?” I suggest that differences as to the conse-
quences of a ruling as to authenticity arise from the third factor, e.g., to what degree is
the record declared to be reliable? Is it merely an acceptance that the record appears to
be what it purports to be, or is it in effect a preliminary decision as to reliability, i.e.,
that the record is prima facie reliable?
56 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Pub.L. 93-595, S. 1,
January 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1926, as amended, Title 28 U.S.C.A. Most of the Amer-
ican states have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence (the FRE) as their State
codes of evidence, thus establishing the FRE as: (1) one of the most successful
codifications of American law; and, (2) the foundation of the vast majority of
state as well as federal case law concerning the U.S. law of evidence. It is there-
fore a small tragedy that Canada failed to enact the Evidence Code proposed by
the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s Report On Evidence (published in De-
cember 1975). The Evidence Code was a true code, and truly a close Canadian
version (copy) of the FRE. Therefore the case law of the FRE would have been
“free legal technology” flowing across the border to Canada had Parliament en-
acted the L.R.C.C.’s Evidence Code (as always, the provinces and territories
would have copied it). For three years, 1976–78, I conducted the consultation
process for the federal Department of Justice as to enacting the Evidence Code.
That process and the resulting documentation produced by its “feedback” (resolu-
tions) are described in, Ken Chasse, “Canada’s Evidence Code?” (2006) 64 The
Advocate 659 (published by the Vancouver Bar Association and distributed to all
members of the Law Society of British Columbia). Because of the mixed recep-
tion the Evidence Code received (as described in the article), the resulting Fed-
eral/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed in 1981, a
Uniform Evidence Act, which became (Senate) Bill S-31. But it too died. (How-
ever, the Task Forces’s Report was published in 1982 by the Carswell Company.)
Contradicting these comprehensive reform proposals, statutory reform of the law
of evidence is now proceeding piecemeal, but very slowly. The addition of the
electronic record provisions to the Evidence Acts, beginning in 2000, was the first
significant reform of that variety. I was the Task Force’s first “chair” and a mem-
ber for the four years of its existence (1977–1981). For a definition and analysis
of what is a “true code” (the Criminal Code is not), see: Ken Chasse, “The Mean-
ing of Codification,” (1976) 35 C.R.N.S. 178.
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has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting
a finding that the electronic record is what the person claims it to be.”57
These statements are not definitions of “authentication.” They are merely
statements as to the onus and burden of proof — who has to do the proving, what
has to be proved, and with how much evidence (what degree of proof). George L.
Paul, an experienced American litigation and technology attorney says this of the
simplicity of FRE 901(a):58
Clearly, no knowledge, either personal or institutional, about the immutabil-
ity of the information in the record is required. No testimony is required
about any processes that support immutability of information. What we
have instead is a quick once-over with the information then coming into
evidence and thereafter affecting the relevancy dynamics discussed previ-
ously. If you can introduce evidence of a routine, there is a presumption the
routine was followed, even though it might not have been followed in that
instance, or even if the “routine” is only a haphazard goal. There is no re-
quirement about the quality of the routine, or how it would ensure immuta-
bility. These elements are assumed. The evidence is admitted, and the bur-
den then shifts to the other party to disprove the information going to
authenticity.
This description refers only to issues as to authentication. It does not mean
that the record is admissible in spite of hearsay or best evidence rule challenges.
However it does cast the American authentication rule as a rule by which prima
facie admissibility in regard to authentication is established, i.e., “a quick once-
over,” as to reliability. In contrast, the Canadian authentication rule serves only the
more limited purpose of stating who has the burden of proving that a record is in
fact what it purports to be. The American rule is considered to be an aspect of
showing a record’s relevance. After citing cases that indicate that the quantity and
quality of the evidence necessary to authenticate depends on the ease with which
the evidence can be altered or tampered with, Paul states59: 
There is therefore a tension in the authentication requirements under the
Federal Rules. The language of Rule 901, and the greater weight of com-
ment on the rules, view authentication foundations as issues of conditional
relevancy and as governed by Rule 104(b). Under this view, so long as there
is evidence whereby a rational jury could find an object authentic, there is a
sufficient foundation to admit the evidence.
FRE 104(b) states:
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
57 Section 41.3 AEA, s. 23C NSEA, and s. 31.1 CEA, are very similar to s. 34.1
OEA.
58 Supra note 13. George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence, (American Bar Asso-
ciation, 2008), p. 41. The author is a partner and experienced trial lawyer in the Busi-
ness Litigation Section of Lewis and Roca LLP in Phoenix, Arizona. His other books
include, The Authenticity Crises, The Discovery Revolution, and, Information Inflation:
Can the Legal System Adapt? He has been active in several sections of the ABA and of
the Arizona State Bar concerning technology law and litigation.
59 George L. Paul, ibid., p. 44.
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subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition.
The Canadian rule does not link authentication to relevance. Because it has
this wider purpose, the American rule allows for greater scope for demands for
electronic discovery of relevant documentation and information, which can also be
used in relation to “weight.”60
However, authentication of electronic business records would take on more
effectiveness if guided by FRE 901(b)(9): 
Process of system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce
a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
As stated by Cooper Offenbecher, an American commentator writing about
the impact of In re Vin Veehnee:61, 62
Indeed, such a presumption requires the opposing party to have detailed,
affirmative knowledge about the computer systems. In these cases, however,
the proponent is often the only party with access to the computer systems;
the opposing party, conversely, usually lacks sufficient access to investigate
potential sources of error. In today’s fast-paced technological world, requir-
ing the opponent to object to computer evidence likely puts an undue burden
on the opposing party.63 As a result, some argue that the Rule 803(6) foun-
dation does not satisfy the basic authentication requirements of Rule 901(a),
and that computer records always need to be authenticated under Rule
901(b)(9).64 The method employed by Vinhnee incorporates many of these
criticisms. It essentially puts the burden on the party offering the evidence
to affirmatively demonstrate, through an eleven-step foundation process,
60 Ibid., p. 49-50: “But remember that the main fight in any battle over truth is not the
concept of admissibility, but rather the weight of evidence. If one wants to oppose a
record introduced against your cause, you must be able to attack its probative force.
Accordingly, there is a wealth of discovery and proof that can occur about the main
facets of authenticity: about whether the information in a digital record has stayed the
same through time; about the identity of who did what; and about the time at which
certain events occurred. And similarly, if one wants to bolster a record, one shores up
things through circumstantial evidence and eunomic regimes, if possible.
“For example, . . . what do we know about the file before it was
printed? Who had access to it? Does its custodian even know where it
came from? Is there any trail or history of its evolution? Was it edited?
When was it edited? By whom? Does the company that possesses the
record have any information about these facts? And if it does not know
about these facts, how can it know its records are authentic?”
61 Supra note 30 and accompanying text. The decision in Veehnee was released on Dec.
16, 2005.
62 Cooper Offenbecher, “Admitting Computer Record Evidence after In Re Vinhnee: A
Stricter Standard for the Future?” (2007), 4 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 6, at paras. 18,
20, and 23.
63 J. Shane Givens, “The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence at Trial: Courtroom
Admissibility Standards,” 34 Cumb. L. Rev. 95, 107 (2003-2004).
64 Mark A. Johnson, “Computer Printouts as Evidence: Stricter Foundation or Pre-
sumption of Reliability,” 75 Marq. L. Rev. 439 at 464 (1992).
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that the offered record is in fact an accurate reflection of the information or
record it purports to be.
. . . . .
The Vinhnee court seemed most concerned with the witness’ knowledge of
specifics regarding accuracy, security, and the potential for data error or
loss. “There is no information regarding American Express’ computer pol-
icy and system control procedures, including control of access to pertinent
databases, control of access to pertinent programs, recording and logging of
changes to the data, backup practices, and audit procedures utilized to as-
sure the continuing integrity of the records.”65
. . . . .
Regardless of what reasons the court actually had for excluding the records,
it explicitly adopted the Imwinkelried “prism” as the court’s means for eval-
uating the foundation.66 In doing so, it rejected the sufficiency of the tradi-
tional Rule 803(6) foundation as self-authenticating and implicitly renewed
the need to affirmatively authenticate computer records. The Vinhnee
court’s emphasis on reliability, accuracy, and system knowledge is consis-
tent with urgings by the Manual [The Manual for Complex Litigation] and
some scholars. Though it employs an eleven-step foundation process that
has not previously been cited by courts, the key inquiries are into accuracy
and reliability. These issues are not new and are the crux of traditional au-
thentication inquiries in all areas of evidence. Imwinkelried’s foundation
process has been in circulation since 1980 and his Evidentiary Foundations
book is a widely employed trial tool. In its essence, the Imwinkelried foun-
dation is a well-articulated inquiry into accuracy and reliability. The
Vinhnee approach is not, by nature, an outlier. It reflects a long-standing
desire by some to inquire into the accuracy and reliability of computer
records. While other courts may not immediately follow Vinhnee, the deci-
sion is unlikely to be eschewed as requiring unrealistic, exacting knowledge
of records custodians.67 The case may influence other judges who are simi-
larly dissatisfied with the lack of knowledge of testifying witnesses.68
65 Supra note 13 at 448-449.
66 Ibid. at 447. Edward J. Imwinkelried is the author of a well-respected book on
evidentiary foundations. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations §
4.03[2] (5th ed. 2002).
67 Vinhnee, supra note 30, and Imwinkelried are cited positively and extensively in
Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007), a memo-
randum decision denying summary judgment motions and detailing the law con-
cerning the admissibility of computer records.
68 Most courts have held that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) decisions are not
binding on U.S. District Courts. See, e.g., Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis Inc.,
904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990). One court, however, has stated that BAP deci-
sions are equivalent to the circuit courts and are therefore binding on all lower
courts. In re Globe Illumination Co., 149 B.R. 614, 620 (Bkrtcy. C.D. Cal. 1993),
in the Ninth Circuit, for example, as a practical matter BAP decisions are re-
garded as persuasive by the Court of Appeals, and by district courts and bank-
ruptcy courts within the circuit. Appeals Before The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Of The Ninth Circuit: A Manual For Litigants, Summer 2007, available at
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Clearly American commentators believe that the decision in Vinhnee69 has es-
tablished a new and more detailed inquiry into authenticity.70 Cooper Offenbecher
concludes:71
However, the Vinhnee court marks an important step in the evolution of the
comfort levels of courts with computer records. And while some litigators
and witnesses may not be ready to produce the type of knowledge required
to authenticate under the Vinhnee standard, they would be wise to take no-
tice of this case as some courts are likely to begin requiring a more detailed
foundation than Rule 803(6) requires on its face.
And Canadian courts can do the same for the authentication and business re-
cord provisions of our Evidence Acts.
Following Cooper Offenbecher’s conclusion, the following “Practice Point-
ers” are stated: 
Businesses should have a designated “custodian of records” who knows the
specifications of the hardware and software systems, processes for entering
and extracting data from the computer, and the safeguards for accuracy and
reliability.
Witnesses who are called to authenticate computer records should be pre-
pared to lay the Vinhnee/Imwinkelried foundation. There is generally no
http://207.41.19.15/Web/bap.nsf/cd1860ad415dbd4688256bc0006d5046/
5e2253b1056e374288256ed2007766da/
69 Supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70 In addition to Cooper Offenbecher’s article, supra note 62, the following are some of
the available articles that analyze the decision in Vinhnee, supra note 30 (accessed on
LexisNexis Quicklaw (“American journals”) using the search term “Vinhnee”).
(1) Thomas R. McLean, MD, JD, FACS, “EMR Metadata Uses and E-Dis-
covery” (2009), 18 Ann. Health L. 75.
(2) Steven Goode, “The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence,” 2009, The
University of Texas School of Law Review of Litigation, 29 Recv. Litig. 1.
(3) Keiko L. Sugisaka and David F. Herr, “SYMPOSIUM: The Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of the Minnesota Court of Appeals: EVIDENCE LAW:
Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or Evidence as
Usual?” (2009), 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1453.
(4) Hon. Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi, Esq., Alexander W. Major,
Esq., “Back to the Future: Lorraine V. Markel American Insurance Co. and
New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information,
(2009), 42 Akron L. Rev. 357.
(5) Kathrine Minotti, “Evidence: The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implica-
tions of Social Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession” (2009), 60
S.C. L. Rev. 1057.
(6) Emily Burns, Michelle Greer Galloway, and Jeffrey Gross, “E-Discov-
ery: One Year of the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 N.Y.U.
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 201.
(7) David E. Ries, “Records Management: Current Issues in Retention, De-
struction, and E-Discovery,” (2007), 78 PA Bar Assn. Quarterly 139.
71 Supra note 62 at para. 24.
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harm in laying too much foundation.
(b) The Exception to the Hearsay Rule for Business Records
In both Canadian and American business records exceptions to the rule against
hearsay evidence, reliance is placed on the repetitive and routine nature of “a regu-
larly conducted business activity” such as the making of business records. Section
35(2) OEA states: 
Any writing or record made of any act, transaction, occurrence or event is
admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event if made
in the usual and ordinary course of any business and if it was in the usual
and ordinary course of such business to make such writing or record at the
time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
And (U.S.) FRE 803(6) uses a similar phrase, “in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activ-
ity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, . . ..” Note that
both use a double “in the course of” phrase. But s. 30(1) CEA uses only a single
phrase. US cases see an important distinction in the double phrase which distinction
Canadian courts have not entertained, viz., not only for example, must an accident
report be made in the “usual and ordinary course of business,” but also, having
accidents must be part of the business.72 Otherwise hearsay, such as accident re-
ports, does not qualify for admissibility under the business records exception.
Most electronic business records are in fact the product of “regularly con-
ducted business activities.” Now, almost any such record can satisfy the business
records exception without any showing of reliability or “system integrity.” Almost
all electronic records are admitted into evidence, which makes the only protection
against using unreliable records as evidence, the assessment of “weight” (probative
value; credibility) of records once admitted into evidence. But electronic RM is too
complicated and vulnerable to error to allow its records to be given to the trier of
fact without a preliminary investigation of reliability by way of an admissibility
rule such as “system integrity.” However there is a type of reliability (authentica-
tion) requirement in the wording of s. 30(6) CEA that allows, “the circumstances of
72 Compare the classic U.S. textbook cases of, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct.
477 (1943), Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), which rejected such
accident reports as not being part of the business’s business, with the contrary result in,
Setak Computer Services Corp. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. (1977), 15 O.R.
(2d) 750, 76 D.L.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. H.C.J.), wherein Griffiths J. stated (at p. 760 O.R.;
p. 650 D.L.R.): “With respect, I believe that Palmer imposes an unreasonable and un-
necessary limitation on the wording of the enactment [s. 35(2) OEA]. To draw a dis-
tinction between records relating to the principal business and those relating only to an
auxiliary feature of the business, is not justified by the plain wording of the section. So
long as the records are made in the usual and ordinary of some phase of the business,
whether principal or auxiliary, they should be admitted, in my view, according to the
plain meaning of s. 36 [now s. 35].” However, Setak did not involve a “record made in
contemplation of litigation” as did Palmer v. Hoffman. Therefore in Canada, the double
phrase has not imposed an additional requirement beyond what the single phrase in s.
30(1) CEA requires.
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the making of the record” to be used to determine admissibility.73 The FRE
803(6)’s comparable qualifying phrase is, “unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” It too is a
business record provision that will not provide adequate protection against unrelia-
ble electronic records being used as evidence if those words are not given an inter-
pretation requiring proof of “electronic record system integrity.” The case law
shows no sign of it so far.
These traditional business records hearsay rule exceptions mistakenly attribute
to electronic technology the fact that people become more accurate by carrying out
the same activity repeatedly. Therefore the activity repeated within the “usual and
ordinary course of business,” and “the regularly conducted business activity,” are
assumed to be adequate guarantees of accuracy. But computer accuracy does not
improve with repetition alone. Humans trained in “habits of precision” become
more accurate. But computers, if programmed or operated incorrectly will always
be wrong no matter the amount of repetition. Only a very small portion of software
is self-correcting, because, inter alia, it requires built-in parameters as to what to
look for and aspire to as being “correct.”
What is needed is a “systems reliability” test that judges the quality of the
whole electronic records system. Obviously the “system integrity test” could serve
that purpose74 as an authentication rule of the expanded type, to act as a first step to
admissibility. The “systems integrity test” would be applied to ensure that the elec-
tronic records system from which the record comes complies with the recognized
standards of RM, i.e., the principles and practices established by the two National
Standards of Canada cited above. Such issues are too complex to be left to
“weights” and to juries.
Then a second test would be applied to the record itself to verify that there is
no “circumstance of its making” requiring its exclusion. This need can be served by
provisions such as s. 30(6) CEA, which is an exclusionary rule that determines if
the admissibility rule in s. 30(1) CEA applies, i.e., is there some “circumstance of
the making of the record” that justifies excluding it even though “made in the usual
and ordinary course of business”?75
73 Section 35(4) OEA and s. 23(4) NSEA contain similar words, but such examination of
“the circumstances of the making” are restricted to use in relation to “weight” and
prohibited from being used in relation to admissibility. The better opinion of s. 30(6)
CEA is that it, and not the “usual and ordinary course of business” test in s. 30(1) is
dominant test because any such “circumstance” could be used to rule any record inad-
missible. However, s. 30(6) is an exclusionary rule and not an inclusionary rule as is s.
30(1). The other view is that s. 30(6) is applicable only to weight; see: Ken Chasse,
Electronic Records As Documentary Evidence (2007) 6 Canadian Journal of Law and
Technology 141, at section, “4(b) The Two Hearsay-Admissibility Tests of s. 30
CEA — Which is Predominant?”; and, J. Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence In
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at p. 85, footnote 57 of that text.
74 To best serve that purpose, the references to the “best evidence rule” should be re-
moved to prevent any interpretation that reduces the importance of that purpose.
75 Section 35(4) OEA, and s. 23(4) NSEA restrict the use of such “circumstances” to
“weight.” It would have to be amended to serve the same purpose. But s. 35(2) OEA
and s. 23(2) NSEA do have a double “course of business” test, whereas s. 30(1) CEA
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These interpretations would accomplish these purposes: (1) ensure that all of
the unique features of electronic RM systems, as distinguished from those applica-
ble to pre-electronic paper systems, are judged as in compliance with recognized
standards; and, (2) the existing legislation is used with a minimum of revision
needed and none not absolutely necessary. They will help to move admissibility
issues beyond an unquestioning faith in the evidence produced by science and its
electronic devices, but within a manageable time allowance in court or tribunal pro-
ceedings to accommodate them.
(c) The Best Evidence Rule
The above purposes for the business record and electronic record provisions of
the Evidence Acts leave no room or need for the best evidence rule. References to
it in the Evidence Acts should be removed, and until then, one’s arguments as to
admissibility made stronger by denigrating it — “system integrity” is not a mere
matter of “best evidence.” Electronic technology, as applied to RM, has no place
for it, therefore neither should the laws of evidence that determine when and how
electronic records are to be used. The best evidence rule was developed at a time
when making a copy required copying by hand to make a copy. It was not possible
to have a record without its also being recorded on a medium of storage such as
paper. Therefore issues as to copies were easily distinguished from issues as to “the
truth of the contents” of a document. For the former, the best evidence rule was
applied; for the latter, the hearsay rule and its exceptions were applied. The two
rules provided different solutions for very different problems.
But now there is data without a physical, viewable medium of storage, which
is nonetheless a record — a record in electronic form, which can be viewed and
altered apart from any particular medium of storage. And so there are records that
are “original records” but they have no medium of storage in the traditional sense.
And it is frequently not possible to distinguish which activities of computers con-
cern “the truth of the contents of a record” (a hearsay issue), and which concern the
authenticity of a record, and which concern the laying down of a record upon a
medium of storage and accessing and printing it from that medium — any and all
storage, be it magnetic, optical, mechanical, chemical, genetic, paper, or stone tab-
let (a best evidence rule issue). As a result, distinguishing which one of these three
rules applies is more than just somewhat arbitrary. For example, a software failure
that casts doubt upon the truth of the contents of a printout, does not require catego-
rization as giving rise to a hearsay rule issue or a best evidence rule issue. If there is
doubt as to the credibility of the printout, that is the legal issue to be dealt with, and
it requires no further categorization or naming before legal analysis based upon
“system integrity” can begin.
Drafting the electronic record provisions as a variety of the best evidence rule
has only the single phrase. So far, the case law has not made a distinction as to the legal
consequences of the difference; see: Setak Computer Services Corp. v. Burroughs
Business Machines Ltd. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 750, 76 D.L.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. H.C.J.).
The double phrase could be interpreted as providing the same exclusionary mechanism
that is provided by s. 30(6) CEA.
ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC BUSINESS RECORDS   139
makes them a contradiction of the traditional rule:
1. It stands the rule on its head by making the last produced record and
printout the “original,” instead of the first made recording of the contents
of the record, as does the traditional best evidence rule.
2. The electronic record provisions state, “where the best evidence rule is
applicable . . ..” Where and when is that? Given this very unconventional
and unprecedented usage, how does one know how to frame, or answer
an objection based upon the best evidence rule? Falling back on the tradi-
tional rule as the only resource, one looks for an “original” and a “copy,”
but with no guidance as to how those concepts apply to electronic
records. Then perhaps one should use the “McMullen standard”?76 But
that formula requires proof of the equivalent of the “system integrity
test,” which is where one starts when attempting to use the electronic
record provisions.
3. How to see or compare the electronic “original” of a printout other
than by the printout itself or a screen display of that “original,” i.e., the
copy cannot be compared with its “original” to determine if it is a “true
copy.”
4. The traditional best evidence rule concerns, “copies, duplicates, and
other secondary evidence of an original record,” but not the “system in-
tegrity” of a whole records system, in all aspects of records management
“integrity”!
5. The former is a “records” concept, the latter is a “systems” concept;
this is using terminology merely for the sake of using traditional
terminology.
6. The traditional rule determines the form in which a record is to be
adduced; the “system integrity test” determines the “integrity” of the re-
cord adduced, and that “integrity” bears heavily upon “the truth of the
contents” of that record, if not completely determining its outcome.
7. Therefore the “systems integrity test” well serves the purpose of a
records exception to the hearsay rule, (or an American “authentication”
rule) which is not the purpose of the traditional best evidence rule.
8. In regard to electronic records, the best evidence rule (as used in the
electronic record provisions in Evidence Acts in Canada) is to safeguard
against the use of unreliable records as evidence, but in regard to non-
electronic paper records, it will protect only against inadequate copies
and duplicates of those records.
These points do not detract from the important improvements brought to the
law by the “system integrity test,” but it shouldn’t have used the terminology and
concept of the best evidence rule. In fact, the following improvements brought to
the law by the electronic records provisions of the Evidence Acts show how inap-
76 For the passage of McMullen (OCA, 1979) stating the “McMullen standard,” for the
admissibility of electronic records, see notes 122 to 125 infra and accompanying text.
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propriate a foundation concept the best evidence rule provides for them:
1. Substitute an evaluation of “electronic record system integrity” in
place of evaluating paper-original documents as a test for determining the
admissibility of, and “weight” (probative value; credibility) to be given
business records (ss. 31.2 & 31.3 CEA; s. 34.1(5)–(7) OEA; ss. 41.4 &
41.5 AEA; ss. 23D & 23E NSEA), particularly so if they were to sub-
sume the business record provisions, because satisfying the “system in-
tegrity test” will satisfy the subjective “usual and ordinary course of busi-
ness” test of the business record provisions;
2. Expressly encourage the use of: (1) national, international, and indus-
try standards of records and information management in the determina-
tion of issues of admissibility and weight of electronic records; and, (2)
recognize private evidentiary agreements and protocols for computer-to-
computer communications, i.e., EDI (electronic data interchange) for
transmitting all business records electronically, and for settling disputes
arising from such data interchange (s. 31.5 CEA; s. 34.1(8) OEA; s. 41.6
AEA; s. 23F NSEA)77;
3. Abolish retention periods for paper-original records as a condition-pre-
cedent to the admissibility of their microfilm and imaged counterparts
(the infamous “six-year rule”; e.g., s. 34(3), (4) OEA repealed — but
such repeal not being necessary for s. 31 CEA because it did not contain
a retention period);
4. Give electronic records a legal status equal to that of paper-originals in
regard to the authentication rule and the best evidence rule (ss. 31.1 &
31.2 CEA; s. 34.1(4), (5), (5.1) OEA; ss. 41.3 & 41.4 AEA; ss. 23C &
23D NSEA);
5. Make destruction of paper-originals optional without impairing the le-
gal status of their electronic record counterparts in relation to admissibil-
ity and weight.78
77 These two functions are captured in the words, “. . . evidence may be presented in any
legal proceeding in respect of any standard, procedure, usage or practice on how elec-
tronic records are to be recorded or stored, . . ..” For example, two companies could
have a private agreement setting rules as to their computer-to-computer communica-
tions concerning orders, invoices, and deliveries. Note that such “standards, etc.,” can
be used “For the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an electronic
record is admissible, . . . “i.e., not just for determining admissibility under the elec-
tronic record provisions alone.
78 Destruction of original paper records after scanning or otherwise imaging them into a
secure electronic records management environment (national standard 72.34, Section 5
“Legal Requirement,” Section 5.1 “General”; see notes 40 and 52 supra, and accompa-
nying text), can be assumed to be optional because the electronic records provisions of
the Evidence Acts are silent as to such disposal and destruction after making such elec-
tronic versions or counterparts. But records management retention-destruction/disposal
programs are always subject to the “litigation hold” required to be placed upon such
programs (suspending their operations) by demands made in electronic discovery pro-
ceedings. Such obligations arise “on contemplation of litigation,” and not only when
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None needs nor makes appropriate the use of the best evidence rule. Then why
was it used? The electronic record provisions were created to render irrelevant
doubts as to the ability of the business record provisions to cope with electronic
records, but to do so without disturbing those provisions and their treatment of the
business record exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, the electronic record pro-
visions could not be a hearsay rule or exception thereto. The doubts were not evi-
dent in the case law as to s. 30 CEA and its provincial counterparts, but rather in
the other forms of analytical legal literature. In fact, the case law on s. 30-type
provisions did not show it (or them) to be “broken” at all, therefore, “why fix it?”
Section 30 CEA wasn’t “broken,” rather, it wasn’t “built right” in the first place.79
litigation commences or is ongoing. Otherwise, paper originals should be disposed of
once moved to secure electronic storage. As long as the paper is accessible, production
of it can be demanded for comparison with its electronic version.
79 The then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, John Turner, told the
House of Commons on January 20, 1969, (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, p.
4496) on Second Reading of the present s. 30 CEA: “It is therefore apparent that the
law in this country has fallen far behind the major changes which the computer age has
brought to business methods.” And he justified s. 30’s low “threshold of admissibility”
as follows: “I consider that, in general, the law of evidence should be moving away
from the rigid rules of admissibility toward assessment of the cogency of logically rele-
vant facts. If the facts are relevant, what is the best way to introduce those facts without
there being any unfairness to either side? Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, this bill would,
subject to certain safeguards, render business records as defined in the bill generally
admissible and would entrust the courts with the discretion of assessing the probative
value of those documents.” In fact to the contrary, the “computer age” has necessitated
a more demanding and objective standard for admissibility as exemplified by the elec-
tronic record provisions such as ss. 31.1 to 31.8 CEA.
I have read the Department of Justice files generated by the creation of s. 30. They
show (1) a dominant intention to cope with the decision in Myers v. D.P.P, [1965] A.C.
1001; (2) an absence of any concern that electronic technology would require a change
in the admissibility rule as to business records (Myers did not involve electronic
records); (3) a bias towards admissibility because most issues were believed best left to
“weight”; and, (4) the belief that the reliability of business records is sufficiently as-
sured by proving that they are the product of a regularly conducted business activity.
Therefore, with the guidance, approval, and correspondence of Sir Rupert Cross, the
author of the leading British, Evidence textbook at that time, the phrase, “the usual
ordinary course of business” became the key phrase in the business record provisions
of the Evidence Acts in Canada. It was taken from American law reform proposals
such as s. 63(13) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1953. And today, Rule 803(6) of the
(U.S.) Federal Rules of Evidence (the “FRE”) uses the phrase, “in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity,” to determine the admissibility of a “data compila-
tion, in any form.” Thus an “electronic records admissibility test” for “business
records” is provided by a single subsection within a section of several hearsay excep-
tions — the kind of order that codification can provide. But like the Canadian business
record exceptions, Rule 803(6) depends upon proof of a repeated “course of business”
business activity as the guarantee of record reliability. However, it isn’t unnecessarily
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VI. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE BUSINESS RECORD
PROVISIONS OF THE EVIDENCE ACTS
Section 30 CEA, and the business record provisions of the provincial and terri-
torial Evidence Acts, still have the several major deficiencies with which they were
enacted, which are still in need of case law or legislative solutions. Further com-
pounding these difficulties is the absence of definitions of key phrases — a legisla-
tive drafting style intending flexibility, rather than doubt as to intended meaning,
usage, and scope.
The current law as to the admissibility and weight of business records is based
upon three concepts, two of which are without fixed definitions and the third needs
to be revised for electronic records. The two undefined concepts are, “the usual and
ordinary course of business;” and, “the circumstances of the making of the record.”
They appear in most of the Evidence Acts in Canada.80 The third is the concept of
the “original” record.81 The absence of fixed definitions of these key phrases gives
the courts complete flexibility in applying them. But that same flexibility leaves
litigants and the business community uncertain as to what is required to prove busi-
ness records as admissible, credible, and persuasive evidence. And, several impor-
tant hearsay rule questions about business records as evidence remain unanswered,
even with the combined assistance of statutory business record provisions and court
decisions interpreting them.
Consider the following examples of important questions needing answers, or
new answers, and the conflicting answers given by the court decisions cited in their
accompanying notes: 
Whether the present statutory language requires that admissible records
need only be made by a person under a “business duty” to make such
records, or whether the supplier of the information recorded, as well as the
maker of the record must have been acting pursuant to such “business du-
spread out over two sets of subsections as are the electronic and business records provi-
sions of the Evidence Acts in Canada.
80 See for example s. 30(1), (6) CEA, s. 35(2), (4) OEA, s. 23(2), (4) NSEA. While these
OEA and NSEA provisions contain a double “usual and ordinary course of business”
test (as do most of the provincial Evidence Acts), the CEA provisions contain a single
test, and whereas the CEA makes the “circumstances of the making of the record”
relevant to both admissibility and weight, the OEA and NSEA counterparts in s. 35(4)
OEA and s. 23(4) NSEA expressly restricts the relevance of such “circumstances” by
the words, “may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances do not affect its
admissibility.”
81 Before computers were used to create and store business records, the words “record”
and “document” could be used interchangeably because all records were in the form of
paper documents. But separating the concepts of the content of a record from the me-
dium upon which it was stored made necessary the use of a different word for each,
that is, “record” for the content of the record, and “document” for the medium upon
which it was stored or written. Similarly, “data” makes a “record,” which when stored
on paper, becomes a “document.” But now the CEA uses “document” in its electronic
record provisions, while most of the other Evidence Acts use “record,” and, the CEA
itself uses “record” in its business, banking, and microfilm record provisions (ss. 30,
29, and 31). Therefore the inconsistency in the CEA is inexplicable.
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ties”.82 For example, a customer using an ATM is not under a business duty
to the bank but bank records are thus made by that customer and relied upon
by the bank.
Whether s.30(1) CEA allows for double hearsay (twice removed from the
person having direct personal knowledge) and not just single hearsay (once
removed). Such limitation would arise from the opening words, “Where oral
evidence in respect of a matter would be admissible . . ..”83
Whether it is sufficient if the making of the record was part of the ordinary
course of the business, or whether not only the making of the record but also
the events being recorded must be part of the business routine.84 For exam-
ple, making an accident report is business routine, but the accident is not,
82 See for example the following decisions: R. v. Felderhof, 2005 ONCJ 406, 201
C.C.C. (3d) 384, 2005 CarswellOnt 4726, [2005] O.J. No. 4151 (Ont. C.J.)
[Felderhof]; Setak Computer Services Corp Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines
Ltd et al. (1977), 15 O.R.(2d) 750, 76 D.L.R.(3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.); Waltson
Properties Ltd., Re (1976), 17 O.R. (2d) 328 (Ont. H.C.); Matheson v. Barnes
(1980), [1981] 2 W.W.R. 435 (B.C. S.C.); Adderley v. Bremner (1967), [1968] 1
O.R. 621 (Ont. H.C.) [Adderley]; Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté & de
l’Immigration) c. Obodzinsky, 2003 CarswellNat 1351, 2003 CarswellNat 551,
[2003] A.C.F. No. 370 (Fed. T.D.); R. v. Monkhouse, 1987 CarswellAlta 248,
[1987] A.J. No. 1031 (Alta. C.A.); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v.
L. (J.), 2003 CarswellOnt 1685, [2003] O.J. No. 1722, 39 R.F.L. (5th) 54 (Ont.
C.J.) [Catholic Children’s].
83 R. v. Gregoire, 1998 CarswellMan 451, [1998] M.J. No. 447, 130 C.C.C. (3d) 65
(Man. C.A.); R. v. Grimba (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 469 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R. v. Martin
(1977), 8 C.R. (5th) 246 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Wilcox, 2001 CarswellNS 83, [2001]
N.S.J. No. 85, 152 C.C.C. (3d) 157, 192 N.S.R. (2d) 159 (N.S. C.A.), [Wilcox];
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) v. Oberlander (1998), [1999] 1
F.C. 88, 153 F.T.R. 11 (Fed. T.D.); Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration) v. Skomatchuk, 2006 FC 730, 2006 CarswellNat 1634, 2006 Car-
swellNat 4746, [2006] F.C.J. No. 928 (F.C.); R. v. Sunila (No. 2) (1986), 26
C.C.C. (3d) 331 (N.S. T.D.) [Sunila]; R. v. Marini, 2006 CarswellOnt 6215,
[2006] O.J. No. 4057 (Ont. S.C.J.); Baker v. R. (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 314 (B.C.
C.A.); R. v. Scheel (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 31 (Ont. C.A.).
84 Setak Computer Services Corp Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd et al.
(1977), 15 O.R.(2d) 750, 76D.L.R.(3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.); Aynsley v. Toronto
General Hospital (1967), [1968] 1 O.R. 425 (Ont. H.C.); varied 1969 Carswell-
Ont 888 (Ont. C.A.); affirmed 1971 CarswellOnt 170, 1971 CarswellOnt 170F
(S.C.C.); Palter Cap Co. v. Great West Life Assurance Co. (1935), [1936] O.R.
341, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 304 (Ont. H.C.); reversed 1936 CarswellOnt 156 (Ont.
C.A.); Conley v. Conley, [1968] 2 O.R. 677, 70 D.L.R. (2d) 352 (Ont. C.A.);
British Columbia v. Harris, 2003 BCSC 1257, 2003 CarswellBC 1981, [2003]
B.C.J. No. 1897 (B.C. S.C.); Newmarket (Town) v. Halton Recycling Ltd., 2006
CarswellOnt 3371, [2006] O.J. No. 2233 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at 2006
CarswellOnt 5284 (Ont. S.C.J.); Robb Estate v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre,
1999 CarswellOnt 500, [1999] O.J. No. 523 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Robb]; Catholic
Chilren’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.L. (2003), 39 R.F.L. (5th) 54, [2003] O.J.
1722 (Ont. S.C.); Johnson v. Lutz et al. (1930), 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (C.A.
of New York); Palmer v. Hoffman (1943), 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477 (USSC).
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unless one’s business is accidents.
Whether contemporaneity (co-incidence in time) between the making of a
record and the events recorded as part of the “usual and ordinary course of
business” must always be required, or at least considered.85
Whether records are inadmissible because of the interest or bias of the
maker of the records, or whether such a requirement is not to be read into
the business record provisions of our Evidence Acts, and is merely to be
considered as to the “weight” of the record if admitted into evidence.86
Whether admissibility requires detailed evidence of the RM system, or
merely an examination of the system by an expert witness of the proponent
of the records in question.87
Whether business records may contain statements of opinion.88
And the Supreme Court of Canada has held that a computer printout can be
treated as an “original” business record even if its electronic source has been
deleted. Previously, the hardcopy printout was held to be merely a copy
dependent upon the continued existence of its electronic counterpart for pur-
85 R. v. Felderhof (2005), 201 C.C.C. (3d) 384, [2005] O.J. No. 4151 (Ont. S.C.);
Setak Computer Services Corp Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd et al.
(1977), 15 O.R.(2d) 750, 76D.L.R.(3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Vanlerberghe
(1976), 6 C.R. (3d) 222 (B.C. C.A.) [Vanlerberghe]; R. v. West, 2001 Carswell-
Ont 2960, [2001] O.J. No. 3413 (Ont. S.C.J.) [West]; Robb v. St. Joseph’s Health
Care Centre, [1999] O.J. 523 (Ont. Ct. G.D.); Re S.V., [2002] S.J. No. 714 (Sask.
Q.B.).
86 Northern Wood Preservers Ltd. v. Hall Corp. (Shipping) 1969 Ltd., [1972] 3 O.R.
751 (Ont. H.C.); affirmed (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 335 (Ont. C.A.); Setak Computer
Services Corp Ltd. v. Burroughs Business Machines Ltd et al. (1977), 15 O.R.(2d)
750, 76 D.L.R.(3d) 641 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Biasi (No.2) (1981), 66 C.C.C.(2d) 563
(B.C.S.C.); R. v. McLarty (No. 3) (1978), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 184 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R. v.
West, [2001] O.J. 3413 (Ont. S.C.). Note that s. 30(10) CEA, and s. 42(4)
B.C.E.A. exclude such records from being admissible as business record excep-
tions to the hearsay rule.
87 Compare, R. v. McMullen, 1979 CarswellOnt 1494, [1979] O.J. No. 4300, 25
O.R. (2d) 301, 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 506
[C.C.C.] [McMullen], with, R. v. Vanlerberghe (1976), 6 C.R. (3d) 222 (B.C.
C.A.) [Vanlerberghe]; note the difference when expert testimony is used as in
Vanlerberghe. However, it is an open question as to whether evidence of “system
integrity” in satisfaction of the electronic record provisions, would be sufficient to
prove the “usual and ordinary course of business.” A system having such “integ-
rity” would make its records “in the usual and ordinary course of business,” but
the converse would not necessarily be true.
88 R. v. Felderhof, 2005 ONCJ 406, 201 C.C.C. (3d) 384, 2005 CarswellOnt 4726,
[2005] O.J. No. 4151 (Ont. C.J.) [Felderhof]; R. v. Laverty (No. 2) (1979), 47
C.C.C. (2d) 60 (Ont. C.A.); Robb v. St. Joseph’s Health Care Centre, [1999] O.J.
2003 (Ont. S.C.); Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.L. (2003), 39
R.F.L. (5th) 54, [2003] O.J. 1722 (Ont. S.C.); Re S.V., [2002] S.J. No. 714 (Sask.
Q.B.).
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poses of an “accuracy comparison” if called for.89 Should electronic records
have the same legal status as their paper originals if those originals are no
longer available to verify the accuracy of those electronic descendants? And
should printouts have the legal status of their electronic parents and ances-
tors after they have been deleted from their hard drives or other forms of
electronic or optical storage?90 Software now affects all three rules of ad-
missibility “seamlessly” — the hearsay, best evidence, and authentication
rules — and therefore there should be a single legal rule “seamlessly” deter-
mining the admissibility of the products of the application of such software
in making and storing electronic records.
And, the electronic record provisions, added to the Evidence Acts beginning
with ss. 31.1 to 31.8 CEA in 2000, have raised more questions about the business
record provisions: 
Won’t proof of “system integrity” under the electronic record provisions al-
ways satisfy the “usual and ordinary course of business” test in the business
record provisions as well, i.e., can a records system still have the necessary
“integrity” even though some or all of its records are not created “in the
usual and ordinary course of business”?
Will the “circumstances of the making test” in s. 30(6) CEA, s. 35(4) OEA,
and s. 23(4) NSEA, be altered in meaning or usage by the enactment of the
electronic record provisions; i.e., these subsections allow an evaluation of
any particular factor in the making of an electronic record in determining
what “weight” to give it, and in the case of s. 30 CEA, whether it is admissi-
ble; is this not similar to the “system integrity test” of the electronic record
provisions? Is it compatible with the nature of the hearsay rule and the best
evidence rule that a “circumstances of the making test” be attached to a
hearsay rule exception, but a “systems integrity test” be attached to a best
evidence rule exception?
Should the “relied upon printout” be subject to the business record provi-
sions? It is created by the electronic record provisions (s. 41.4(3) AEA, s.
34.1(6) OEA; s. 23D(2) NSEA; s. 31.2(2) CEA) to be, “the record for pur-
poses of the best evidence rule,” if it has been, “manifestly or consistently
acted on, relied upon, or used as the record of the information recorded or
stored on” it [the printout]. Should it also have to be proved to have been
made, “in the usual and ordinary course of business,” in order to use it in
89 Compare, R. v. McMullen, 1979 CarswellOnt 1494, [1979] O.J. No. 4300, 25
O.R. (2d) 301, 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (Ont. C.A.), with, R. v.
Bell and Bruce (1983), 35 O.R.(2d) 164 at 166; 65 C.C.C.(2d) 377 at 380 (OCA);
affirmed without reasons [1985] 2 SCR 281, 55 O.R.(2d) 287.
90 The electronic record provisions deal with this issue, but in relation to the best
evidence rule, not the hearsay rule. And, they merely state that, “in relation to an
electronic record the best evidence rule is satisfied on proof of the integrity of the
electronic record system.” They say nothing about the effects of the destruction of
original paper records or of the destruction of electronic versions of paper
printouts. Can the electronic records system have the necessary “integrity” in re-
lation to those records after such destruction?
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proof of the truth of some fact stated in it?91
The British Columbia Evidence Act does not yet contain electronic records
provisions (other than its “electronic court documents,” ss. 41.1 to 41.4).
Will the interpretation and use of its business record provisions therefore be
different than in proceedings subject to an Evidence Act having both sets of
provisions? And the Newfoundland and Labrador Evidence Act also awaits
electronic records provisions. But the courts in B.C. and Newfoundland and
Labrador didn’t before, and are therefore unlikely now to hold electronic
records to be inadmissible.
Such unanswered “hearsay” questions could be resolved by statute to allow
the business record provisions to be compatible with the electronic records provi-
sions of the Evidence Acts.92
VII. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
To effect the usage of existing legislation advocated above, requires adequate
and principled electronic discovery applicable in both criminal and civil proceed-
ings — entitlements under the rules of evidence are useless without the appropriate
productions from disclosure and discovery with which to use those rules. The pro-
ponent of any electronically written or stored information should have to make dis-
covery of all aspects of the electronic records system at issue. Admissibility under
91 The business record subsections, s. 30(11) CEA, s. 35(5) OEA, and s. 23(5)
NSEA, state that those sections do not affect the operation of any other rule of
admissibility. Therefore one could use the common law business record exception
to the hearsay rule if admissibility cannot be obtained under these sections. Or,
one could use the “principled approach to the rule against hearsay evidence” de-
clared in, R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, 2000 CarswellMan 449, 2000 CarswellMan
450, [2000] S.C.J. No. 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 190 D.L.R.
(4th) 591, [2000] 11 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.) [Starr], which holds inter alia, that writ-
ten statements may be admitted in proof of the truth of their contents if “reliable
and necessary,” even though they may not be admissible under a traditional ex-
ception of the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court modified its decision in Starr in
R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, 2006 CarswellOnt 7825, 2006 CarswellOnt 7826,
[2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 (S.C.C.) [Khelawon], holding that the
factors in regard to admissibility are not to be separated into “threshold and ulti-
mate reliability” factors, but are to be considered together. The application of the
“principled approach” is exemplified for records as admissible hearsay evidence
by, R. v. Wilcox, 2001 CarswellNS 83, [2001] N.S.J. No. 85, 152 C.C.C. (3d) 157,
192 N.S.R. (2d) 159, ¶59 to 76 (N.S. C.A.), [Wilcox].
92 A contrary opinion as to the state of hearsay issues attendant to electronic records is
given by John D. Gregory, in, “Canadian Electronic Commerce Legislation,” (2002),
17 Banking & Finance Law Review (Carswell) 277, at 328 et seq., (see:
http://pages.ca.inter.net/~euclid1/bflr2002.pdf (at p. 20 et seq.)) whereat the author
states: “The rules on hearsay are generally accepted to present no special problems for
the admission of electronic records.” For further quotation from, and analysis of this
article, see: Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence,” (2007), 6
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 141, note 109 and accompanying text in part
10, “Answering John Gregory’s Attack.” And in regard to John Gregory himself, see
also notes 28, 50, and 91 in that CJLT article.
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the electronic records provisions puts an electronic records system’s “systems in-
tegrity” at issue, and not just that of one of its records adduced as evidence, nor just
that part of the RM system where the record was recorded or stored. If such level of
discovery is not performed, the court should not admit the evidence because the
hearing as to “system integrity” could not in fairness proceed, nor provide adequate
assurance of such “integrity.”
As aptly stated by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. District Judge, Southern
District of New York:93
Despite the changes in discovery practice resulting from the era of elec-
tronic record-keeping, the purpose of discovery remains unchanged. Discov-
ery continues to be the key component in the search for truth. Liberal dis-
covery is at the heart of the effective administration of justice in the United
States. To that end, counsel’s duty to both seek and provide discovery has
not changed. Judges have little tolerance for attorneys (and litigants) who do
not give serious attention to their discovery obligations. Failure to preserve,
or to collect and review relevant information, may lead to the absence of
critical evidence, which defeats the truth-seeking process.
Particularly so in criminal proceedings, such discovery is essential to the
proper operation of the records provisions of the CEA, and therefore must be much
more than the fulfilling of an obligation by the prosecution to disclose and produce
that which the Crown prosecutor believes is relevant to the defence, and within the
Crown’s “investigative file.”94 The practice in regard to electronic discovery is
wider in civil proceedings even though the legal obligation is the same. The prac-
tice in criminal proceedings has a smaller scope because (1) it is limited to the
contents of the “investigative file”; (2) limited to the Crown’s determination of
what is relevant; and, (3) by the belief that third party claims as to the intellectual
property law protections, privileges, trade secrets, and proprietary rights justify the
Crown’s taking the position that such evidence is beyond its control. Therefore be-
yond its disclosure obligation, and therefore the defence can chose to pursue it by
way of an O’Conner-McNeil application.95 No party should be able to use evidence
93 Writing in the “Forward,” p. X, of, Michele C.S. Lange and Kristin M. Nimsger, Elec-
tronic Evidence and Discovery: What Every Lawyer Should Know Now (American Bar
Association Publishing, 2009). Judge Scheindlin is an advisory board member of the
Sedona Conference, and served on the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which pro-
posed the 2006 Amendments to the (U.S.) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
94 As to the disclosure and discovery obligations upon the Crown in relation to the “inves-
tigative file,” see note 7 supra.
95 The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in O’Connor and McNeil are cited ibid.
Clearly the concept of “the contents of the investigative file” as defining the extent of
the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation in Canada is now well entrenched, judicially as
well as in practice. Therefore that “file,” in concept as well as in practice, will have to
be expanded to make electronic discovery effective to the defence and to the fulfill-
ment of the prosecutor’s obligations to the defence in criminal proceedings. See: Ken
Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System” (2010), 14 Canadian
Criminal Law Review 111. It is an inadequate concept because it delivers to the de-
fence at the very most, only that which is of interest to the police, leaving to the de-
fence to bring an O’Connor-McNeil application for further disclosure. Such motion is
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in regard to which adequate electronic discovery has not been made.
Nor can any argument be entertained that the courts just don’t have time for
the time-consuming complexities of electronic discovery. “Make discovery or don’t
use the evidence,” should be a key tenant of discovery, and a condition-precedent
to admissibility. Otherwise, evidence without opportunity to challenge it operates
with an unjustified presumption of reliability which, if it relates to essential issues,
can in effect reverse the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Charter of Rights
s. 11(d).96
American commentators, although disagreeing on how to adjust the admissi-
bility rules best to cope with electronic records, all agree that (1) adequate elec-
tronic discovery is critical to their use as evidence; and, (2) electronic discovery is
itself a major area of law and legal practice, and not just an adjunct procedure in the
service of litigation. That it is, but it is many times more complex, costly, time-
consuming, and important than traditional, non-electronic discovery. For example,
as a result, important amendments were made to the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) to accommodate electronic discovery of electronically stored in-
formation (ESI). They are summarized in the 2008 New York University Annual
seriously hobbled by lack of access to third party databases, and lack of knowledge of
what to ask for in prescribed detail. For example, a thorough search for relevant elec-
tronic data and records should involve many and diverse electronic locations such as:
business and home computers, laptop and desktop; FTP servers; email servers; CD’s;
hard drives; fileservers; floppy disks; remote storage; PDA’s; web servers; backup
tapes; blackberries (or competitors); digital cameras; thumbdrives; digital fax ma-
chines; and retired computers and other electronic devices. Can such a “rolled up blan-
ket request” be successful without further detail supporting claims that such sources are
likely to contain relevant evidence and information?
96 Evidence that cannot be challenged as to its accuracy and reliability will be presumed
to be correct, and therefore, as it relates to key issues in a trial, will have the effect of
reversing the burden of proof. That was one of the key points emphasized by the
Goudge Inquiry Report, being the, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in On-
tario Report, Volume 3: Policy and Recommendations, The Honourable Stephen T.
Goudge, Commissioner, September 30, 2008 (Ontario Ministry of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Queen’s Printer Ontario, 2008), online: for one year after publication at:
<www.goudgeinquiry.ca>, and thereafter: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca>
The inquiry was prompted by the work of a pediatric forensic pathologist whose in-
competent opinions and testimony resulted in wrongful convictions. See the references
to Justice Goudge’s Report, and to the contrasting approach to disclosure and discovery
in the LeSage-Code Report (the first, a response to wrongful convictions; the second, a
competing response to demands for greater efficiency), in, Ken Chasse, Electronic Dis-
covery in the Criminal Court System, (2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111.
The LeSage-Code Report by, Honourable Patrick J. LeSage, C.M. Q.C., (former Chief
Justice of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice), and Professor Michael Code, (Faculty
of Law, University of Toronto), Report of the Review of Large and Complex Criminal
Case Procedures, submitted to the Honourable Chris Bentley Attorney General of On-
tario, November 2008 (Queen’s Printer for Ontario: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General, 2008), online: <www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca>
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Survey of American Law as follows:97
Then, in 2006, amendments to the FRCP changed the Rules in six key areas:
(1) ESI became a separate category of discovery materials; (2) the FRCP
mandated early attention to e-discovery issues; (3) new rules created a sepa-
rate procedure for ESI that was “not reasonably accessible”; (4) new rules
were adopted to allow parties to assert privileges after production; (5) Rules
33, 34 and 45 were revised to apply to ESI, including the form of produc-
tion; and (6) Rule 37 set forth a “safe harbour” for ESI lost as a result of the
“routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” . . .
[e.g.], the party produced a privileged memorandum from a database that it
believed contained only non-privileged documents. . . . A common issue re-
garding the form of production is whether the producing party shall be re-
quired to produce metadata. The good faith requirement of Rule 37 means
that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an informa-
tion system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to
continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to
preserve. Because emails often contain a combination of idle chatter, party
admissions, and hearsay, parties must be precise about which parts of emails
constitute business records.
Alterations have also been made to Canadian statutory law to accommodate
electronic discovery. For example, the Sedona Canada Principles — Addressing
Electronic Discovery, for civil proceedings98 are being applied across Canada,99
97 Emily Burns, Michelle Greer Galloway, and Jeffrey Gross, “E-Discovery: One Year of
the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” (2008), 64 N.Y.U. Ann. Survey. Am.
L. 201, at 201 [2008 New York University Annual Survey of American Law].
98 The Sedona Canada Principles — Addressing Electronic Discovery, online: The
Sedona Conference, Canada, January 2008: <http://www.thesedonaconference.com/
content/miscFiles/canada_pincpls_FINAL_108.pdf> or, <http://www.thesedona con-
ference.org/dltForm?did=canada_pincpls_FINAL_108.pdf> and, online: E-Discovery
Canada website, hosted by LexUM (at the University of Montreal), online:
<http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/e-discovery>
Hereinafter “Sedona Canada Principles” because there are The Sedona Principles Ad-
dressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition (June, 2007) applicable in
the U.S., also available from the Sedona Conference website, online:
<http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf>
In addition, in July 2008, the Sedona Conference launched its “Cooperative Proclama-
tion,” described as, “a coordinated effort to promote cooperation by all parties in the
discovery process to achieve the goal of a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action’.” . . . “Only when lawyers confuse advocacy with adversarial conduct
are these twin duties in conflict” (i.e., the duties of being zealous advocates for their
clients, and a professional obligation to conduct discovery with integrity and in a dili-
gent, candid manner. See: http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_
cooperative_proclamation/proclamation.pdf
99 For example, the following recent decisions apply or cite as a recognized standard the
Sedona Canada Principles: Dykeman v. Porohowski, 2010 BCCA 36, 2010 Car-
swellBC 136, [2010] B.C.J. No. 113, 1 B.C.L.R. (5th) 246 (B.C. C.A.); Innovative
Health Group Inc. v. Calgary Health Region, 2008 ABCA 219, 2008 CarswellAlta
736, [2008] A.J. No. 615, ¶26 (Alta. C.A.); additional reasons at 2008 CarswellAlta
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and they have been incorporated by reference into the Ontario Rules of Civil Proce-
dure — Rule 29.1.03(4).100 Other authoritative guidelines have been declared in
various provinces.101
Electronic RM, discovery, and rules of evidence are now a mutually interde-
pendent whole. But for the most part, civil litigation favours discovery over the
rules of evidence, and criminal, the opposite. In fact, electronic discovery and the
rules of evidence are interdependent. They are not mutually exclusive, nor alterna-
tive tools.
All of the above indicates this very important fact for litigation lawyers, in
order to cope with both the admissibility of electronic records and related discovery
procedures and motions for production, they have to become more knowledgeable
982 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal refused 2008 CarswellAlta 1819, 2008 CarswellAlta
1820 (S.C.C.); Doucet v. Spielo Manufacturing Inc., 2007 NBCA 85, 2007 Car-
swellNB 551, 2007 CarswellNB 552, [2007] N.B.J. No. 510, ¶11 (N.B. C.A.); Saint
John (City) Employee Pension Plan v. Ferguson, 2009 NBQB 74, 2009 CarswellNB
128, [2009] N.B.J. No. 92, ¶15-16 (N.B. Q.B.); Vector Transportation Services Inc. v.
Traffic Tech Inc., 2008 CarswellOnt 1432, [2008] O.J. No. 1020, ¶19 (Ont. S.C.J.);
additional reasons at 2008 CarswellOnt 2540 (Ont. S.C.J.); Commonwealth Marketing
Group Ltd. v. Manitoba (Securities Commission), 2008 MBQB 319, 2008 Car-
swellMan 602, [2008] M.J. No. 430, ¶7 (Man. Q.B.); affirmed 2009 CarswellMan 94
(Man. C.A.); Borst v. Horizon Financial Group Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 5984, [2009]
O.J. No. 4115, ¶3 (Ont. Master), Master R. Brott; Andersen v. St. Jude Medical Inc.,
2008 CarswellOnt 6654, [2008] O.J. No. 430, ¶27 and 28 (Ont. Master), Master C.U.C.
MacLeod.
100 Rule 29.1.03(4): “In preparing the discovery plan, the parties shall consult and have
regard to the document titled ‘The Sedona Canada Principles Addressing Electronic
Discovery’ developed by and available from The Sedona Conference. O. Reg. 438/08,
s.25.” (Operative from January 1, 2010) The new rules concerning discovery plans are
published in, James J. Carthy, W.A. Derry Millar & Jeffrey G. Cowan, 2009-2010 On-
tario Annual Practice (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 576, and 893-894.
101 Ontario: Guidelines for the Discovery of Electronic Documents in Ontario (November,
2005), online: Ontario Bar Association <http://oba.org/en/pdf_newsletter/E-
DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf>
Alberta: see the, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Civil Practice Note No. 14 —
Guidelines for the Use of Technology in Any Civil Litigation Matter, May 30, 2007;
and the Alberta Generic Protocol Document, online:
<http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/civil/pn14technology.pdf>
and: <http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/civil/pn14-protocol.pdf>
They are reproduced in, Todd J. Burke et al., E-Discovery In Canada (LexisNexis Can-
ada Inc., 2008), Appendices 7 and 8, pp.231–270.
British Columbia: see the, British Columbia Supreme Court Practice Direction re Elec-
tronic Evidence, July 1, 2006, and the, British Columbia Generic Protocol Document,
reproduced in, Todd J. Burke et al., E-Discovery In Canada (LexisNexis Canada Inc.,
2008), Appendices 5 and 6, pp.193–230.
All of the above need compliance with the National Standards of Canada for electronic
records management to work properly; see: notes 36, 40, 46, and 50 supra and accom-
panying text.
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about RM principles and practices. Under the heading, “Unique Challenges of
Electronic Discovery,” an American attorney tells why lawyers have to become
more knowledgeable about electronic information systems:102
E-discovery presents a new series of challenges which require attorneys to
understand their clients’ and adversaries’ information systems. There is a
wide variety of types of digital data which has to be considered in e-discov-
ery, such as: e-mails, data compilations, drafts, electronically created and
stored documents, pictures, audio files, voicemails, Internet use records, and
much more. This wide variety of electronic data resides on networks, com-
puters and portable devices, often with multiple copies in different loca-
tions. Servers and network appliances often contain substantial information
about how the network has been used, such as: access to systems (log-
ons/logoffs), access to programs/files, use of printers, faxes, etc., e-mail use
and Internet use. Data is also frequently copied to backup media like backup
tapes and mirror servers. This list is likely to continue to grow with ad-
vances in technology.
The E-Discovery Process Includes the Following Steps; 1. Preservation; 2.
Collection; 3. Processing (including filtering, dedulication, maintaining rela-
tionships between records, etc.); 4. Reviewing; 5 Producing. Service provid-
ers can perform these steps or assist attorneys in performing them. It is, of
course, necessary for attorneys to participate in reviewing for relevancy and
privilege. Service providers utilize powerful search tools, like conceptual
searching, and provide hosting for large volumes of data which can be
viewed and processed over the Internet.
Note that the articles cited herein show (1) not only an understanding of the
close relationship between knowledge of RM principles and practices and the new
laws and analytical approaches to electronic discovery and the admissibility of evi-
dence; but also therefore, (2) an understanding of the interdependent relationship
between the FRE and the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for electronic dis-
covery. Changes to either will cause changes to the other, in both content or inter-
pretation. Canadian lawyers have some catching-up to do. Criminal lawyers have a
long way to go.103
102 David G. Ries, “Records Management: Current Issues in Retention, Destruction, and
E-Discovery,” (2007), 78 PA Bar Assn. Quarterly 139. David G. Ries is a partner in the
Pittsburgh office of Thorp Reed & Armstrong, LLP. This article explains why Ameri-
can attorneys have to become more knowledgeable about records management princi-
ples and practices. And it describes the electronic discovery process.
103 On this topic of the absence of electronic discovery procedures in Canadian criminal
law, and of an understanding of them and of the need for them, see: Ken Chasse, “Elec-
tronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law
Review 111. Obligations regarding the safekeeping of electronic records and other
records when litigation is pending is itself a complicated RM subject involving the
identification, preservation, collection, review (for relevance, and privilege, privacy,
and confidentiality), and production of relevant records. A “litigation hold” program
should be designed and documented within the records policy and procedures manual
before litigation is contemplated and discovery request letters are received. This fol-
lows from the acceptance by Canadian courts of this key “discovery” proposition:
“once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine retention-
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That critical interdependence of evidence and discovery (i.e., disclosure, pro-
duction, and discovery), which is standard procedure in civil proceedings, is lack-
ing in criminal proceedings in Canada. Defence and Crown counsel should operate
according to these principles:
1. Prosecution is defence; defence is offence, i.e., the Crown prosecutor’s
strategy in a criminal trial is to protect its case. Defence strategy is most
often to attack the Crown’s case.
2. Discovery and admissible evidence are interdependently linked. The
complexities of electronically stored information make the defence in-
creasingly dependent upon the Crown for defence evidence and strategies
of defence. (Such dependence is aggravated by the limitations of Legal
Aid.)
3. The credibility of electronically-produced evidence is the same as the
credibility of a witness — it is of one whole piece. But the defence asks
only for copies of the records to be adduced by the Crown. Defence
counsel should also be asking for disclosure of the Crown’s method of
proving, “the integrity of the electronic documents system by or in which
the electronic document was recorded or stored.” Those words in s.
31.2(1)(a) CEA mean that the admissibility of an electronic document is
dependent upon proof of the “integrity” (credibility) of the whole elec-
tronic documents system, not just that part that produced, stored, or oth-
erwise “touched or concerned” the record.
4. The Crown’s current practice in regard to discovery is determined by
that of the defence, i.e., if the defence is undemanding and satisfied with
a low standard of discovery, that will determine the Crown’s practice. In
addition, the Crown’s practice should be shaped by its obligations to the
accused, to ensuring that innocent accused persons are not convicted, and
that those convicted are convicted properly and in good conscience.
destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of rele-
vant documents.” Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18771 (Zubulake IV), being a case much cited in Can-
ada, and recently updated in, The Pension Committee of the University of Montreal
Pension Plan, et al. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, et al., 2010 WL 184312
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2010) (U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York) concern-
ing the “sanctions” appropriate for gross negligence in the performance of electronic
discovery. And, Sedona Canada Principle 3: “As soon as litigation is reasonably antici-
pated, parties must consider their obligation to take reasonable and good faith steps to
preserve potentially relevant electronically stored information.” Note also that organi-
zations should also have a similar “tax hold” procedure that operates when notified of a
government tax “assessment.” In addition, good RM procedure will require that there
be a “document hold” that is long enough to provide for: (1) quality control inspection;
(2) business unit processing; and, (3) audit requirements. Typically, this “document
hold” period may vary from two to six months, based upon the business unit processing
cycle and the system “secured storage” and audit functions. These points can be used in
cross-examination, and as reasons for not accepting superficial, uninformed excuses for
failure to make adequate discovery.
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Crown counsel should guard against being “wilfully blind” to the nature
and quality of the record systems that produce relevant evidence, i.e., not
be content with what the police give and say about their sources.
5. Therefore, the O’Connor-McNeil application is an inadequate proce-
dure for the needs of discovery for the defence, and an inadequate answer
by the Crown to defence requests for discovery.104
This critical interdependence of evidence and discovery in criminal proceed-
ings has been dealt with in more detail elsewhere, along with their relationship to
electronic RM.105
VIII. CHARTER RIGHTS AND ADMISSIBILITY
Admissibility requires decisions on the authenticity of electronic records and
the “reliability” of the systems they come from. Software and its electronic devices
are perfected only to the point of marketability, not infallibility. Court decisions
based upon the evidence produced by electronic devices, if not subjected to a suffi-
ciently high and thorough “threshold of admissibility,” in effect allow those devices
to displace laws establishing the respective burdens and onuses of proof of civil and
criminal liability, with the standards of success in the marketplace. For criminal
proceedings, that fact violates constitutional rights as to, “fundamental justice,”
“full answer and defence,” “fair trial,” “an independent and impartial tribunal,”
and, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”106 And they similarly displace constitu-
104 See: R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, 2009 CarswellOnt 116, 2009 CarswellOnt 117, [2009]
S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.) [McNeil] at para.42; R. v. Shearing, 2002
SCC 58, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, 165 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 2 C.R. (6th) 213 (S.C.C.)
[Shearing]; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 28 C.R. (5th) 207,
180 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [Mills]; R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CarswellBC 1098, 1995
CarswellBC 1151, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1
(S.C.C.) [O’Connor]; R. v. Chaplin (1994), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, 96 C.C.C. (3d) 225
(S.C.C.) [Chaplin]; R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CarswellAlta 559, 1991 CarswellAlta 192,
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [Stinchcombe]; R.
v. Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38, 2009 CarswellAlta 1110, 2009 CarswellAlta 1111, [2009]
S.C.J. No. 38 (S.C.C.) [Bjelland].
105 See: Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010), 14
Canadian Criminal Law Review 111.
106 The right, “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,” is guaranteed by s. 11(d) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to, “any person charged with an of-
fence.” Rights as to, “an opportunity to make full answer and defence” and to “funda-
mental justice” are entrenched within Charter s. 7 (“Everyone has the right to life, lib-
erty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”). Rights as to “fair trial” and
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” are entrenched within Charter s. 11(d). The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Can-
ada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, as amended, proclaimed
in force April 17, 1982 ((hereinafter, “the Charter” or, “Charter of Rights”). Its drafting
drew heavily from the experience of the American Bill of Rights (the first ten Amend-
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tional rights in civil proceedings where “state action” is involved.107
Therefore, such constitutional rights are very much dependent upon the evi-
dentiary rules that determine the admissibility and “weight” of evidence produced
by electronic technology, particularly most frequently electronic records. If those
rules are sufficient to guarantee the availability of such constitutional rights, then
the standards of the marketplace will not be able to displace the operation of laws
establishing the burdens and onuses of proof of civil and criminal liability.
As argued above, the “usual and ordinary course of business” test of the busi-
ness record provisions is an inadequate guarantee of accurate records for eviden-
tiary purposes.108 Those business records are almost always produced by and
stored in electronic RM systems that depend upon uncertified electronic equipment
and software. Therefore, the “usual and ordinary course of business” test needs to
be supplemented by, and more appropriately, “led by” (1) the “systems integrity
test” of the electronic records provisions; and, (2) the “circumstances of the mak-
ing” test (an exclusionary rule of the s. 30(6) CEA type, as argued above).
But what effect does the new “principled approach to the rule against hearsay
evidence” (i.e., a new hearsay rule exception) have upon (1) the existing, traditional
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the exception at common law for business
records “made in the routine of business”109; and, (2) statutory exceptions, such as
ments of the U.S. Constitution). But its interpretation has taken the law significantly
elsewhere, mainly because of differences in legal history and tradition, and political
culture.
107 The Charter of Rights, ibid., applies only to the actions of the state (“state action”),
particularly those of agents of the state such as police officers, hospitals, universities,
and Legal Aid agencies.
108 The electronic record systems of even very good private and public sector organiza-
tions may have many defects of quantity and quality and nonetheless be sufficiently
successful in the marketplace, the stock market, and in the world of public (political
and parliamentary) accountability. But that success cannot displace or compensate for
the fact that such defects undermine the credibility of any particular record adduced as
evidence. See the list of defects above in section 4, “The Common Defects of RM
Systems Affect Admissibility and ‘Weight’.” “Macro success” in business or other en-
terprise, does not require “micro integrity.” But such success should not dictate the
content of “system integrity,” nor the burden of proof.
109 For an analysis of this common law hearsay rule exception, see: (1) Ken Chasse, “Elec-
tronic Records As Documentary Evidence,” (2007) 6 Canadian Journal of Law and
Technology” 141 (the exception is analyzed at several places in the article); (2) J.
Douglas Ewart, Documentary Evidence In Canada (Toronto: Carswell; 1984)., p. 53,
whereat the author provides a comparative list of the constituent elements of the com-
mon law rule, and the “Impact of Ares” [Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608, 14 D.L.R.
(3d) 4, 12 C.R.N.S. 349 (SCC)] upon each of the constituent elements of the common
law rule by way of a comparative listing of the “Traditional Rules” that made up the
common law hearsay exception before Ares (in left hand column) with the “Impact of
Ares” upon each of them (in the right hand column); (3) a useful discussion of these
points can also be found in the, Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, (Toronto: Carswell; 1982) at pp. 390–401 (being ss. 29.11 &
29.12 of the Report), and elsewhere whereat the decision in Ares v. Venner, supra, is
discussed; (4) in the context of criminal proceedings and generally in relation to the
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the business record provisions of the Evidence Acts? In R. v. Starr (S.C.C.,
2000)110 the Supreme Court of Canada held that hearsay evidence that cannot meet
the “necessity” and “reliability” tests of the “principled approach to the admissibil-
ity of hearsay evidence,” must be excluded, even though such hearsay comes
within an established exception to the hearsay rule. And conversely, it can be ad-
mitted if it satisfies those tests even though it does not come within an established
exception. The “reliability” test can be argued to require an examination of the
records system that generated the record. Although the analysis in Starr concerned
the “traditional exceptions” to the hearsay rule and not statutory exceptions such as
the business record provisions of the Evidence Acts, it can be argued that Starr is
equally applicable to statutory exceptions. Note also that the statutory business re-
cord exceptions contain a provision stating that such exception does not derogate
from the admissibility of a record under any other rule of law.111 The majority
judgement of Iacobucci J., as he then was, contains the following paragraphs
(199–201) that link the “principled approach” to the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms112: 
Why the Exceptions Must be Rationalized
[199] As I have already discussed, a fundamental concern with reliability
lies at the heart of the hearsay rule. By excluding evidence that might pro-
duce unfair verdicts, and by ensuring that litigants will generally have the
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, the hearsay rule serves as a cor-
nerstone of a fair justice system.
[200] In Khan, Smith, and subsequent cases, this Court allowed the admis-
sion of hearsay not fitting within an established exception where it was suf-
ficiently reliable and necessary to address the traditional hearsay dangers.
However, this concern for reliability and necessity should be no less present
when the hearsay is sought to be introduced under an established exception.
This is particularly true in the criminal context given the “fundamental prin-
ciple of justice, protected by the Charter, that the innocent must not be
convicted”: R. v. Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, ¶24, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 385,
143 D.L.R. (4th) 38 quoted in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, ¶71, 139
C.C.C. (3d) 321, 180 D.L.R. (4th) 1. It would compromise trial fairness, and
raise the spectre of wrongful convictions, if the Crown is allowed to intro-
Canada Evidence Act, see: E.G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Can-
ada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2009), at para. 16:15110, “Business records”;
and, (5) the “progeny of Ares” (case law produced by Ares v. Venner, supra note 2)
should also be analyzed, for it remains today the leading decision defining the common
law exception for business records in Canada.
110 R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, 2000 CarswellMan 449, 2000 CarswellMan 450, [2000]
S.C.J. No. 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 190 D.L.R. (4th) 591, [2000]
11 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.) [Starr].
111 See for example: s. 30(11) CEA; s. 35(5) OEA; s. 23(5) NSEA; (the Alberta Evidence
Act and that of Newfoundland and Labrador have no business record exception, and
thus remain dependent upon that at common law, as defined in, Ares v. Venner (S.C.C.,
1970), supra notes 2, 21, and 109, and accompanying text).
112 Being Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, proclaimed in force April 17, 1982.
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duce unreliable hearsay against the accused, regardless of whether it hap-
pens to fall within an existing exception.
[201] In addition to improving trial fairness, bringing the hearsay exceptions
into line with the principled approach will also improve the intellectual co-
herence of the law of hearsay. It would seem anomalous to label an ap-
proach “principled” that applies only to the admission of evidence, not its
exclusion. Rationalizing the hearsay exceptions into the principled approach
shows that the former are simply specific manifestations of general princi-
ples, rather than the isolated “pigeon-holes” referred to in U. (F.J.), supra, at
para. 20.
The “principled approach to hearsay evidence” has thus been made a constitu-
tional principle of trial fairness. Therefore it is superior to any statutory provision
such as the record and document provisions of the Evidence Acts. Therefore the
inadequacy of their “usual and ordinary course of business” test can be displaced
(or supplemented) by the “reliability and necessity” requirements of the “principled
approach to hearsay evidence.” But, being a “Charter fair trial” argument such “dis-
placement” would be applicable only in criminal proceedings, and other proceed-
ings where “state action” is connected to evidentiary issues.113 It can therefore be
used to request an examination of the reliability of a record, and therefore of the
record system it comes from, whether or not the application of s. 30 CEA results in
a finding of that record’s admissibility or inadmissibility. Thus the “principled ap-
proach” is superior to both common law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay
113 The “fair trial” provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d),
applies only to, “Any person charged with an offence.” And, the Charter applies only
to “state action,” which is not relevant in most civil proceedings. Therefore, the s. 7
“fundamental justice” and “full answer and defence” provisions would not be available
unless “state action” were involved; e.g., a children’s aid society taking custody of a
child, or medical treatment for one’s child; B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.); how to educate one’s children, R.
v. Jones, 1986 CarswellAlta 181, 1986 CarswellAlta 716, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986]
2 S.C.R. 284, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 513 (S.C.C.); a hospital failing to provide a sign language
interpreter for communications between a doctor and a hearing-impaired patient:
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1997 CarswellBC 1939, 1997 Car-
swellBC 1940, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.); timely access to
health care: Chaoulli c. Québec (Procureur général), 2005 SCC 35, 2005 CarswellQue
3276, 2005 CarswellQue 3277, [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.);
timely proceedings before a human rights commission, and administrative hearings in
general: Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, 2000
CarswellBC 1860, 2000 CarswellBC 1861, [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307
(S.C.C.); extradition of fugitives without obtaining assurances that the death penalty
would not be imposed: United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, 2001 CarswellBC 272,
2001 CarswellBC 273, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (S.C.C.); deportation
of a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture: Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, 2002 CarswellNat 7, 2002 CarswellNat 8,
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Thus clearly s. 7 applies to civil cases
as well as criminal cases. (Charter s. 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice.”)
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rule, where the Charter can be involved because “state action” is sufficiently con-
nected to issues of admissibility. If the Charter cannot be so invoked, then the
“principled approach” is nonetheless superior to the common law traditional excep-
tions, as established by the decision in Starr.114 Therefore the common law busi-
ness records exception, which requires a record “made in the routine of business,”
is subject to the “reliability and necessity” requirements of the “principled approach
to hearsay evidence.”115
However, this argument may be available only in regard to non-electronic
records because proof of “system integrity,” in compliance with the electronic re-
cord provisions of the Evidence Acts, should mean that the record intended to be
used as evidence is reliable. But what of false information fed into an otherwise
reliable electronic record system? Is the resulting record nevertheless admissible
because it comes from an electronic record system having the required “system
integrity”? Does proof of “system integrity” always require proof of the reliability
of information fed into the electronic record system”? In those cases wherein the
“principled approach to hearsay evidence” operates as a Charter of Rights princi-
ple, its “reliability” requirement would make the record inadmissible.
IX. COMPARING THE AMERICAN RULE: FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 803(6)
In contrast, the (US) Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) expressly states that the
hearsay rule does not exclude a “data compilation, in any form, . . . unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
114 Supra note 105. The Supreme Court modified its decision in Starr in, R. v. Khelawon,
[2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, holding that the factors in regard to admissi-
bility are not to be separated into “threshold and ultimate reliability” factors, but are to
be considered together. The application of the “principled approach” is exemplified for
records as admissible hearsay evidence by, R. v. Wilcox, 2001 CarswellNS 83, [2001]
N.S.J. No. 85, 152 C.C.C. (3d) 157, 192 N.S.R. (2d) 159 (N.S. C.A.), [Wilcox], at
paras. 59 to 76, and applied in, R. v. Port Chevrolet Oldsmobile Ltd., 2009 BCCA 357,
2009 CarswellBC 2132, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1621 (B.C. C.A.); R. v. Lemay, 2004 BCCA
604, 2004 CarswellBC 2823, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2494, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 497 (B.C. C.A.)
[Lemay].
115 Reasons for using the common law hearsay rule exception even though it is more oner-
ous to satisfy than the Evidence Act exceptions, are: (1) it contains no notice provision;
and, (2) it contains no prohibition as to “records made in contemplation of litigation”
(as does s. 30(10) CEA, and s. 42(4) of the B.C. Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124).
Therefore, even though a record is not admissible under s. 30 CEA or counterpart, it
might be admissible under the common law exception: R. v. Sunila, [1986] N.S.J. No.
51; (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (N.S.S.C.). The statutory and common law business
record exceptions can be used together, except in Alberta and Newfoundland and Lab-
rador; their Evidence Acts do not contain a business records exception. As to the defi-
nition of the common law exception, see the references to Ares v. Venner (S.C.C.,
1979), supra notes 2, 21, 109 and 111, and accompanying text.
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of trustworthiness.”116 McCormick on Evidence states of this provision117: 
The theory of trustworthiness supporting the regularly kept records excep-
tion assumes a reliable method of entering, processing, storing, and retriev-
ing data. Moreover, the rule excludes statements when “the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness.” Issues may arise at any of the stages of the handling of the
data regarding (1) computer hardware, (2) software or programming, and (3)
accuracy or security.
But the difference in concept upon which the Canadian electronic record pro-
visions are based, and Rule 803(6), is stated by the same author on the same
page:118
While a well-laid foundation will touch upon each of the general areas noted
above, the trend among courts has been to treat computer records like other
business records and not to require the proponent of the evidence initially to
show trustworthiness beyond the general requirements of the rule. The fact
that the organization relies upon the record in the regular course of business
may itself provide sufficient indication of reliability, absent realistic chal-
lenge, to warrant admission.
The Canadian concept does not treat electronic records as being like other bus-
iness records. Secondly, the “system integrity” test could be interpreted as requiring
in the first instance, more exact proof of trustworthiness than merely “general re-
quirements.” Rule 803(6) is a single business record provision dealing with both
traditional paper and electronic records and systems, whereas the Canadian provi-
sions deal with business records and electronic records in different provisions and
therefore paper records and electronic records in different provisions — an elec-
116 Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmit-
ted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the reg-
ular practice of that business activity to make the memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or
by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “bus-
iness” as used in this paragraph includes business, institu-
tion, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. [emphasis
added]
117 McCormick on Evidence, 6th edition (St. Paul MN: Thomson/West, 2006), at 497.
118 Ibid.
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tronic business record must satisfy both. But in both the Canadian and American
laws, the issues as to hearsay, best evidence, and authentication, are dealt with in
separate provisions.119
X. WHAT DOES THE “SYSTEM INTEGRITY TEST” OF THE
ELECTRONIC RECORDS PROVISIONS REQUIRE?120
The above analysis argues a need to interpret the electronic record provisions
of the Evidence Acts as expanded “authentication” provisions of the American va-
riety. That would provide a test of compliance with the “system integrity test.”
Then the “circumstances of the making” of the adduced record would be examined
to determine if there is any reason to exclude it as not made “in the usual and
ordinary course of business” of the business in question. The “circumstances of the
making” subsections of the Evidence Acts would provide that necessary controlling
function.121 And thus “the usual and ordinary course of business” would not be
allowed to set a “threshold of admissibility” that is far too low and undemanding of
electronic records and the systems that produce them.
There is no helpful case law, but there is one decision that can be argued as
providing guidance as to the meaning of the “system integrity test” in the electronic
record provisions of the Evidence Acts. It is 31 years old: R. v. McMullen (Ont.
C.A. 1979).122 The electronic record provisions are now 10 years old. McMullen
should have developed a line of cases that would have made the electronic record
provisions unnecessary. Instead, it has been used merely to justify the use of elec-
tronically-produced records, but not to further the analysis as to what is required to
make them admissible records.123 McMullen is a s. 29 CEA banking records case,
119 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a hearsay exception in Rule 803(6), and deal
with best evidence rule and authentication issues in Rules 1001–1004 The Canadian
business record provisions deal with all three types of issues for paper records in their
business record sections, and deal with best evidence rule and authentication issues in
their electronic record provisions. Hearsay issues for electronic records come within
the business record sections or other record exceptions to the hearsay rule.
120 See note 29 supra for the words in the Evidence Acts giving rise to the “system
integrity test.” The whole of the electronic record provisions in the Evidence Acts of
Alberta, Ontario, and Nova Scotia, and in the Canada Evidence Act are reproduced in
Appendix C, below.
121 Provisions such as s. 35(4) OEA and s. 23(4) NSEA would have to be amended to
allow such “circumstances of the making” of the record to go to admissibility as well
as to “weight” (probative value; credibility). The bias favoring admissibility so as to
leave rigorous assessment to “weight,” that arose in the pre-computer law of evidence,
is not justified in relation to electronic RM systems. The factual issues of such systems
are too complex to be left: (1) entirely to a jury as the trier of fact and to issues as to
“weight alone; and, (2) without adequate electronic discovery. Admissibility issues jus-
tify more directly the demands of electronic discovery — the burden of proof to be
satisfied mandates discovery and production of the means of satisfying it.
122 [1979] O.J. No. 4300; (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 301, 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499 at 506, 100 D.L.R.
(3d) 671 (Ont. C.A.).
123 See for example, these “McMullen” cases — they cite it but don’t develop its “McMul-
len standard” formulation for the admissibility of electronic records:
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but it is a “best evidence rule” case, which is also the basis of the electronic record
provisions. Therefore it is useful in interpreting those provisions. It defined what is
now the “system integrity test” 31 years ago with these words:124
The nature and quality of the evidence put before the Court has to reflect the
facts of the complete record keeping process — in the case of computer
records, the procedures and processes relating to the input of entries, storage
of information, and its retrieval and presentation: see Transport Indemnity
Co. v. Seib (1965), 132 N.W. 2d 871; King v. State ex rel. Murdock
Acceptance Corp. (1969), 222 So. 2d 393, and ‘Note, Evidentiary Problems
and Computer Records’, 5 Rut. J. Comp. L. 342 (1976), p. 355, et seq. If
such evidence be beyond the ken of the manager, accountant or the officer
responsible for the records (R. v. McGrayne (March 14, 1979) (Ontario
Court of Appeal) [since reported 46 C.C.C. (2d) 63]) then a failure to com-
ply with s. 29(2) must result and the print-out evidence would be
inadmissible.125
The first sentence of this passage lays down a “systems test,” as do the elec-
tronic record provisions, and it does so in words very similar to those used in those
provisions. This “McMullen standard” is therefore a true forerunner of the “systems
integrity test.”
As to the necessary foundation evidence for the admissibility of electronic
records, compare this “McMullen standard” with the “Vinhnee/Imwinkelried foun-
dation” that American courts and commentators are now favouring, which requires
proof of these 11 points:126
(1) the business uses a computer.
(2) the computer is reliable.
R. v. Cordell, [1982] A.J. No. 854 (Alta. C.A.);
R. v. Agyei, [2007] O.J. No. 391 (Ont. C.J.);
R. v. D.L.M., [1999] A.J. 1326, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 213 (Alta. Q.B.);
R. v. Daley, [2007] N.B.J. No. 443 (N.B. Provl. Ct.);
R. v. Lemay, [2004] B.C.J. 2494, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 497 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Marini, [2006] O.J. No. 4057 (Ont. S.C.J.);
R. v. Rideout, [2003] N.B.J. No. 217 (N.B. Provl. Ct.);
R. v. Tempest, [2002] O.J. No. 2467 (Ont. S.C.J.);
R. v. Tewolde, [2007] O.J. No. 4568 (Ont. C.J.).
124 Supra note 122, infra note 125; and, page 506, 47 C.C.C. (2d) 499.
125 The decision in Bell and Bruce further refined the use of McMullen, but it does
not alter the meaning and importance of this passage — “the McMullen standard”
as to the admissibility of electronically-produced business records: R. v. Bell and
Bruce, [1982] O.J. No. 3116; (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 164, 65 C.C.C. (2d) 377 (Ont.
C.A.); affirmed [1985] S.C.J. No. 65, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287, 55 O.R. (2d) 287n.
For an analysis of this usage of McMullen see, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records
as Documentary Evidence,” (2007) 6 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
141, concerning this passage, “the McMullen standard.”
126 Supra notes 67–76. This 11-point “Vinhnee/Imwinkelried foundation” test is  quoted
from para. 13 of the Cooper Offenbecher article, supra note 62.
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(3) the business has developed a procedure for inserting data into the
computer.
(4) the procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify
errors.
(5) the business keeps the computer in a good state of repair.
(6) the witness had the computer readout certain data.
(7) the witness used the proper procedures to obtain the readout.
(8) the computer was in working order at the time the witness obtained
the readout.
(9) the witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout.
(10) the witness explains how he or she recognizes the readout.
(11) if the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the witness ex-
plains the meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of fact.
This list is superficial and therefore inadequate for its professed purpose. It’s a
“lawyer’s list” that identifies the complexities of an electronic records system as
being those of “a computer.” Such lists should reflect a combination of records
management and legal expertise. It is obviously less demanding than either the
“McMullen standard,” or the nine points of proof specified in the National Standard
of Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005,
section 5.5:127
a) sources of data — what are the sources of the data in the record
system;
b) contemporaneous recording — the electronic records are captured and
recorded contemporaneously with, or within a reasonable time after, the
events to which they relate (but contemporaneous recording within a par-
ticular data base is not required);
c) routine business data — the data within a record is of a type regularly
supplied to the organization or created by it during its regular activities;
d) data entry — the data base capture and entry procedures are part of the
usual and ordinary course of business of the organization and are carried
out in accordance with the procedures manual;
e) industry and national standards — the organization conforms to all ap-
propriate standards for records management inputting, importing and
storing of data, and for preserving the reliability of data and of the
records management system that stores and transmits that data;
f) business reliance — the organization, when making business decisions,
relies upon the electronic records in its data bases;
g) software reliability — the software reliably processes the data;
h) recording of system changes — a record of system changes is kept;
127 See notes 36, 40, 46 and 50 supra, and accompanying text. This standard is summa-
rized in Appendix A.
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and,
i) security — security procedures are in place to protect the integrity of
the records management system; at least the following should be able to
be proved:128
1. protection against unauthorized access to data and permanent
records;
2. processing verification of data and information in records;
3. safeguarding of communications lines;
4. maintenance of backup copies of records to replace falsified,
lost and destroyed permanent or temporary records;
5. retention and disposition of electronic records in compliance
with legislated and internal retention periods and disposition
128 As to the security threat to one’s data “threatened” by access to the Internet, the follow-
ing passage is from a decision concerning “defamation on the Internet”: Barrick Gold
Corporation v. Lopehandia et al. (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 416, [2004] O.J. No. 2329 (Ont.
C.A.), per Blair J.A. (Laskin J.A. concurring):
[30] In the Internet context, these factors must be examined in the light of
what one judge has characterized as the “ubiquity, universality and utility”
of that medium. In Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick (10 December
2002), [2002] HCA 56, that same judge — Kirby J., of the High Court of
Australia — portrayed the Internet in these terms, at para. 80:
• The Internet is essentially a decentralized, self-maintained tele-
communications network. It is made up of inter-linking small
networks from all parts of the world. It is ubiquitous, borderless,
global and ambient in its nature. Hence the term “cyberspace”.
This is a word that recognizes that the interrelationships created
by the Internet exist outside conventional geographic boundaries
and comprise a single interconnected body of data, potentially
amounting to a single body of knowledge. The Internet is
[page432] accessible in virtually all places on Earth where access
can be obtained either by wire connection or by wireless (includ-
ing satellite) links. Effectively, the only constraint on access to
the Internet is possession of the means of securing connection to
a telecommunications system and possession of the basic
hardware.
[31] Thus, of the criteria mentioned above, the mode and extent of publica-
tion is particularly relevant in the Internet context, and must be considered
carefully. Communication via the Internet is instantaneous, seamless, inter-
active, blunt, borderless and far-reaching. It is also impersonal, and the
anonymous nature of such communications may itself create a greater risk
that the defamatory remarks are believed: see Vaquero Energy Ltd. v. Weir,
[2004] A.J. No. 84, 2004 ABQB 68, ¶17.
This passage and following, were quoted in, Beidas v. Picherler (2008), 294 D.L.R.
(4th) 310, [2008] O.J. No. 2135, ¶48 et seq. (Ont. SCJ, Divl. Ct.). And para. 30 was
quoted in, Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 481, [2004] O.J. No.
4029, ¶30 (Ont. C.A.).
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[disposal] requirements, and documenting such compliance and
disposition schedules; and,
6. a business continuity plan for electronic records and associ-
ated data, including off-site copies of essential files, operating
and application software [a “disaster recovery” factor].
And, [paraphrasing the next two paragraphs] the use of an electronic record
should not violate any legal principles prohibiting the disclosure of privileged or
confidential data or information; for example, the principles of the privacy laws.
This may be considered a tenth requirement (i.e., insert as “j” above).
These factors should be able to be proved by a single supervising officer, such
as the chief records officer of the organization who is accountable for the records
systems. An additional witness may be required for software that is unique to the
system, unless the supervisor can prove its history of reliability. If not, the
programmer who wrote the software should be available to certify its reliability
until the software does have a history of reliability. Or, when opposing the admissi-
bility of such records, these factors provide a framework for one’s cross-examina-
tion. They have the added authority that comes from being within a National Stan-
dard of Canada that establishes the basic principles and practices of electronic
RM.129
At present, that is substantial authority because the case law (other than the
“McMullen standard”130) is unhelpful as to defining the necessary foundation evi-
dence for admissibility under the electronic record provisions. And the subjective
nature of the “usual and ordinary course of business” test in the business record
provisions means that that test varies with each case and business that adduces
records.
The above lists of factors for admissibility can also serve as the foundation for
disclosure applications, because the requirements of admissibility should produce
the documents with which to test, and if necessary, challenge that admissibility.
The above tests are to be used in satisfaction of three phrases within the Evi-
dence Act admissibility requirements for business records:
(1) “the integrity of the electronic records system,”
(2) “the usual and ordinary course of business;” (or, for the business re-
cord hearsay rule exception at common law, “in the routine of business”)
and,
129 It follows that records management policy and procedure should be written to satisfy
these factors at any point in the life of a records system, and not only when evidence is
needed for legal proceedings or to satisfy any other formal examination or demand in
regard to the organization’s records and RM system. System corrections made in con-
templation of litigation or other formal examination or demand, will undermine the
credibility of the records adduced, and of the “systems integrity” sought to be verified
and demonstrated. Thus, there are several justifications for the “prime directive” of the
national standard, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence, supra notes 36, 40,
46, and 50: “an organization shall always be prepared to produce its records as evi-
dence” (at clause 5.4.3 c, p.17 of the standard).
130 Supra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.
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(3) “the circumstances of the making of the record.”
The first phrase is found in the “electronic record” provisions of the Evidence
Acts.131 The second and third are found in the “business record” provisions.132 All
three must be satisfied for records that are (1) recorded or stored in an electronic
records system; and, (2) business records.133 For records that are “relied upon
printouts” within the meaning of s. 31.2(2) CEA, s. 34.1(6) OEA, s. 41.4(3) AEA,
and s. 23D(2) NSEA, they too will have to satisfy the business record provisions of
the Evidence Acts. One might think of these special subsections as providing a
fourth key legal phrase.134
XI. THE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATION OF THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE TO ELECTRONIC RM
Six interacting levels of legal and technical evolution in RM perpetuate a cor-
responding evolution in its rules of evidence.
(a) Evolution of Evidence for Admissibility and “Weight”
Whenever a new technology provides a new type of evidence, or a new proce-
dure for evaluating evidence, there is an initial period of establishing its credibility
by expert testimony — a period of establishing the persuasiveness of “novel sci-
ence.” A technician need also be a witness if the expert does not also testify to its
application in each case as well as to the validity of the new procedures. Second,
then follows a period of accepting such evidence by way of a technician who ap-
plies it and testifies in each case about the results obtained, without the need for an
expert witness. By this stage, an understanding of the technology has become com-
131 For example, s. 31.2 CEA, s. 34.1(5), (5.1) OEA, s. 41.4 AEA, and s. 23D(1) NSEA, or
in the Electronic Evidence Acts of Prince Edward Island and Yukon: Electronic Evi-
dence Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-4.3, s. 4(1); Electronic Evidence Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c.
67, s. 4(1).
132 Section 30 CEA, s. 35 OEA, s. 23 N.S.E.A. Note that “business” includes all types of
commercial and institutional activity including that of governments. The AEA does not
have a business record provision, making more frequent in Alberta courts the use of the
business record hearsay rule exception at common law; (see the references to Ares v.
Venner (S.C.C., 1970), supra, notes 2, 21, 109, 109, and 111, and to the common law
supra notes 2, 3,23, 93, 111, 113, and 117). But the latter can be used along with an
Evidence Act business record exception in any jurisdiction where the common law ap-
plies. It doesn’t have a “notice” requirement as do s. 30(7) CEA and s. 35(3) OEA, nor
any “in contemplation of litigation” limitation.
133 For Quebec, instead of these legal phrases being within an Evidence Act, comparable
provisions can be found in the Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q., 1991, c. 64, Articles 2803
to 2874, and in, An Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology,
R.S.Q., 2001, c. C-1.1.
134 For analyses of the “relied upon printout provisions,” see: Ken Chasse, “Electronic
Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010) 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review
111 at 150–153; and, Ken Chasse, “Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence,”
(2007) 6 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 141 at 152.
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mon and accepted. Expert testimony is no longer needed to explain, for example,
the difference between electronic records management concepts and paper record
concepts. Third is the certificate period: a technician sends the results to court by
signed certificate. For example, the accused person receives a copy of the certifi-
cate containing the breathalyzer readings when the results are obtained and the cer-
tificate is signed by the breathalyzer officer. But because of doubts and disturbing
results, a less trusting fourth period of greater sophistication may intervene, which
increases the necessary time for determining admissibility. The above lists of tests
mean that the admissibility of electronic records is not purely the product of science
and technology. They are not inherently reliable.135 Nor should courts view elec-
tronically produced and stored records as not raising hearsay issues because such
statements are not the utterances of humans but of machines and devices. Humans
do everything to set electronic devices in motion, including making decisions as to
what information will be fed into them, their software and hardware, and their oper-
ation and maintenance. Therefore they are no more inherently reliable than humans
wish to make them and as reliable as humans make themselves in various situa-
tions. Computers are manufactured, tested, and approved only to the point that they
are sufficiently reliable to be successful in the marketplace. Beyond that is the area
of further profit which is not to be wasted on unmarketable improvements or im-
provements of only marginal profitability. Electronic records produce hearsay
issues.
Therefore the procedures by which the products of science are employed in
legal proceedings are constantly changing. As each new technology gains a “track
record” of reliability and understanding, admissibility becomes almost routine, then
uncontested to save time and costs. Applying it to produce and examine evidence
becomes more efficient. Then its presentment as evidence moves from scientists
who testify to the validity of its principles, to technicians who apply it, to signed
certificates and affidavits without witnesses. In the 1960s, breathalyzer readings
were testified to by a police “breathalyzer officer” in every case. Criminal Code
based certificates came later. Before that, experts had to testify to the validity of the
science and mechanisms of breathalyzer machines. Today, no one can meaning-
fully challenge the principle that no two people have the same fingerprints. But 100
years ago it had to be testified to by a qualified expert in every case. Now we can
come no closer to attacking the foundation principles than arguing over how many
“points of congruency” are sufficient for a fingerprint identification, or arguing that
proper procedures were not used in a particular case. (DNA evidence was at stage
one, and now perhaps rushed too soon to “stage three certificate evidence.”) There-
fore, courts are never justified in refusing to apply new technology because it takes
too much court time to accommodate it. That “time” is constantly evolving. And,
courts and evidence must reflect and accommodate the working world that pro-
duces them. Courts operate on evidence, therefore they cannot shut out the real
world until they have time to “catch-up.” Therefore, the law of evidence must have
135 Automobiles are also the products of science, whose every automatic operation is now
dependent upon electronic devices. Yet, cars are being recalled by their manufacturers
in the millions because of serious faults in those devices.
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rules for the admissibility and use of “novel science.”136
(b) Evolution of RM Technology
The records and information produced by electronic technology today did not
exist 50 years ago, except for that put out by large institutional mainframe com-
puters. RM now includes inter alia, printouts and other renderings from computers
of all types, websites, email, text and instant messaging, data from GPS devices,
computer animations and simulations, digital photos, the several varieties of imag-
ing, and that of electronic audio and video devices. Most business records were
electronically produced before all these varieties of electronic technology existed.
Now, it is best to consider all records and information as electronically produced
and stored. What historic paper records remain with potentially useful information
are quickly being converted to electronic storage then disposed of. There will al-
ways be new RM technology going through the various stages of “legal acceptance
and accommodation.”
George L. Paul states:137
Does each case compel a proponent to prove the reliability of every system,
de novo?
No. As many cases recognize, once there is a familiarity with a particular
system or process, over time, less and less of a foundational showing is re-
quired before evidence is admitted. Do we need litigants proving how a
WORD application inserts information as metadata, as a foundation to each
and every admission of such metadata? No. But of course, the opponent of
the evidence is free to litigate the reliability of the process in question in
every case, and to argue the weight of the evidence.
Accordingly, courts should have a broad and powerful discretion about how
much to require in each case as a matter of a foundational showing. If a
piece of computer-generated information is duplicative, and merely adds to
what is already a substantial weight of evidence, and comes from a com-
monly trusted system, perhaps less of a showing is necessary than when it is
practically the only evidence in the case, as occurred with Vinhnee.138
Further, if the computer-generated information comes from a custom de-
signed, custom-implemented, sparsely distributed or marketed application,
136 R. c. J. (J.-L.), 2000 CarswellQue 2310, 2000 CarswellQue 2311, 2000 SCC 51, [2000]
S.C.J. No. 52, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600 (S.C.C.). As to the safeguards applicable to the use
of expert evidence, see: R. v. Mohan, 1994 CarswellOnt 1155, 1994 CarswellOnt 66,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 36, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (S.C.C.). Those safeguards were most recently
reiterated and applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in, R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624,
2009 CarswellOnt 5008, [2009] O.J. No. 3534, ¶71 to 96 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal
refused 2010 CarswellOnt 4827, 2010 CarswellOnt 4828 (S.C.C.), under the heading,
“The Applicable Principles and a Suggested Approach to Admissibility;” and, R. v. G.
(P.), 2009 ONCA 32, 2009 CarswellOnt 123, [2009] O.J. No. 121, 242 C.C.C. (3d)
558, ¶16 to 18 (Ont. C.A.). And in the Goudge Inquiry Report, supra note 96, at Vol-
ume 3, p. 488, there is a list of 14 factors for determining the admissibility of “novel
scientific evidence.”
137 George L. Paul, supra note 13 at 145-46.
138 In re Vee Vinhnee supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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or a new application, then a different approach is appropriate than if, for
example, a common e-mail system, operating in a common configuration is
examined. Courts, in their opinions, generally skip over this important as-
pect. In some instances, a computer program may only have been written for
one or two users. In other instances, many tens of millions of users might
use a program daily, and are presumably reporting to publishers about any
problems. The foundational determination should take this into account.
This is close to “system discovery,” i.e., producing information and documen-
tation as to an electronic records system’s state of “system integrity compliance.” It
is justified by (1) proof of “system integrity” is the test of admissibility; and (2) by
the fact that an electronic record is dependent for its integrity and authenticity on its
electronic records system. Respectively, it is justified in law and fact.139
(c) A Certification Process for “System Integrity”
A “system integrity” test thoroughly applied to both admissibility and disclo-
sure (discovery of documents) would be considerably facilitated by an expert certi-
fication of compliance procedure. Specialists in records management, as indepen-
139 The failure to make such disclosure of “systems documentation” was successfully ar-
gued as a breach of the right to liberty under Charter s. 7 by reason of the absence of
“procedural fairness” in relation to a prison transfer from light to medium security in,
May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84. The Court held
(at para. 117) that not only were the factors used in making the transfer decision to be
disclosed, but also, “how those values were assigned to them [and] how those values
factored into the generation of the final score.” That would require disclosure of how
the evaluating “SRS” (Security Reclassification Scale) software worked. The appellant
was ordered to be transferred back to a minimum security institution. The judgment of
LeBel and Fish JJ. for the majority states (at paras. 118–120):
118 How can there be a meaningful response to a reclassification decision
without information explaining how the security rating is determined? As a
matter of logic and common sense, the scoring tabulation and methodology
associated with the SRS classification score should have been made availa-
ble. The importance of making that information available stems from the
fact that inmates may [page858] want to rebut the evidence relied upon for
the calculation of the SRS score and security classification. This informa-
tion may be critical in circumstances where a security classification depends
on the weight attributed to one specific factor.
119 Hence, given the importance of the information contained in the scoring
matrix, the presumptive validity of the score and its potential effect on the
determination of security classification, it should have been disclosed. The
respondents had a duty to do so under s. 27(1) of the CCRA. [the Correc-
tions and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20]
120 In conclusion, the respondents failed to disclose all the relevant infor-
mation or a summary of the information used in making the transfer deci-
sions despite several requests by the appellants. The respondents concealed
crucial information. In doing so, they violated their statutory duty. The
transfer decisions were made improperly and, therefore, they are null and
void for want of jurisdiction. It follows that the appellants were unlawfully
deprived of their liberty.
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dent experts, would examine and certify compliance of electronic record systems
with the National Standards of records management. That is one of the intended
purposes of the “use of standards” provisions such as s. 31.5 CEA, s. 34.1(8) OEA,
s. 41.6 AEA, and s. 23F NSEA. Such certification of large electronic record sys-
tems is growing and will become common, then routine. The need for “legal com-
pliance” grows with every new statute dependent upon good records management.
Then, it will become required records management practice. For smaller systems,
“system integrity” will be easily proved — the records manager can testify to, or by
affidavit warrant compliance with the National Standards of Canada140 (a proce-
dure not unlike an affidavit under the banking record provisions such as s. 29
CEA).141 Such affidavits are provided for in the electronic record provisions.142
Thus the application of laws that make use of electronic records, and laws depen-
dent upon good electronic RM will evolve as RM electronic technology evolves
and a common need for “system integrity” grows. There are certification processes
underlying many types of evidence now — from expert witnesses (the “qualifica-
tions” voir dire is a certification process) to breathalyzer machines,143 and the certi-
fication process imposed by s. 5 of PIPEDA144 upon private organizations to com-
ply with the National Standard of Canada, Model Code for the Protection of
Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q830-96,145 or a provincial counterpart if there
is one.146 Certification cuts down the evidence and time needed for obtaining and
determining admissibility, and limits the opposition to admissibility.147 And, it will
140 Supra notes 40 and 53 and accompanying text.
141 Because banking records are so frequently made evidence, and seldom is the bank in-
volved as a party to such proceedings, s. 29 CEA allows bank personnel to warrant by
affidavit (s. 29(2)) that the records satisfy the s. 29 requirements as to “true copies” of
the bank’s records “made in the usual and ordinary course of business,” etc. Thus bank
personnel don’t have to be attending witnesses in such proceedings. Similar provisions
exist in the provincial and territorial “banking record” provisions.
142 For example in, e.g., s. 31.6 CEA, s. 34.1(9) OEA, s. 41.7 AEA, and, s. 23G NSEA.
143 See Criminal Code s. 258, and the resulting “Approved Breath Analysis Instruments
Order” Regulations, supra note 33.
144 PIPEDA, supra notes 33, 46, and 52.
145 Supra notes 34 and 52.
146 Only three provinces have enacted laws comparable to the “Protection of Personal In-
formation” requirements of Part 1 of PIPEDA (supra notes 33, 46, and 52) British
Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec. The other provinces are required to comply until they
do enact such legislation; see the Regulation making powers in s. 26(2)(b) to so exempt
provinces.
147 The device, procedure, or standard that is used to create and certify the evidence, being
statutorily designated and approved, its appropriateness and competence cannot be at-
tacked, except by attacking the statutory approval process itself by way of a superior or
conflicting enactment, e.g., constitutional rights to “fair trial,” “fundamental justice,”
and “full answer and defence” (Charter, supra note 106, ss. 7 and 11(d)), or the “full
answer and defence” provisions of the Criminal Code itself, ss. 276(3)(a), 650(3), and
802(1)). For an analysis of these arguments see the article, Ken Chasse, “Electronic
Discovery in the Criminal Court Process,” (2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review
111.
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reduce the time needed for and complexity of discovery and the motions and other
court proceedings resulting from it.148
(d) Record Formats have Different Rules of Admissibility
Most RM systems have records in several formats, from records on paper, to
records on microfilm and in electronic format. Various divisions of an organization
could have some or all five of the following types of records — each having differ-
ent legal rules for determining its admissibility and “weight” (probative value,
credibility) as evidence:
1. original paper records;149
2. electronic records, i.e., they are created or stored electronically;150
3. microfilmed or imaged records;151
4. “relied upon printouts” of electronic records within the meaning of s.
23D(2) NSEA, s. 31.2(2) CEA, s. 34.1(6) OEA, and s. 41.4(3) AEA;152
5. records created through EDI (electronic data interchange) for which
the advantages of s. 31.5 CEA, s. 34.1(8) OEA, and s. 41.6 AEA are
148 The Canadian General Standards Board, the author and sponsoring agency of The Na-
tional Standards of Canada, supra notes 41 and 42, has been asked by those in the
records management and legal professions to create a certification process and train
records management specialists who can certify electronic records systems as being in
compliance with its national standards. The need for a certification system and compar-
isons with existing certification systems are more fully developed in the article, Ken
Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,” (2010), 14 Canadian
Criminal Law Review 111 beginning at 153.
149 Admissible as business records under s. 30 CEA, s. 35 OEA, and s. 23 NSEA, and by
way of the business record exception at common law, supra notes 78 and 80, and Ares
v. Venner (S.C.C., 1970) supra notes 2, 21, 109, 111 131, and its progeny (case law).
150 The electronic record provisions are: ss. 31.1 to 31.8 CEA; s. 34.1 OEA, ss. 41.1 to
41.8 AEA, and, ss. 23A to 23H NSEA. Electronic business records will also have to
satisfy the business record provisions, ibid.
151 Admissible under the microfilm provisions (s. 31 CEA, s. 40 AEA, s. 22 NSEA, and s.
34 OEA), or the electronic record provisions, ibid., as in the case of COM, computer
output microfilm.
152 “Relied upon printouts”: Admissible because they are, “manifestly or consistently ac-
ted on, relied upon, or used as the record of the information recorded or stored on the
printout,” i.e., admissible independent of their electronic origin and therefore of the
“system integrity” (good or bad state) of the electronic record system in which they
were originally recorded or stored. (Whether these special provisions will be given that
interpretation is yet to be seen.) Therefore compliance with the national electronic RM
standards would be inapplicable if “relied-upon printouts” are considered to be paper-
original documents and not electronically-produced records. An example of such a
printout would be a contract or other official document whose interpretation, contesta-
tion, or other use would be based entirely upon its paper form, its electronic origins
having no part in any such interpretation or dispute.
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available.153
Records managers have to be instructed accordingly if they are to give ade-
quate “foundation evidence” for admissibility.
(e) The Transition from RM as Good Business Practice to RM for
“Legal Compliance.”
Since 2000, major laws have been enacted that depend upon high quality elec-
tronic RM — being laws, without precedent in Canada, as to154 (1) electronic
records provisions in the Evidence Acts; (2) electronic commerce; (3) personal in-
formation protection and privacy; (4) electronic discovery; (5) RM National Stan-
dards of Canada; and, (6) the records and information management requirements of
government departments and agencies, e.g., those of taxing departments155 and se-
curities commissions.156 These, without more, constitute a regime of “legal compli-
ance” imposed upon on all electronic RM. It is no longer merely good business
practice to conduct RM according to recognized standards. It is a matter of law —
laws comprised of these six subjects (in addition to laws on specialized subjects).
And such “legal compliance” will include laws as to electronic signatures; the
regulation of all major industries, professions, and services; and personal identifica-
tion. Electronic technology greatly magnifies the need to use hearsay evidence in
proof of communications and transactions because it removes the need for face-to-
face communications and transactions. It greatly reduces the need for witnesses
“having direct personal knowledge” of such events by correspondingly enabling the
use of records as evidence. That in turn requires the standardization and enforce-
ment of RM principles and practices. That fact means that every new law extending
the use of electronic technology will have to extend the area of legal compliance as
to RM.
(f) Admissibility Acquires, Then Requires Canada’s National
Standards of RM
Changing forensic attitudes towards the efficacy of various developments in
science and technology and the evidence it produces determine the appropriate
rules of evidence to be applied and how to apply them. Not the converse. Those
attitudes are most quickly changed by changes in expert knowledge and expert tes-
153 Section 31.5 CEA, s. 34.1(8) OEA, s. 23F NSEA, and s. 41.6 AEA have two purposes:
(1) to put beyond doubt that standards, particularly RM standards, may be used in de-
termining the admissibility of electronic records, “under any rule of law”; and, (2) to
facilitate the use of trading partner agreements, “on how electronic records are to be
recorded or stored.” This second usage gives legal recognition to privately contracted
protocols containing rules of evidence applicable to a high volume flow of electronic
records between two individuals or institutions, e.g., EDI, as between a manufacturer
and its parts suppliers, or a government and its government-supported agencies by way
of computer-to-computer orders and agreements.
154 See also notes, 18 to 21, 29, and accompanying texts supra.
155 See for example the Canada Revenue Agency’s requirements in note 46 supra.
156 See for example the Ontario Securities Commission’s requirements in note 27 supra.
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timony. The National Standard of Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Ev-
idence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005 can be used as very effective expert knowledge
and testimony as to the requirements of electronic records and information manage-
ment.157 If used as intended, the requirements for admissibility will evolve compat-
ibly with the principles and practice of electronic RM.
I say this as much because of the case law and legislative history of laws con-
cerning the admissibility of records as evidence, as for the need for an authoritative
standard that makes RM law and practice compatible. Issues concerning such pro-
visions don’t get decided often enough nor quickly enough, and the legislative
drafting mentality still is (1) “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”; and, (2) “be vague
because black-letter, well defined and exclusive, legislated definitions as to ‘foun-
dation evidence for admissibility’ could exclude good records and records systems;
so let the judges decide what’s right for each case.” Therefore amendments don’t
happen until a court decision causes a crisis as happened when Myers v. D.P.P.
(H.L., 1965),158 caused business record hearsay exceptions to be added to Canada’s
Evidence Acts. Those provisions have been in the Evidence Acts since the late
1960s, but their major defects are still the stuff of law journal and textbook litera-
ture because they have not been remedied by amendment or case law. And the
electronic records provisions have been in the Evidence Acts since 2000, but there
are still no decisions providing analysis of their key phrases such as the “system
integrity test.” And they were enacted more than 40 years after the business record
provisions were enacted, and at least 40 years after electronic technology showed
that it would soon dominate the production of business records.159 Why? Because
that which doesn’t need to be decided, doesn’t get decided, nor fixed. Lawyers
consent to the admissibility of each other’s records (to save time and costs), so
issues don’t get raised and decided. And very few lawyers know enough about RM
principles and practices to mount effective challenges to the admissibility and
“weight” of records. Those challenges they perceive to require expensive expert
investigation, advice, and testimony that the client, Legal Aid, public defender, or
157 The other RM National Standard of Canada, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Doc-
umentary Evidence CAN/CGSB 72.11-93, supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying
text, is still the “industry standard” in regard to imaging. But its “legal sections” should
not be relied upon because they were written before the electronic record provisions of
the Evidence Acts were enacted.
158 Supra note 2.
159 Supra note 79. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, John Turner,
told the House of Commons on January 20, 1969, (Hansard, Commons Debates, p.
4496), “It is therefore apparent that the law in this country has fallen far behind the
major changes which the computer age has brought to business methods.” As a result, a
bias toward a “low threshold of admissibility” was confirmed on that occasion by his
statement, “I consider that, in general, the law of evidence should be moving away
from the rigid rules of admissibility toward assessment of the cogency of logically rele-
vant facts. If the facts are relevant, what is the best way to introduce those facts without
there being any unfairness to either side? Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, this bill would,
subject to certain safeguards, render business records as defined in the bill generally
admissible and would entrust the courts with the discretion of assessing the probative
value of those documents.”
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legal services clinic won’t pay for. Therefore the legislative drafting mentality ag-
gravates the shortcoming that is this absence of case law.160
But how and what to prepare for trial in regard to records as evidence? And
what to tell a RM manager asking if major electronic technology alterations to
his/her records system will affect the use of records in court, or in regard to the
“legal compliance” régime discussed above?161 Therefore, the National Standard of
Canada, Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence,162 can provide an ongoing,
updateable standard by which to develop the necessary rule of admissibility for
electronic records in a principled way.163 The records manager is to be told that
alterations “in contemplation of litigation” raise an inference as to the absence of
“system integrity”; and, (2) the “Prime Directive,” an organization shall always be
prepared to produce its records as evidence.”164 Such state of readiness is neces-
sary for (1) ascertaining efficiently and accurately what records are available to be
used as evidence or disclosed for “document discovery”; (2) making discovery and
disclosure of records; and, (3) making “RM systems” discovery, i.e., information
and documentation as to the system’s state of compliance with the “system integ-
rity” standard as measured by the National Standard, which should also be required
as foundation evidence for arguments as to admissibility.
XII. SUMMARY OF CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES, AND POINTS
MADE
1. Paper record systems are based on “records” concepts; electronic record
systems are based on “systems” concepts. The business record provisions of the
Evidence Acts, including U.S. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), were enacted
when “records” concepts were the conceptual basis of legislation in regard to the
use of records as evidence.
160 These “realities” have to be taken into account when legislating, particularly in adopt-
ing and adapting legislation from other countries.
161 See the previous section.
162 Supra notes 40 and 53.
163 The section in the electronic records provisions that refers to the use of standards
doesn’t cite the standard, but its express linking of such standards as an aid in deciding
issues of admissibility provides the necessary involvement of the law with in RM. It
allows a flexible, adaptable test of admissibility to be authoritatively supplemented so
that there is sufficient certainty for: (1) preparation for trial; (2) conducting an exami-
nation-in-chief and cross-examination; and, (3) for advising RM technicians and man-
agers responsible for large and small electronic records systems (see: s. 31.5 CEA; s.
23F NSEA; s. 34.1(8) OEA; and, s. 41.6 AEA). In addition, the Canada Revenue
Agency has added references to the standard in its Information Circulars concerning
records requirements for taxpayer records (supra note 46). Now, many large private
and public sector institutions are having their electronic records systems and “systems
alterations” expertly evaluated as to compliance with this National Standard of Canada.
For a discussion of these issues concerning the interdependence of RM law and RM
practice, see: Ken Chasse, “Electronic Discovery in the Criminal Court System,”
(2010), 14 Canadian Criminal Law Review 111 at 123–157.
164 Supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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2. “Records” concepts judge a record by its own history, as do the business
record provisions; “systems” concepts judge a record by the electronic records sys-
tem in which it is recorded or stored.
3. The business record provisions contain a “business activity” wording for
their rule of admissibility. Therefore they are “subjective” in that the creation and
use of records within the usual business activity of the organization from which the
records come is the requirement for admissibility. In contrast, the electronic record
provisions are “objective” in that proof of the “system integrity” of the electronic
records system from which the records come is the requirement for admissibility
under their unique version of the best evidence rule. The business record provisions
deal with hearsay issues; the electronic record provisions deal with best evidence
rule issues. An electronic business record must satisfy both sets of provisions if
both a hearsay and a best evidence rule issue are raised.
4. All provinces, territories, and the federal jurisdiction in Canada have en-
acted electronic record provisions except the two provinces of British Columbia
and Newfoundland and Labrador.
5. The B.C. Evidence Act contains a business record provision but not an elec-
tronic record provision. Therefore both hearsay and best evidence rule issues in
regard to an electronic business record would be dealt with under that provision.
6. The Evidence Act in Newfoundland and Labrador contains neither a busi-
ness record nor an electronic record provision. Therefore both hearsay and best
evidence rule issues would be dealt with under the common law rules.
7. The authentication rule in Canada in regard to records states simply: “The
person seeking to introduce an electronic record has the burden of proving its au-
thenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic record is
what the person claims it to be.” The American authentication rule is broader in
that it requires proof that the record contains authentic evidence of what it purports
to prove. It thus provides an initial assessment of the reliability of the record.
Therefore, it appears to deal, in a preliminary fashion, with what would be left to
the hearsay rule in Canada.
8. However, U.S. FRE 803(6) contains a business record hearsay exception
requiring proof that the record etc., was, “kept in the course of a regularly con-
ducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.” The Canadian busi-
ness record hearsay exception in the Evidence Acts uses comparable “business ac-
tivity” wordings such as, “made in the usual and ordinary course of business.”
9. Such admissibility rules are no longer able to provide adequate protection
against the use of unreliable records as evidence. The “business activity” admissi-
bility rule is no longer adequate because profit is no longer the only motivation
controlling records management. Their shortcomings and unanswered issues are set
out above. Therefore the “system integrity” test is necessary.
10. These business record provisions also contain wordings that direct atten-
tion to the “circumstances of the making of the record.” Section 30(6) of the Can-
ada Evidence Act may therefore be the predominant test of admissibility in s. 30 in
that if such “circumstances” are deemed inadequate, the record could be ruled inad-
missible. Therefore s. 30(6) is an exclusionary rule. The comparable words in FRE
803(6) serve the same purpose: “. . . unless the source of the information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” In con-
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trast, the comparable subsections in the other Evidence Acts in Canada are limited
in application to “weight.” If all such “circumstances of the making” provisions
applied to admissibility as well as to weight, they could be interpreted to require
proof of “system integrity” comparable to that required by the electronic record
provisions.
11. The comparable “business activity” phrase in the common law business
record exception is, “in the routine of business.” The common law rule in Canada
was revised by the Supreme Court of Canada in, Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608,
12 C.R.N.S. 349, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4, approximately one year after s. 30 was added to
the Canada Evidence Act. Similar provisions were added to the other Evidence
Acts in the late 1960s, except for the Evidence Act of Alberta and Newfoundland
and Labrador. Therefore they still use the common law rule. However, the common
law rule can be used together with a statutory provision.
12. The National Standards of Canada concerning records management can
provide the necessary detailed content of the “system integrity” test of admissibility
in the electronic record provisions. They are: Electronic Records as Documentary
Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.34-2005; and, Microfilm and Electronic Images as Docu-
mentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-93. The electronic record provisions make
such standards relevant “under any rule of law” in determining the admissibility of
an electronic record. Therefore these standards can be used when applying the “cir-
cumstances of the making of the record” provisions in the business record sections
of the Evidence Acts to electronic records.
13. Serious, common defects in electronic RM practices are referred to be-
cause the admissibility and “weight” of electronic business records should be inter-
disciplinary determinations — law and record management principles.
14. Admissibility and electronic discovery are very interdependent. Both re-
quire “RM systems discovery” and not just the disclosure and production of rele-
vant records. The integrity of electronic records is dependant upon “the integrity of
the electronic records system in which they are recorded or stored,” Therefore “sys-
tem discovery” is required in relation to both discovery and admissibility, and
thereafter for determinations of “weight” (probative value and trustworthiness).
15. Because there are now many Acts dependent upon and demanding good
records management practice and the production of records, records management is
now controlled by the principle of “legal compliance” and not just by good busi-
ness practice.
16. The different records formats have different rules of admissibility. Paper,
electronic, and microfilm records, “relied-upon printouts” and records created
through electronic data interchange (EDI), all have their own admissibility rule.
17. The best evidence rule should be abolished. Its use in the electronic record
provisions as the basis for the “system integrity” test is a contradiction of the tradi-
tional rule in several respects. If the business record provisions are to be kept
(which is not necessary), the electronic record provisions should be redrafted as
“authentication” provisions using the American concept of the authentication rule.
18. A single section for the admissibility of all business records, based upon
the “system integrity” concept, should replace the current three phrases in the busi-
ness and electronic record provisions in the Evidence Acts: (1) “the integrity of the
electronic records system”; (2) “the usual and ordinary course of business”; and, (3)
“the circumstances of the making of the record.”
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19. The electronic record provisions have brought several improvements. Par-
ticularly important are: (a) giving electronic records a legal status equal to that of
“paper original” records, thus enabling the destruction of paper records once they
have been placed into secure electronic records management environment; and (b)
expressly made relevant the use of national and international records management
standards in relation to determinations of the admissibility and “weight” of elec-
tronic records. The National Standards of Canada are particularly useful for this
purpose.
20. To facilitate admissibility and electronic discovery, an authoritative certifi-
cation process for electronic records systems as being compliant with the require-
ments of the National Standards of Canada should be established by the Canadian
General Standards Board, the sponsor of those standards.
Appendix A — Summary of RM system compliance
standards established by the National Standard of Canada,
Electronic Records as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-
72.34-2005 (“72.34”)165
The principal groupings of the principles provided by 72.34 are: [The square
bracketed references that follow each, refer to sections and paragraphs within the
national standard, 72.34.]
1. Management authorization and accountability: to test that records and
document management receives authoritative recognition from senior
management. [5.4.3] This is an essential aspect of a RM (records man-
agement) system’s “system integrity,” and “usual and ordinary course of
business,” which are requirements of the Evidence Acts.
2. Documentation: to test whether sufficiently detailed and unambiguous
documentation exists for the procedures used to manage records and doc-
uments; that this documentation is sufficiently known to all parties that
have access to modify the electronic records in any manner; and that the
guidance in this documentation is followed by all such parties at all
times.
3. Reliability: Reliability of electronic records is tested according to the
following legal rules:
Authenticity: to test whether records and documents actually
come only from the person, organization or other legal entity
asserting to be their author or authorizing authority. [5.2.2]
Integrity: the electronic records provisions of the Evidence
Acts state that where any such record is challenged as to
whether it is a reliable copy of its electronic source, such chal-
lenge is satisfied by, “evidence of the integrity of its electronic
165 Only 72.34 is summarized, because it is comprehensive of all electronic records,
including those of the other National Standard of Canada 72.11, Microfilm and
Electronic Images as Documentary Evidence. However, 72.11 is still the “industry
standard” for the RM requirements of imaging.
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records system by or in which the data was recorded or stored.”
Therefore, proof of the integrity of any particular electronic re-
cord is established by proof of the integrity of the electronic
RM system that recorded or stored it — this is the “system in-
tegrity test” of admissibility for electronic records (the accepta-
bility of records in legal proceedings). [5.2.3] To aid proof of
such “system integrity,” the electronic records provisions of the
Evidence Acts provide three presumptions that are paraphrased
in subsections of the national standard [5.2.3(a), (b), (c)].
4. The procedures manual and chief records officer: to test whether there
is a current manual covering all policies, procedures, and systems in re-
gard to all records and information management. Again, authorization,
accountability, and documentation for such a manual, and for the creation
of the position of chief records officer should be based upon a bylaw, or
order of similar authority within the organization. There can be one or
more manuals covering these functions. [5.4.2; 5.4.3]
5. Readiness to produce (the “Prime Directive”). “An organization shall
always be ready to produce its records as evidence.” [5.4.3c, at p. 17]
Measuring the readiness to produce its records by gauging the organiza-
tion’s ability to produce an human-readable or human-viewable version
of any document or record. “This dominant principle applies to all of the
organization’s business records including electronic, optical, original pa-
per source records, microfilm and other records of equivalent form and
content.” [5.4.3c; 5.4.1c]
6. The “usual and ordinary course of business,” and “system integrity”: to
test whether: (1) the electronic documents or records that are to be used
as documentary evidence have been recorded, stored, and used in the or-
ganization’s usual and ordinary course of business, i.e., within its normal,
approved practices and procedures; and, (2) the “system integrity” of the
RM system those records come from. [5.2.1b, c] These tests from the
Evidence Acts refer to the organization’s records and information man-
agement, and not simply the usual and ordinary course of business of its
chief records officer. It is what senior management has approved by by-
law (or order of comparable authority), not what its chief records officer
has invented or improvised. Such is an important factor in proof of “sys-
tem integrity.” [6.2.1; 6.2.2]
7. Retention and Disposal: to test that an appropriate retention program
has been documented and is followed. RM policy should provide guide-
lines for records storage, protection, and retention so that records remain
available and usable as required for decision-making, program-service
delivery, and accountability. Disposal should occur in accordance after
business, legal, and audit requirements have been served and the applica-
ble retention periods have expired, such disposal being formally docu-
mented. [6.8; 6.9]
8. Backup and system recovery: to test whether appropriate backup pro-
cedures are in place and maintained. [6.10]
9. Security and protection: to test whether appropriate security is in place
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and is maintained. [6.12]
10. Quality Assurance Program: to test whether a quality assurance pro-
gram is in place and is adequate, including periodic confirmation reviews
conducted by independent audit to verify compliance. [7]
11. Audit Trail: to test whether audit trails are in place and are adequate
to provide evidence of the authenticity of stored records. [8]
12. Additional tests that touch on related areas such as system manage-
ment, workflow, and version control. [8; Annexes A, and C]
There are more than 200 specific compliance tests that are applied to deter-
mine if the individual principles are being complied with. The analysts — a com-
bined team of records management and legal expertise — analyze: (1) the nature of
the business involved; (2) the uses and value of its records for its various functions;
(3) the likelihood and risk of the various types of its records being the subject of
legal proceedings, or of their being challenged by some regulating authority; and,
(4) the consequences of the unavailability of acceptable records — for example, the
consequences of its records not being accepted in legal proceedings. It follows that
the details of good electronic RM practice may differ substantially from one organ-
ization to another. And, to determine adherence to the above tests, an examination
of the RM of every department would have to be conducted. For example, a gov-
ernment auditor may require that such an independent assessment of the RM of a
government agency, board, or commission, or of a university records system be
conducted. And for business organizations as well, the consequences of failing to
comply are equally applicable and threatening to their viability.
Similarly, in regard to the older national standard, Microfilm and Electronic
Images as Documentary Evidence CAN/CGSB-72.11-93, there is a comparable se-
ries of more than 50 tests that are applied to determine the state of compliance with
its principles.
Appendix B — A List of Electronic Commerce Acts and
Electronic Record and Business Record Provisions in the
Evidence Acts in Canada
Canada (Federal)
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.
5, Parts 2 and 3,
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, ss. 31.1 to 31.8, 30.
Alberta (no business record provision)
Electronic Transactions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-5.5,
Alberta Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, ss. 41.1 to 41.8.
British Columbia (no electronic records provision)
Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10,
Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124, s. 42.
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Manitoba
The Electronic Commerce and Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. E55,
The Manitoba Evidence Act, C.C.S.M. c. E150, ss. 51.1 to 51.8, 50 49.
New Brunswick
Electronic Transactions Act, S.N.B. 2001, c. E-5.5,
Evidence Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.E-11, ss. 47.1, 47-2, 49.
Newfoundland and Labrador
Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.L. 2001, E-5.2.
Nova Scotia
Electronic Commerce Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 26,
Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 154, ss. 23A to 23G, 23.
Ontario
Electronic Commerce Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 17,
Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, s. 34.1, 35.
Prince Edward Island
Electronic Commerce Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-4.1,
Electronic Evidence Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-4.3.
Evidence Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E.11, s. 32.
Quebec
An Act to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology, R.S.Q.
2001, c. C1-1,
Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Articles. 2803 to 2874.
Saskatchewan
The Electronic Information and Documents Act 2000, s.s. 2000, c. E7.22,
The Evidence Act, S.S. 2006, c. E-11.2, ss. 54 to 59.
Yukon
Electronic Commerce Act, S.Y. 2000, c. 10,
Electronic Evidence Act, S.Y. 2000, c. 11.
Evidence Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 78, s. 49.
Evidence Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 78, s. 39.
Northwest Territories (no electronic commerce Act)
Evidence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988. c. E-8, s. 37.1, s. 47.
Nunavut
Electronic Commerce Act, S. Nu. 2004, c. 2004, c. 7,
Evidence Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nu.) 1988. c. E-8, s. 37.1.
ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC BUSINESS RECORDS   179
Appendix C — Legislation Grid — Electronic Record
Provisions — Alberta, Canada, Ontario, & Nova Scotia
Evidence Acts Incorporate the Uniform Electronic Evidence
Act
Ken Chasse, Barrister and Solicitor, Toronto, kchasse@fixy.org
Legal Alberta Canada Evidence Act Evidence Act
Issue Evidence Act Evidence Act (Ontario) (N.S.)
R.S.A. 2000, c. R.S.C. 1985, c. R.S.O. 1990, c. R.S.N.S. 1989,
A-18 C-5 E.23 c. 154
S.N.S. 2002, c.
17, s. 2.
Note: the amended by Federal Bill C-6, Ontario Bill 11,
UEEA, adding s. 33 of ss.56 & 57 Per- S.O. 1999,
being the the, Electronic sonal Information c.12, Sch. B,
source of Transactions Protection and s.7 In force,
this legis- Act, S.A. 2001, Electronic Docu- June 30, 2000,
lation is c. E-6.5 ments Act and later
below at  http://www.qp. (PIPEDA), S.C. amended by,
pp. 71-72. gov.ab.ca/docu- 2000, c.5, Part 3 S.O. 2000, c.
ments/acts/ In force May 1, 26, Sch. A. s.7




s. 33 of Elec- s. 7(2) of Billtronic Transac- s. 56 of Part 3Section of 11 added thetions Act, adds the follow-the following sec-added the fol- ing sections toamending tion to the Evi-lowing sections the Canada Evi-Act dence Act ofto the Alberta dence Act Ontario:Evidence Act
Defini- 41.1 In this 31.8 The defini- 34.1(1) In this 23A In this Sec-
tions section and tions in this sec- section, tion and Sec-
sections 41.2 to tion apply in tions 23B to
41.8, sections 31.1 to 23H,
31.6.
(a) “electronic “computer sys- — “data” (a) “data”
record” means tem” means a de- means repre- means represen-
information vice that, or a sentations, in tations, in any
that group of inter- any form, of form, of infor-
connected or re- information or mation or con-
lated devices one concepts: cepts;
or more of (“donnèes)
which,
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Legal Alberta Canada Evidence Act Evidence Act
Issue Evidence Act Evidence Act (Ontario) (N.S.)
R.S.A. 2000, c. R.S.C. 1985, c. R.S.O. 1990, c. R.S.N.S. 1989,
A-18 C-5 E.23 c. 154
S.N.S. 2002, c.
17, s. 2.
(i) is recorded (a) contains — “electronic (b) “electronic
or stored on computer record” means record” means
any medium in programs or data that is re- data that is re-
or by a com- other data; corded or corded or stored
puter system or and stored on any on any medium
other similar medium in or in or by a com-
device, and by a puter system or
(ii) can be read (b) pursuant computer sys- other similar de-
or perceived by to computer tem or other vice and that
a person or a programs, similar device, can be read or
computer sys- performs that can be perceived by a
tem or other logic and read or per- person or a
similar device, control, and ceived by a computer sys-
and includes a may perform person or a tem or other
display, any other computer sys- similar device
printout or oth- function. tem or other and includes a
er output of similar display, printout
that
information, “data” means device, and in- or other output
other than a representations of cludes a dis- of that data,
printout re- information or of play, printout other than a
ferred to in concepts, in any or other output printout referred
section 41.4(3); form. of that data, to in subsection
other 23D(2);
(b) “electronic “electronic docu- than a printout (c) “electronic
records system” ment” means referred to in records system”
includes the data that is re- subsection (6); includes the
computer sys- corded or stored (“document computer sys-
tem or other on any medium électronique”) tem or other
in or by a com-
puter system or
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Legal Alberta Canada Evidence Act Evidence Act
Issue Evidence Act Evidence Act (Ontario) (N.S.)
R.S.A. 2000, c. R.S.C. 1985, c. R.S.O. 1990, c. R.S.N.S. 1989,
A-18 C-5 E.23 c. 154
S.N.S. 2002, c.
17, s. 2.
similar device other similar de- — “electronic similar device
by or in which vice and that can records system” by or in which
information is be read or per- includes the data is recorded
recorded or ceived by a per- computer sys- or stored, and
stored, and any son or a tem or other any procedures
procedures re- computer system similar device related to the
lated to the re- or other similar by or in which recording and
cording and device. It in- data is recorded storage of elec-
storage of elec- cludes a display, or stored, and tronic records.
tronic records. printout or other any procedures












vice by or in
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Legal Alberta Canada Evidence Act Evidence Act
Issue Evidence Act Evidence Act (Ontario) (N.S.)
R.S.A. 2000, c. R.S.C. 1985, c. R.S.O. 1990, c. R.S.N.S. 1989,
A-18 C-5 E.23 c. 154
S.N.S. 2002, c.
17, s. 2.
Applica- 41.2(1) Sec- “secure electronic 34.1(2) This 23B (1) Sec-
tion and tions 41.3 to signature” means section does tions 23C to
power of 41.8 do not a secure electron- not modify any 23H do not
court modify any ic signature as common law or modify any
common law or defined in sub- statutory rule common law or
statutory rule section 31(1) of relating to the statutory rule re-
relating to the the Personal In- admissibility of lating to the ad-
admissibility of formation Protec- records, except missibility of
records, except tion and the rules relat- records, except
the rules relat- Electronic Docu- ing to authenti- the rules relat-
ing to authenti- ments Act. cation and best ing to authenti-
cation and best evidence. cation and best
evidence. evidence.
(2) A court 31.7 Sections 34.1(3) A court (2) A court may
may have re- 31.1 to 31.4 do may have re- have regard to
gard to evi- not affect any gard to evi- evidence ad-
dence adduced rule of law relat- dence adduced duced under
under sections ing to the admis- under this sec- Sections 23C to
41.3 to 41.8 in sibility of tion in applying 23H in applying
applying any evidence, except any common any common
common law or the rules relating law or statutory law or statutory
statutory rule to authentication rule relating to rule relating to
relating to the and best evi- the admissibili- the admissibility
admissibility of dence. ty of records. of records.
records. 2002, c. 17, s.
2.
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Authenti- 41.3 A person 31.1 Any person 34.1(4) The 23C The person
cation seeking to in- seeking to admit person seeking seeking to intro-
Rule Es- troduce an an electronic to introduce an duce an elec-
tablishing electronic re- document as evi- electronic re- tronic record in
“Authen- cord as evi- dence has the cord has the any legal pro-
ticity” dence has the burden of prov- burden of prov- ceeding has the
burden of prov- ing its authentici- ing its authen- burden of prov-
ing its authen- ty by evidence ticity by ing its authen-
ticity by capable of sup- evidence capa- ticity by
evidence capa- porting a finding ble of support- evidence capa-
ble of support- that the electron- ing a finding ble of support-
ing a finding ic document is that the elec- ing a finding
that the elec- that which it is tronic record is that the elec-
tronic record is purported to be. what the person tronic record is
what the person claims it to be. what the person
claims it to be. claims it to be.
Best Ev. 41.4(1) Subject 31.2 (1) The best s.34.1(5) Sub- 23D (1) In any
Rule Ap- to subsection evidence rule in ject to subsec- legal proceed-
plication, (3), where the respect of an tion (6), where ing, subject to
and the best evidence electronic docu- the best evi- subsection (2),
“relied rule is applica- ment is satisfied dence rule is where the best
upon ble in respect applicable in evidence rule is
printout” of respect of an applicable in
an electronic (a) on proof of electronic re- respect of an
record, it is sat- the integrity of cord, it is satis- electronic re-
isfied on proof the electronic fied on proof cord, the rule is
of the integrity documents sys- of the integrity satisfied on
of the electron- tem by or in of the electron- proof of the in-
ic records sys- which the elec- ic record. tegrity of the
tem. tronic document electronic
was recorded or records system
stored, or in or by which
the data was re-
corded or
stored.
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(2) The integri- (b) if an eviden- s.34.1(5.1) The (2) In any legal
ty of an elec- tiary presumption integrity of the proceeding, an
tronic record established under electronic re- electronic record
may be proved section 31.4 ap- cord may be in the form of a
by evidence of plies. proved by evi- print-out that
the integrity of dence of the in- has been
the electronic tegrity of the
records system (2) Despite sub- electronic manifestly or
by or in which section (1), in the records system consistently ac-
the information absence of evi- by or in which ted on, relied
was recorded dence to the con- the data was upon or used as
or stored, or by trary, an recorded or the record of
evidence that electronic docu- stored, or by the information
reliable encryp- ment in the form evidence that recorded or
tion techniques of a printout sat- reliable encryp- stored on the
were used to isfies the best ev- tion techniques printout is the
support the in- idence rule if the were used to record for the
tegrity of the printout has been support the in- purposes of the
electronic re- manifestly or tegrity of the best evidence
cord. consistently acted electronic re- rule.
on, relied on or cord.
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(3) An elec- s.34.1(6) An
tronic record in electronic re-
the form of a cord in the
printout that form of a
has been mani- printout that
festly or con- has been mani-
sistently acted festly or con-
on, relied on or sistently acted
used as the re- on, relied upon,
cord of the in- or used as the
formation record of the
recorded or information re-
stored on the corded or
printout is the stored on the
record for the printout, is the
purposes of the record for the
best evidence purposes of the
rule. best evidence
rule.
Presump- 41.5 For the 31.3 For the pur- s.34.1(7) In the 23E In the ab-
tion of In- purposes of poses of subsec- absence of evi- sence of evi-
tegrity section 41.4(1), tion 31.2(1), in dence to the dence to the
in the absence the absence of contrary, the contrary, the in-
of evidence to evidence to the integrity of the tegrity of the
the contrary, contrary, the in- electronic electronic
the integrity of tegrity of an records system records system
the electronic electronic docu- by or in which in which an
records system ments system by an electronic electronic record
in which an or in which an record is re- is recorded or
electronic re- electronic docu- corded or stored is pre-
cord is record- ment is recorded stored is sumed in any
ed or stored is or stored is prov- proved for the legal proceeding
proved en purposes of
subsection (5),
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(a) by evidence (a) by evidence (a) by evidence (a) by evidence
that supports a capable of sup- that supports a that supports a
finding that at porting a finding finding that at finding that at
all material that at all materi- all material all material
times the com- al times the com- times the com- times the com-
puter system or puter system or puter system or puter system or
other similar other similar de- other similar other similar de-
device was op- vice used by the device was op- vice was operat-
erating properly electronic docu- erating properly ing properly or,
or, if it was ments system or, if it was if it was not,
not, the fact of was operating not, the fact of the fact of its
its not operat- properly or, if it its not operat- not operating
ing properly was not, the fact ing properly properly did not
did not affect of its not operat- did not affect affect the integ-
the integrity of ing properly did the integrity of rity of the elec-
the electronic not affect the in- the electronic tronic record,
record, and tegrity of the record, and and there are no
there are no electronic docu- there are no other reasonable
other reasona- ment and there other reasona- grounds to
ble grounds to are no other rea- ble grounds to doubt the integ-
doubt the integ- sonable grounds doubt the integ- rity of the elec-
rity of the elec- to doubt the in- rity of the elec- tronic records
tronic records tegrity of the tronic records system;
system, electronic docu- system;.
ments system;
(b) if it is es- (b) if it is estab- b) if it is estab- (b) if it is estab-
tablished that lished that the lished that the lished that the
the electronic electronic docu- electronic re- electronic record
record was re- ment was record- cord was re- was recorded or
corded or ed or stored by a corded or stored by a par-
stored by a par- party who is ad- stored by a par- ty to the pro-
ty to the pro- verse in interest ty to the pro- ceedings who is
ceedings who to the party seek- ceedings who adverse in inter-
is adverse in ing to introduce is adverse in est to the party
interest to the it; or interest to the seeking to intro-
party seeking party seeking duce it; or
to introduce it, to introduce it;
or or
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(c) if it is es- (c) if it is estab- (c) if it is es- (c) if it is estab-
tablished that lished that the tablished that lished that the
the electronic electronic docu- the electronic electronic record
record was re- ment was record- record was re- was recorded or
corded or ed or stored in corded or stored in the
stored in the the usual and or- stored in the usual and ordi-
usual and ordi- dinary course of usual and ordi- nary course of
nary course of business by a nary course of business by a
business by a person who is business by a person who is
person who is not a party and person who is not a party to
not a party to who did not re- not a party to the proceedings
the proceedings cord or store it the proceeding and who did not
and who did under the control and who did record or store
not record or of the party seek- not record or it under the
store it under ing to introduce store it under control of the
the control of it. the control of party seeking to
the party seek- the party seek- introduce the re-
ing to introduce ing to introduce cord.
it. the record.
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Standards 41.6 For the 31.5 For the pur- s.34.1(8) For 23F For the
as evi- purpose of de- pose of determin- the purpose of purpose of de-
dence — termining under ing under any determining termining under
national, any rule of law rule of law under any rule any rule of law
interna- whether an whether an elec- of law whether whether an elec-
tional electronic re- tronic document an electronic tronic record is
(ISO), and cord is admissi- is admissible, ev- record is ad- admissible, evi-
industry ble, evidence idence may be missible, evi- dence may be
standards, may be presen- presented in re- dence may be presented in any
and proce- ted in respect spect of any stan- presented in re- legal proceeding
dures and of any stan- dard, procedure, spect of any in respect of
practices dard, proce- usage or practice standard, proce- any standard,
dure, usage or concerning the dure, usage or procedure, us-
practice on manner in which practice on age or practice
how electronic electronic docu- how electronic on how elec-
records are to ments are to be records are to tronic records
be recorded or recorded or be recorded or are to be re-
stored, having stored, having re- stored, having corded or
regard to the gard to the type regard to the stored, having
type of busi- of business, en- type of busi- regard to the
ness or endeav- terprise or en- ness or endeav- type of business
our that used, deavour that our that used, or endeavour
recorded or used, recorded or recorded or that used, re-
stored the elec- stored the elec- stored the elec- corded or stored
tronic record tronic document tronic record the electronic
and the nature and the nature and the nature record and the
and purpose of and purpose of and purpose of nature and pur-
the electronic the electronic the electronic pose of the
record. document. record. electronic re-
cord.
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Affida- 41.7 The mat- 31.6 (1) The s.34.1(9) The 23G The mat-
vits — ters referred to matters referred matters referred ters referred to
Proof in sections to in subsection to in subsec- in subsection
by — 41.4(3), 41.5 31.2(2) and sec- tions (6), (7) 23D(2) and Sec-
Cross-ex- and 41.6 may tions 31.3 and and (8) may be tions 23E and
amination be established 31.5 and in regu- established by 23F may be es-
by an affidavit lations made an affidavit tablished by an
given to the under section given to the affidavit given
best of the de- 31.4 may be es- best of the de- to the best of
ponent’s tablished by affi- ponent’s the deponent’s
knowledge or davit. knowledge and knowledge or
belief. belief. belief. 2002, c.
17, s. 2.
41.8(1) A de- (2) A party may s.34.1(10) A 23H (1) A de-
ponent of an cross-examine a deponent of an ponent of an af-
affidavit re- deponent of an affidavit re- fidavit referred
ferred to in affidavit referred ferred to in to in Section
section 41.7 to in subsection subsection (9) 23G that has
that has been (1) that has been that has been been introduced
introduced in introduced in evi- introduced in in evidence may
evidence may dence evidence may be cross-ex-
be cross-ex- be cross-ex- amined as of
amined as of amined as of right by a party
right by a party right by a party to the proceed-
to the proceed- to the proceed- ings who is ad-
ings who is ad- ing who is ad- verse in interest
verse in interest verse in interest to the party who
to the party to the party has introduced
who affidavit who has intro- the affidavit or
or caused the duced the affi- has caused the
affidavit to be davit or has affidavit to be
introduced. caused the affi- introduced.
davit to be in-
troduced.
(a) as of right, if
the deponent is
an adverse party
or is under the
control of an ad-
verse party; and
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(b) with leave of
the court, in the
case of any other
deponent.
(2) Any party s.34.1(11) Any (2) Any party to
to the proceed- party to the the proceedings
ings may, with proceeding may, with leave
leave of the may, with of the court,
court, cross-ex- leave of the cross-examine a
amine a person court, cross-ex- person referred
referred to in amine a person to in clause.
section 41.5(c). referred to in 23E(c).
clause (7)(c).
Repeal [No provision [No provision to s. 7(1) Subsec- [No provision to
(abolish) to be repealed be repealed in tions 34(3) and be repealed in
Retention in the Alberta the Canada Evi- (4) of the Evi- the Nova Scotia
periods re Evidence Act] dence Act] dence Act are Evidence Act]
microfilm- repealed.
ing
Canada — s.57 Subsection [The Evidence —
Gazette as 32(2) of the Act Act of Ontario
proof of is replaced by the contains the
official following: following pro-
documents vision:]
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32(2) All copies s.28. Copies of
of official and proclamations
other notices, ad- and of official
vertisements and and other docu-
documents pub- ments, notices
lished in the and advertise-
Canada Gazette ments printed
are admissible in in the Canada
evidence as Gazette, or in
proof, in the ab- The Ontario
sence of evidence Gazette, or in
to the contrary, the official ga-
of the originals zette of any
and of their con- province or ter-




and of the con-
tents thereof.
Appendix D
Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA)
As adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1998. The UEEA
with commentary at: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2
Sec 1: Definitions
In this Act,
(a) “Data” means representations in any form, of information or concepts;
(b) “Electronic Record” means data that is recorded or stored on any medium or
by a computer system or similar device, that can be read or perceived by a
person or a computer system or other similar device. It includes a display,
printout or other of output of that data, other than a printout referred to in Sub-
sec 4(2);
(c) “Electronic Records System” includes the computer system or other similar
device by or in which data is recorded or stored, and any procedures related to
the recording and storage of electronic records.
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Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA)
As adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1998. The UEEA
with commentary at: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2
Application and power of court
2.(1) This Act does not modify any common law or statutory rule relating to the
admissibility of records, except the rules relating to authentication and best evi-
dence.
2.(2) A court may have regard to evidence adduced under this Act in applying
any common law or statutory rule relating to the admissibility of records.
Authentication Rule — establishing “authenticity”
3. The person seeking to introduce an electronic record [in any legal proceeding]
has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a
finding that the electronic record is what the person claims it to be.
Best Evidence Rule and “relied upon printouts”
4.(1) [In any legal proceeding,] subject to Subsection 2, where the best evidence
rule is applicable to an electronic record, that rule is satisfied in respect of the
electronic record on proof of the integrity of the electronic records system in or
by which the data was recorded or stored.
4.(2) [In any legal proceeding,] An electronic record in the form of a print-out
that has been manifestly or consistently acted on, relied upon, or used as the
record of the information recorded or stored on the print-out, is the record for
the purpose of the best evidence rule.
Presumption of Integrity
5. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the electronic
records system in which an electronic record is recorded or stored is presumed
[in any legal proceeding]
(a) by evidence that supports a finding that at all material times the computer
system or other similar device was operating properly or, if it was not, the fact
of its not operating properly did not affect the integrity of the electronic record;
and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the electronic
records system;
(b) if it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored by a
party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party seeking to
introduce it; or
(c) if it is established that the electronic record was recorded or stored in the
usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the
proceedings and who did not record or store it under the control of the party
seeking to introduce the record.
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Uniform Electronic Evidence Act (UEEA)
As adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1998. The UEEA
with commentary at: http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1u2
Standards as evidence of how electronic records to be recorded or stored
6. For the purpose of determining under any rule of law whether an electronic
record is admissible, evidence may be presented [in any legal proceeding] in
respect of any standard, procedure, usage or practice on how electronic records
are to be recorded or stored, having regard to the type of business or endeavor
that used, recorded or stored the electronic record and the nature and purpose of
the electronic record.
Affidavits — proof by
7. The matters referred to in subsection 4(2) and sections 5, and 6 may be
established by an affidavit given to the best of the deponent’s knowledge or
belief.
Sec 8. Cross-Examination
Affidavits — Cross-examination on
8(1). A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 7 that has been introduced
in evidence may be cross-examined as of right by a party to the proceedings
who is adverse in interest to the party who has introduced the affidavit or has
caused the affidavit to be introduced.
8(2). Any party to the proceedings may, with leave of the court, cross-examine a
person referred to paragraph 5(c).
9. Repeal provisions which require retention of original after microfilming.
(e.g.: Remove six year rule on retaining original documents after Microfilming)
